Can data determine moral values?
A high and virtually impenetrable wall separates modern science, since its rise, and religion, morality and human values. The claim of the "naturalistic fallacy", sometimes known as the "problem of the existing and the desired" - the claim that the mere fact that something is "existing" cannot be used as evidence that this is the "desired" state - has been used for decades by those who devoutly quote it from its chief thinker, Professor David Hume and Professor J. A. Moore, as a means whose mere lip service closes the door to further scientific investigation.
We must express skepticism in the face of this division. If it is impossible to base the moral principles and values on the basis of the way things are actually conducted, that is, on reality, then what should they be based on? All moral values must ultimately be based on human nature. In my book "The Science of Good and Evil"* I built a scientific argument that moral feelings have an evolutionary basis and I showed how science can contribute to moral decisions. As a species of social primates ("supermammals") we have developed during evolution a deep sense of distinguishing between good and bad which is used by us to emphasize and reward reciprocity and cooperation and to reduce and punish excessive selfishness and parasitism. The legal systems of human societies are built on the basis of the legal systems of human nature.
A new scientific field, neuroethics, is based on this evolutionary ethics. The latest representative of this field is the one-eyed skeptic and persuasive writer Sam Harris, a neuroscience researcher who tattoos the wall of the desired and the found in his book "The Moral Landscape"**. Harris's argument is a first principle based on a great deal of experimental evidence woven into a tight and reasoned thread of thought. Harris's primary principle is safeguarding the well-being of sentient beings. From this principle it is possible to build a system of moral values, based on science, in which we determine quantitatively whether any factor increases well-being or decreases it. For example, Harris asks, is it right to force women to wear a sack and splash acid on their faces for the crime of adultery? You don't need advanced science - nor religion, as Harris sharply comments - to conclude that such "cultural values" reduce the well-being of the punished women and are therefore immoral.
These examples are the fruits that hang on the low branches of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and therefore both science and religion have no difficulty in picking the ripe ones and stating with certainty that certain actions, such as lying, adultery and theft, are a sin because they destroy the relationships of trust between human beings that depend on telling the truth, Loyalty and respect for the property. But when a political, economic and ideological charge is placed on these moral issues, hills rise in this moral landscape.
Harris' science-based moral scheme is a brave scheme that I wholeheartedly embrace. But how will we resolve contradictions in burning issues, such as taxes? Harris's moral landscape allows for the existence of peaks and valleys and more than one right or wrong answer to moral dilemmas. That is why liberals and conservatives, leftists and rightists, greens and oranges can exist side by side on separate peaks. I advocate a "live and let live" approach, but what happens when the majority who live on many peaks pass laws forcing the minority who live on other peaks to help and fund social welfare programs for everyone? It is unlikely that additional scientific data will solve the problem.
I asked Harris his opinion on this possible problem. "Live and let live is often a smart approach to minimizing human conflict," he agrees. "But it only works when the stakes are not too high or when the probable results of our behavior are unclear. To say that 'it is unlikely that additional scientific data will solve the problem' is like saying that in fact nothing will solve it: because the only alternative is to make claims without relying on facts. I agree that we find ourselves in such a situation from time to time, often in economic questions, but this does not indicate whether they have correct answers or not."
I agree. The fact that we cannot imagine how science can solve any moral issue is not evidence that the issue is unsolvable. Science is an art that deals with solvable issues, and we should use it where we can.
* The Science of Good and Evil (Times Books, 2004);
** The Moral Landscape (Free Press, 2010)
About the author
Michael Shermer is the publisher of Skeptic magazine (www.skeptic.com and his upcoming book is The Believing Mind. Follow him on Twitter: @michaelshermer
43 תגובות
Here is another interesting link that demonstrates the evolutionary roots of morality.
http://www.ted.com/talks/frans_de_waal_do_animals_have_morals.html
Amadeus:
Are you telling me not to extrapolate the meaning of the phrase "a priori" from mathematics to other fields?
The example I used is the use of colloquial language that happened to also penetrate mathematics while you want to bind me to a very specific meaning that the concept has received in certain philosophical circles.
I repeat and explain (and this is also explained in the link I brought from Wikipedia):
A priori - in the meaning I meant and although no one can understand it - Wikipedia writers understood it - it is "first - on the timeline".
In the specific case we are talking about (and I have explained this as well) the reference is to the first - on the timeline - to man's attempt to understand or even to the existence of life.
I repeat and ask: do not drag me into this stupid discussion unless you did not understand what I wanted to say.
If you understood - I achieved my goal and will leave you to struggle alone with the rules of the word police.
And regarding ethics:
How many times should it be said that there cannot be a commandment when there is no one commanding.
An injunction can only be given by someone who has the ability to enforce it.
I'm not like that and I guess you aren't either - which leaves God who doesn't even call.
Therefore - when you want to create an imperative to comply with these or other laws - you create an enforcement system.
Morality can become an imperative - only when it is realized within the framework of the laws of such a system.
That's why they really build such systems and try (some more and some less) that the laws they enforce reflect morality.
I clearly claim that our basic morality is a description of a state of affairs (by the way - just as the claim that water boils at 100 degrees is a description of a state of affairs).
When I say that moral behavior promotes human well-being - this statement includes the answer to your question "what makes it desirable".
What makes it desirable is man's desire for well-being.
And between us - what do you mean when you use the word "desired" as in a commanding word that requires someone to command - so also the word "desired" requires someone to will. Do you mean God again or do you agree with my claim that man is allowed to want?
Then you simply make a salad: "What does the fact that evolutionarily desirable empathy should increase human well-being mean?" "
I didn't say anything like that. There is almost no fact that just pointing it out by me increases or decreases the well-being of humanity and I never claimed that there is such a fact and certainly not that the specific fact you mentioned is such.
Then you write "after all, everyone behaves empathetically anyway, and cannot do otherwise because that is what evolution has determined" and this is already in clear contradiction to what I said that although everyone feels empathy, not everyone acts empathetically and that our actions are derived from the weighing of many impulses of which empathy is only one.
By the way - empathy also sometimes dictates contradictory behaviors because there is a conflict between empathy for a criminal and empathy for his victim.
In addition to that - again - this whole passage comes from a presupposition of an imperative when I'm really talking about a description.
In general - I'm quite tired of this debate because you are all along attributing things to me that I did not say - especially in an obviously incorrect description of my words in sections 1,2, 3 and XNUMX:
I did not say any of the things that appear in these sections and I did not even hint at them and it is not surprising because it is far from what I think of as the distance from east to west.
Therefore I will stop my response at this point.
It seems to me that a misunderstanding at the level expressed in your description cannot but be intentional and I don't have time to invest in an argument based on twists.
I will just conclude by saying that what I described as morality is indeed a description and that my purpose in this description is not to command anything to anyone but to allow us to continue using the word morality to describe the closest realistic thing to that concept that is binding on God and that being such allows people (who have never resisted the temptation) to present themselves as his representatives and impose on us to act wickedly towards one another.
Ruby (39):
I agree with your words and I also said from the beginning that our ability to complete the "Morality Project" is questionable.
There is a size optimization problem here that we don't know how to quantify yet.
Maybe someday we will know and maybe not.
But still - there are situations where we know - even if we can't really quantify - at least compare two values of this quantity.
In these situations we can decide and in fact - in a truly democratic country - decisions of this type are ultimately determined in the law book.
I also agree with your words in response 41, which is why I wrote that in my opinion the most succinct expression of morality is "Do not do to your friend what you hate."
This phrase includes only the restrictions imposed on you because anyone can be trusted that within these restrictions he will not forget to take care of his private happiness and well-being.
What an enforceable set of laws that derives from morality should do is to break down those restrictions to the smallest detail - as our understanding of human well-being develops.
Year:
My approach is not an approach of interpretation but an approach of offering an interpretation.
We are currently in a problematic situation:
There is a concept called morality that we are taught comes from God.
It is clear to us that this is not true, if only because of the fact that different Gods command different commandments (of course - we know this for many other reasons).
On the other hand - we know that there is something good in a large part of the collection of behaviors defined as "moral" - something for which we would like to preserve the word.
What I (and many other good people like Shermer, Dawkins, Dent and Harris) try to do - is to distill those things because of which we feel that morality is good and offer them as an interpretation of the word "morality" - because if we don't do this, the concept will remain without any meaning (since the interpretation The former is based on a meaningless external authority) - in the best case, or has an interpretation that is sometimes horrifying - in the religious case.
Another word or two to refine what I'm trying to say.
What do you think is morality at all?
Not where it comes from, not what its purpose is not what the benefit is.
but a simple and axiomatic exclusion of the concept we are talking about
About him, what is morality...
PS - If I had to define morality, I would define it
As a balance (the equilibrium point) between the good of the individual and the good of the whole (society as a whole).
Defined according to the needs of the individual for the needs of the whole. including the basic need
of existence.
So ideally morality can be defined in a utopian way
(an individual who receives all his needs/desires while the whole community receives the same things)
But it is also clear that given different details and different rules (from the wording of the rule)
Different "morals" or different balance points will be created between the individual and the whole in which there is a compromise
between each and every individual and between society as a whole.
And lest there be a dissonance that I speak in two voices - this is philosophy not science...
Good Day
Machel, (34)
You testify to yourself that you carry the revolution on our website, and therefore you absorb fire from conservatives.
The responses of Amadeus (38) and Ruby (39) differ from mine but convey similar basic approaches, and I accept them.
Zeev's response, 36 is also correct. Today we talk about cultural evolution, also in animals, and psychological and sociological evolution, but if you haven't called evolution by its name, then we talk about biological evolution. A feature of evolution, i.e. biological, that the structure is imposed on the organism. Both the structure of the hand and the structure of the brain are imposed on us.
On the other hand, the evolutions with the nicknames do not create structural splints.
When you claim in the name of evolution, neto, it is necessary that you can prove that various developments are forced upon us.
As far as social behaviors are concerned, the large variety, with many contrasts, of behaviors in the same matters excludes any possibility of proving such coercion, therefore your approach is largely speculative, an interpretation with a certain probability, nothing more.
Something is not clear to me in this discussion.
More than a new field in science is proposed here, a new field in morality seems to be proposed here
that tries to rely on scientific or pseudo-scientific methods.
I don't understand what the prediction of such a field in science is supposed to be.
The author of the article quotes:
"Harris' first principle is the preservation of the well-being of sentient beings. From this principle it is possible to build a system of moral values"
How do you define well-being exactly?
How do you quantify it?
What is awareness? And how do you prove or disprove it?
How exactly do you determine according to Harris if the system of moral values created is really moral?
Where is the empirical test?
Quantification will not work morally, after all it is clear that the welfare of 29 rapists does not stand up to the welfare of the rapist.
And it is clear that the well-being (say the freedom) of a serial killer will not stand in front of the well-being of his victims.
The very definition of morality based on well-being requires proof and is easy to disprove, in my opinion and probably in the opinion of
As a rule on this forum, regardless of religion, race and science, risking your life to save a child will probably be seen by all of you.
As a moral act, I don't know where the welfare is for the moral guy who risks his life...
I feel that the discussion here and any future discussion would be completely silly without establishing a basic language
of how good is defined, how well-being is defined and what morality is... the principle of Harris as it is
Described in the article in the first place does not pass the test of prediction (see the examples I gave) and is therefore not substantiated
On no scientific principle!
Good Day
Michael-
The fact that there is something called "a priori" in mathematics does not mean that this meaning applies to the way the word is used in philosophy, just as there is no connection between mathematical induction and induction in philosophy (which is, in fact, deduction strictly from the philosophical point of view). There is no other meaning to say "the laws of nature are a priori" than to mean that "there is no need for sensory experience to know the laws of nature". If you try to say anything else, you're talking nonsense that no one but you will understand.
Regarding ethics.
First of all, morality must have a commanding dimension, otherwise it is impossible to make a moral judgment. Moral claims such as "X behavior is immoral", are not similar to descriptive sentences such as "water boils at 100C" or "the movement of my hand caused the light to go out". And this is important because when you assert a sentence like "moral behavior is behavior that contributes to human well-being", you are not describing a mere fact, you are describing a value that you expect people to behave according to, that is, morality should motivate people to a certain behavior in order, in this case, to increase human well-being. Because if a claim like "X behavior is immoral" does not cause people to avoid X, then the sentence is not related to morality, but to a mere description of a state of affairs.
And this is where the naturalistic fallacy comes in. If the claim that "moral behavior is behavior that contributes to human well-being" is true, then the question arises as to what makes this behavior desirable. You can say that it is self-evident that everyone's well-being is desirable to him. But why should the well-being of other people be desirable to anyone? What is the thing that should motivate people to want to increase the general well-being of humanity?
If you say that it is an evolutionary instinct such as empathy, then a funny situation emerges - because on the one hand, if empathy is inherent in everyone, then why mention the fact that empathy is desirable from an evolutionary point of view should increase human well-being? After all, everyone behaves empathetically anyway, and can't do otherwise because that's what evolution has determined. On the other hand, if this is not the case (and as far as I know it isn't), and people can behave contrary to their evolutionary tendencies, then why should they care that they don't behave according to their tendencies, if they simply don't want to, and don't see any value in doing so Because this does not benefit them personally?
Moreover, your position is very vague and not very consistent.
You present two main claims**:
1. All moral behavior is behavior favored by evolution.
2. Any moral behavior is behavior that contributes to human well-being.
And the conclusion should follow from this-
3. Any behavior favored by evolution contributes to human well-being.
** Note that you must use categorical claims of "all", otherwise if evolution prefers only some of the moral behaviors, or there are behaviors that evolution prefers but are immoral, then it turns out that evolution is not relevant to morality, and it is not what defines it as morality. Likewise, it is impossible for there to be moral behaviors that are not for human well-being, or for there to be behaviors for human well-being that are immoral.
First, chances are that statements 1 and 3 are simply factually false, which is enough to overturn your entire Torah. But even if you ignore it, you first have to decide what you actually want to say. In claim 1. You define that the moral is what evolution preferred. In claim 2. You define the moral with the help of human well-being. So when you want to consider morally what you should do or choose, what criterion will you use? Do you need to check that a certain act has an evolutionary benefit, or do you need to check that there is actually a benefit to human well-being? It can't be both together. If you claim that morality is what evolution has determined, then what does it matter if it increases human well-being? But if being moral is what increases human well-being, then who cares if evolution favors it or not?
This conceptual confusion, the fallacy of what is proper and necessary, and ignoring the prescriptive dimension of ethics, make this whole approach worthless and empty when it comes to talking about actual ethical dilemmas. For example, what are the reasons that can be against or in favor of abortion? Or conscientious objection? Because it is very well and good that you want well-being for humans, but when you have several conflicting values, each of which is no less important than the other, and someone's well-being will be harmed in each case, based on which principle will you decide between one value and another? Because a vague term like "welfare" (whose welfare? How much? Why?) or "behavior determined through the process of natural selection" (perhaps you will argue that natural selection instilled in us an instinct regarding abortion or service in the territories?), will not help you decide on a moral dilemma, because simply It is impossible to conclude from them the correct moral action to be taken in the specific situation.
And one last thing, regarding your question "Who is the mitzvah?", then I answer that every person has the duty to command himself the moral commandment, by virtue of being a rational being. When a person respects the moral law and wants it for its own sake, then it is obvious that he will also subject himself to its command. An act is a moral act if and only if it is done in the name of the moral law, and not in order to benefit someone or yourself, and it is not because evolution determined it that way.
The word evolution is aerial only for the ignorant and the peoples of the lands.
You use the ethereal word evolution like the religious use the word God.
It doesn't mean or give anything.
I see that there are quite a few people here who enjoy reading mistakes.
Year:
These are not thought templates but the beginning of a revolution that you and other commenters have not yet joined because you want to leave morality in God's hands.
I have been presenting this position for a long time because it is clear that all our impulses - both the impulses for evil and the impulses for good - are the result of evolution.
A person's activity is ultimately derived from weighing the various impulses and therefore:
The fact that a person knows what is moral will not necessarily prevent him from acting immorally - because of hunger or because of greed and vice versa - the fact that he acts immorally does not mean that he does not know what is moral.
"Narrow self-interest" also developed in us during evolution.
Our evolution was ultimately different from that of bonobos.
This can be seen even through the fact that we use the Internet.
Therefore it is likely that in some points our morality will be different from theirs.
I'm not here to express an opinion on adultery, but to point out the invalidity of the argument you raised on the matter.
And so I am firm in my position that the impulses that we define as moral (usually because they correspond to the rule "Do not do unto your fellow man what is hateful to you") are the result of evolution and what deserves to be called "morality" are these impulses and the results derived from them by our ability to understand the future consequences of Our actions (there is nothing immoral in the act of dragging a large rock down the mountain, but if others may pass in its path, then the above calculation teaches us that it is immoral)
And just an example to illustrate the fact that morality is an evolutionary product:
http://scienceblogs.com/pharyngula/2009/10/dogs_can_be_good_without_god.php
Why did this article get the nickname "the voice of the skeptic", when it raises the cynicism of thought to the level of elite truth?
For example the following quote:
"Moral feelings have an evolutionary basis"... as a species of social primates ("supermammals") we developed during evolution a deep sense that differentiates between good and bad..."
If we really develop in a person a deep sense of the difference between good and bad, which apparently is not based on narrow self-interest, why do people do so much evil in the eyes of others?
And what do we think of the following quote:
Both science and religion...certainly state that certain actions, such as lying, adultery and theft are a sin..."
Adultery is a consequence of a society where the woman is the property of the man, and therefore women who are raped are executed, as is still customary in some societies. In a society where all people are equal, I don't know if there is such a society, but in nature there is, the bonobo society is like that, and in it the sexual relations are similar to those found in human society, but there is no adultery and no sin in any sexual act!
Theft - a large part of the thefts are committed by literally hungry people. To a large extent, hunger is a consequence of a social and economic structure that transfers many assets to individuals and deprives them of many. Those who see theft as a means of living a sin do not see a sin in denying many people a means of living.
Neither can lying automatically be considered a sin or a crime, since it has many functions.
Amadeus, well done, it's a pleasure to read your comments.
By the way A priori:
See the use of the word that corresponds to the use I made of it:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_priori_estimate
Yossi, Amadeus and Yair
Morality - you can say about it - is a system that consists of rules. And these laws change from time to time.
If once the ancient man felt or felt it necessary to kill an animal in order to eat it and provide himself with energy so that he could survive, then today, at least for humans there is no need to kill in order to eat.
So it is true that there are still humans left who kill other animals (including humans themselves). But this does not mean that their moral laws regarding killing are true for our world, because the majority of the human population does not kill.
Those moral laws were true then, but they are not true today.
Moral laws are laws that are subject to the a priori laws of nature itself, and change from period to period.
One example of this is:
That the moral laws that humans formulate for themselves have changed since the time of the primitive man.
Therefore, man can use science to produce moral laws that will benefit the entire population of the world (including the population of other animals).
The term a priori exists regardless of Kant and so does the English word Prior which means "before" (usually on the timeline).
I made it clear that this is what I meant and I do not intend to continue the futile debate about choice of words.
I repeat my suggestion to use the word "Sperholtz" because I was not talking about scientific realism (which is an expression that describes my approach to reality) but about what I think in relation to morality (whose laws are not given to us by the spaghetti monster).
I did not confuse the question of existence with the question of knowledge and that is why I also wrote that science examines the laws instrumentally.
According to my perception - there are laws of nature itself and we try to describe them as best we can.
The truth is that this whole discussion seems absurd and irrelevant to me.
I wanted to express my opinion on morality and I expressed it accurately and suddenly I find myself in a fruitless debate about scientific realism.
So yes - my perception of science and the world is indeed scientific realism and I explained it well.
Now can we return to the topic of discussion?
The sentences you quoted from me are nothing and vice versa.
In the first sentence I say that I do speak of morality but not one given by the spaghetti monster and in the second sentence I suggest the use of the word as I perceive it (ie - one of human and not monstrous origin) because it contributes to human well-being.
Oxymoron? Since when is the same thing and its opposite?
You continue to use the morality of the spaghetti monster, and therefore you do not see that what contributes to human well-being (according to the judgment of man, who has no one who knows better than him what causes his well-being, a judgment formed in him as a result of evolution and not as a result of dead God's words) can be called morality and that is the only way it is a term of ownership meaning.
Morality does not have to have an imperative meaning.
Food also contributes to a person's well-being and does not have a commanding meaning.
Anyone who says that something has a commanding meaning attributes the commandment to the flying spaghetti monster (since there is no one else who can command).
Michael, there is no need to invent new words, because the term "scientific realism" already exists to describe what you mean, and leave the a priori alone. And let's be precise - the term a priori was coined by Kant at the end of the 18th century, and he really did not mean what you are trying to say.
"What exactly is the meaning you give to the laws of nature and their existence in this sentence?
Don't you perceive that your entire thought on the matter is based on a contradiction?"
I'm afraid you're confusing questions of existence and questions of knowledge. One question is whether X exists or not, and another question is how we know that X exists or not. The term a priori refers only to questions of the second type. When they say that certain knowledge is a priori knowledge, they mean that there is no need for empirical experience to acquire the knowledge - they do not mean that the knowledge is only in our head and not in the external world, or something of that kind. I don't want to commit now about the laws of nature whether they really exist, or just a figment of our imagination. It is not important to the topic of the discussion. All I was trying to argue is that science must be a posteriori inquiry (meaning the opposite of a priori), otherwise one would have to adopt all sorts of strange rationalist views such as those of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, etc.
But why just argue? You are invited to check the issue yourself, what is the accepted meaning of the term "a priori" since Kant, and check what your view is called in the discourse of the philosophy of science.
Back to the subject of ethics.
How do you write two sentences like-
"I didn't write anything implying moral laws that have some imperative or absolute meaning and I made that clear. I made it very clear.
It is interesting to talk about the morality I am talking about because it is the only morality that can contribute to human well-being."
Without seeing you say anything and vice versa. In the first sentence you say you are not talking about morality, and in the second sentence you say yes. Because how can the view that says that "humans developed tendency X because it is evolutionarily profitable" contribute to human well-being, and where is the morality in this? I have already explained the matter at length and I do not want to repeat myself. Morality must have an imperative meaning, at least if you say its role is to contribute to the well-being of man. But all these evolutionary-psychological views lack this dimension, so they do not constitute morality, are morally worthless, and belong to the realm of scientific speculation, and not to the realm of ethics which asks completely different questions.
I also want to emphasize that I'm not talking about religious morality, and I'm trying to outline an approach to morality that is on par with a naturalistic worldview, which you probably believe in. Don't attribute views to me that are not mine.
Well done, Amadeus!
So you don't think there is another meaning for the word a priori even though I explained to you what meaning I use the word.
But Your wish is my command and I am ready to use any word you suggest instead of the word a priori.
What do you think of "Spferholz"?
Would you object to my giving that meaning to that word or would you allow me to use the word here and not be caught ruining the joke by claiming that there is no tunnel there?
Tell me:
How do you allow yourself to write something like "when they say "doesn't depend on experience", they don't mean that the existence of the laws of nature depends on experience, but whether their knowledge depends on experience."?
What exactly is the meaning you give to the laws of nature and their existence in this sentence?
Don't you perceive that your entire thought on the matter is based on a contradiction?
I am not distorting the meaning of the word but using the most appropriate word that exists.
The word a priori existed even before formal logic was formulated and I made it clear that this is the meaning I am using.
Do you also object to mathematical proofs that begin with "Let epsilon be a small positive number as we wish for it so and so..." because they make non-standard use of the word epsilon?
I have not written anything implying moral laws that have any imperative or absolute meaning and I have made that very clear.
It is interesting to talk about the morality I am talking about because it is the only morality that can contribute to the well-being of man.
We also practice medicine without having what you call an "ethical meaning" for healing.
I don't call it that because in my opinion - just like the word "morals" the word "ethics" should be taken out of God's hands and entrusted to man.
Do you think there is less value in defining terms that have meaning and even meaning that can be used for our well-being than in using terms whose entire meaning is derived from the meaning of the Flying Spaghetti Monster?
Joseph:
I still think that instrumentalism is a joke and that Niels Bohr and other scientists did the right thing nonetheless.
I have already explained that we are not able to test science except in an instrumental way, but this does not belong to the fact that at the base of the research there is indeed the assumption that there is some thing that we are investigating and this is the thing in itself.
When it is said that something provides the best prediction for the behavior of the world, it is assumed that there is indeed a world out there that behaves - something that will cause the experiment to give results of the type we are trying to predict.
As mentioned - I can't think otherwise at all.
I don't think the stories about Einstein and non-Euclidean geometry are relevant to our case.
These are precisely examples of the instrumental description developing and changing because the previous description did not describe the thing well enough by itself.
Amadeus
The mere fact that something is 'found' can indicate that it was 'wanted' in a certain period of time.
Michael, instrumentalism is not a joke. Niels Bohr's complementarian approach, Ernst Mach's idealism are just two examples of scientists who operated under anti-realist assumptions. (Hawking also seems to strive in this direction of instrumentalism) Serious scientists can still act seriously in order to search for and develop a scientific theory whose predictive ability is better than its predecessor, and this without deluding themselves that they reveal the laws of the universe 'as they are'. Beyond that, contemporary physics has been working extremely successfully in recent decades despite the internal tension between the two main theories: relativity and quantum mechanics.
Scientific realism is a serious position that should not be taken lightly and there is no doubt that it is there to provide motivation for scientific investigation and it also aligns with our intuition. Despite this, it is not necessary and it is not certain that it is correct (of course, I also have doubts about the decision here and there). The question of the scientist today is what is the best explanation that tells the best prediction for events in the world and not what is the essence of the universe. This is a proper instrumentalist approach and is a proper opponent to scientific realism.
Regarding the laws of logic. Einstein's concept of time is contrary to our intuitions and our beliefs but today it is accepted in science. Despite this, on a daily basis we follow normal concepts of time (past, present and future). There may be a situation in which we will come to the conclusion that it is possible to develop completely different laws of logic that we will not be able to manage our lives according to. (One can also think of the non-Euclidean geometry which provided a way to show that 'a-priori' theorems like the sum of the angles of a triangle equals 180 degrees' is false
Amadeus' comments are excellent, and it is worth collecting them and publishing them as an article, they are infinitely superior to the original, meager article.
And, science cannot contribute anything to morality and ethics, firstly because morality is built on subjective principles, even if they are a priori.
Second, in practice we see the technologies that are based on science being introduced into our lives without any indication from scientists or any person who relies on science. And these technologies bring a huge wealth of anti-moral actions.
Michael, I don't think there is any other meaning for the term "a-priori", apart from the accepted philosophical-logical meaning. A priori is an epistemological concept that speaks to human perception, not to the sense in which the laws of nature are fixed or not. Sentences that can be known a priori are sentences like "today it rains or it doesn't rain", "all singles are unmarried", and things like the Pythagorean theorem. Statements like water is H2O, are not statements that can be known a priori, and certainly not statements like E=MC^2. When they say "does not depend on experience", they do not mean that the existence of the laws of nature depends on experience, but whether their knowledge depends on experience. As mentioned, we are talking about epistemology, not ontology.
I suggest you use the terms in the accepted way, and not distort them for your purposes, because this leads to misunderstandings and unnecessary confusion.
I was quite sure that you were talking about the naturalistic fallacy because first of all, the author of the article set himself the goal of refuting it and showing that it does not exist, and you also spoke as if the tendencies supposedly ingrained in us by evolution are "moral laws", meaning that they have an imperative dimension and not just a description of a phenomenon, Otherwise, what does it mean to call it a "law"?
So if this is not the case, why is it morally interesting to talk about evolutionary instincts? This is something that does not belong to the field of ethics, but to anthropology or sociology. I don't think it is ethically interesting, when it comes to answering moral issues such as abortion or euthanasia, which instincts evolution favored when humans evolved millions of years ago (which is what this pretentious article tried to claim).
Joseph:
It seems to me that there is no escape from referring to the "thing in itself" even if we will never know for sure its properties, because what is the thing we are investigating and trying to find the best instrumental description of if not the thing in itself?
In my opinion - any researcher who does not make toys the main thing - must assume that there is a "thing in itself".
There are things we simply believe in because we have no other option.
After all, someone can argue that there is no a priori basis for our belief in the laws of logic either.
And what will he do after saying that? - will continue to apply the laws of logic.
Regarding thinkers like Machiavelli - it is important to insist on the distinction I made between natural impulses and "calculated" morality.
The natural laws, in my opinion, are the same (for the most part - of course there are also psychopaths) while the calculated laws are the result of a calculation and since we are only human - a mistake can fall in the calculation.
Note that I did not claim that we have found the universal moral laws (those that, after an effort of persuasion dependent on intelligence, will appear to most people to be appropriate) but only that they may exist in principle (and even likely that they exist).
For Michael, the debate between instrumentalism and realism is, as you probably know, long and winding. In many ways Kant fueled the discussion by distinguishing between the transcendental world (the thing in itself) which we can never grasp and the transcendental world which is the world given to us through our conscious categories and especially the concepts of space and time. If we accept this distinction, the question arises as to why we need the concept (the thing in itself). This is an unnecessary metaphysical assumption. To assume that the scientific activity is instrumental does not harm the scientific project but simply 'cleanses it' of unnecessary metaphysics. If as you believe 'we can never know if our description of reality is really true or just a work' why do we need realism?
Regarding the rejection that exists in the depths of the human soul, I think that there were thinkers in the field of ethics such as Machiavelli who really believed in their position and thought it was a serious position. (Unfortunately, there are those who think this way even today and do not feel any reluctance to adopt this moral system which in my view is repulsive)
What is the depth of the human soul?
We are DNA and that's it.
Is killing a cockroach good morals or bad morals?
Amadeus:
Maybe I didn't make my words clear enough.
When I say that the laws of nature are a priori - I do not mean this term as it means in logic, but the usual linguistic meaning - meaning that they are predetermined - even before anything is done in the world.
According to my perception - the laws of nature exist and indeed do not depend on experience.
What does depend on experience is our description of them, but it is clear that the laws themselves worked out very well before we were created and before we started trying to describe them.
In this sense they are a priori.
I'm not ignoring anything and I don't think that the sentence "evolution instilled in humans X" derives from the sentence "it is proper for humans to do X". I don't understand why you think this is my opinion.
It is difficult for me to relate to the rest of your words because it seems to me that (perhaps through my fault) you did not understand my words at all.
Joseph:
If you read what I wrote to Amadeus at the beginning of this response (as well as in other responses in the past) I believe (like most scientists) in scientific realism, that is, in the existence of a priori laws of nature.
On the other hand, it is clear that our theories are tested instrumentally and we will never be able to know if our description of reality is really true or if it just works.
I say again:
In my opinion - if any moral system is repulsive in your eyes - it is also repulsive in the eyes of the person who tried to sell it to you (and I repeat and clarify: not because it is repulsive by virtue of some a priori law of nature, but because the feeling of repulsion has developed in all humans in a similar way and therefore they are able to agree on what which repels and which does not repel).
True - there are methods of brainwashing that certain currents in society specialize in, which can greatly obscure this rejection, but in the depths of a person's soul, it exists.
If I understood correctly the responses of Eddie Amadeus and Michael, then there is unanimity at least regarding the claim that a distinction must be made between scientific assertions or claims and between claims in the field of morality. This is a claim I certainly agree with. But the reason for this is not because of the assertion that the field of science is based on a priori laws of nature, while the field of morality is based on cultural determinations or a priori moral determinations. As I understand it, the expression a priori has no meaning. The debate here is between scientific realism and instrumentalism. Are the laws of nature a human creation that tries to produce laws in the process of scientific investigation, which laws come to establish order in the empirical data that are also presented to us through the prism of a scientific theory accepted in a given period or are the laws of nature a discovery, that is, the scientific activity reveals the laws of nature in a slow process. I believe that the correct option is the first and not the second which accepts scientific realism. Scientific paradigms, which are creative interpretations of the data we interpret from reality, will continue to exist and be created every time anew. Parallel to this and in this sense, determinations in the field of morality are also a long process of cultural creation which may be conditioned according to cultural interests and needs. 'Murder' for example is a forbidden action, however killing on the battlefield is legitimized due to cultural interests and is not defined as murder.
There may be a future culture in which this kind of killing will also be forbidden and no ideology - neither nationalistic nor religious - will be able to allow and legitimize killing on the battlefield. Currently, the human moral system allows this for various cultural reasons.
The cultural discourse has no boundaries. And what is not legitimate today will be legitimate tomorrow and vice versa. The restrictions on the discourse do not exist. Nazi Germany is a painful and unfortunate example that a discourse can fundamentally change and determine a different moral system. McKibley also presents a moral system. It may not be acceptable and may be repulsive (I certainly think it is repulsive - but I have no justification why it is repulsive in my opinion) but it is moral.
Therefore, even if the position of the connection between science and morality is not acceptable, this position reflects our very scientific culture. Humans today are studied based on quantitative naturalistic approaches. Since morality is a facet of human existence, this facet also receives a positivist approach. This is a legitimate approach in the cultural discourse, although I disagree with it, precisely because I think that human beings are not only a biological being but primarily a cultural being that creates itself and changes with history. Another 1000 years, (if we survive) culture will be different, morality will be different and so will the scientific 'facts'. Humans do not have rigid a priori features that limit the cultural-scientific and moral discourse.
And one more thing. Stating things like "We know that stealing is immoral because we hate people stealing from us." No moral imperative follows. Because from the fact that I don't like being stolen from, it doesn't follow that I shouldn't steal from others. As long as they're not me, then why do I care to steal from them? After all, I feel bad when they steal only from me, but not when they steal from others. And if you say that we naturally have empathy and the ability to share in the suffering of others, then I will say - fine, but there are people who lack empathy. What will you do? And what if I deliberately suppress my sense of empathy because it doesn't pay for me to behave empathetically? What is immoral about that? Why does the fact that the majority choose to practice empathy (and does it matter if it's because of evolution or anything else) make empathy a moral good? All it means is that empathy is common, not desirable.
At the base of your thinking is a serious flaw in the assumption of the desired. What actually makes evolution so important and special that it can impart moral values? You say a sentence like "it is clear to each of us what was immoral in them and it is clear to us - not because of the education we received but because of what evolution planted in us." But you don't give any reason why evolution is more important than the education given by society. Let's say aliens were to come, they probably went through a different evolution than us, and they have an advanced culture that educates them to high moral values (let's say they are not religious), so would you say that they can't be moral, because they didn't go through the same evolution as us? If there may be cases in which moral behavior can exist without evolution, then evolution is a phenomenon that is not necessary for morality, and therefore cannot define it (as from the statement that if there are dogs without tails, it follows that a tail cannot be the thing that defines a dog as a dog).
Michael-
How can you say that the laws of nature are a priori? It sounds like a return to Cartesian science. You are basically saying that observations and experiments are not necessary to know scientific facts, but only intellectual study is sufficient. I doubt that is what you believe. The laws of nature must be a posteriori, otherwise you admit that science is unnecessary, and philosophy is sufficient.
But more importantly, you are simply ignoring the naturalistic fallacy. You speak as if it is self-evident that from the sentence "evolution has instilled X in humans" the sentence "it is proper for humans to do X" follows. So let's assume what if tomorrow they proved that from an evolutionary point of view every man tends to be a rapist. Something that is also evolutionarily profitable, it is likely, because this way a man manages to spread his genes more efficiently without needing all kinds of expensive and unnecessary courtship rituals (let's say it was true). If so, then would you say that rape is a moral thing because "all humans are like that from an evolutionary point of view"? And it's messed up.
From this point of view, religious morality is also guilty of the naturalistic fallacy. That a supernatural entity, no matter how powerful, and no matter whether it created the entire world and humans, says that X is good, does not prove that X is moral and desirable. At most, this results in a morality of acceptance and punishment or reward and punishment. Morality is a completely autonomous field. That is, it is impossible to justify moral values with the help of claims that are not in the field of morality (such as claims about human nature, psychology, evolution, etc.). And this is for the reason that morality serves only itself, a moral act is a moral act because it is done for its own sake - not to achieve an instrumental goal that is external to it. This should be qualified, of course, because a teleological morality such as utilitarianism says exactly the opposite (which is close to what you are talking about), but in my opinion it is fundamentally flawed and does not constitute real morality, also because, among other things, it is guilty of the naturalistic fallacy.
In my opinion, it is possible to receive prescriptive moral imperatives (that is, those that say what is appropriate and not only what is in practice), only with the help of a priori thinking that analyzes moral concepts (such as the concept of law, or duty), and establishes moral criteria that are formal and not instrumental (X is moral because he achieves Y). When you state a hollow claim such as "All human beings desire happiness, therefore moral is whatever brings the most happiness", you turn the moral agent into an instrument whose purpose is to achieve goals that are amoral (that is, not related to the moral realm), and here we enter a dangerous realm in which we Allowing ourselves to decide what is good for others, and who is worth what and how much, and who can be sacrificed for whom.
Leosie,
First of all, I want to clarify what I meant by the term "a-priori". A priori means not (logically) dependent on experience. A priori knowledge can of course be acquired through experience, but in essence it is knowledge that does not need experience to justify it. For example, to know that the sum of the angles in a triangle is 180 degrees, it is not necessary to make measurements of triangles on paper, but it is theoretically possible to determine that every triangle (according to the definition) will necessarily have a fixed sum of angles. This is an analytical conclusion that does not need the induction that scientific knowledge uses (and if that were the case, then we would have to measure a representative sample of triangles on paper to prove the theorem "scientifically").
The choice between fascist and humanist values is, in my opinion, an a priori matter and does not depend on experience. I will try to explain. When you give an intrinsic moral value to a person, a group of people, a country, etc. you are not making a factual-scientific claim, but a value claim - you consciously choose to give a moral value to something. That is, no empirical findings will convince a humanist that there are values more important than the value of human life, which under certain circumstances can cancel it. And it should be noted that this does not result in moral relativism, because moral relativism is the position that all moral systems are equally good, and there is no reason to prefer one over the other, but you must adapt yourself to the moral system of the culture to which you belong. But this is a position that neither a humanist nor a fascist will agree with, because for them there is only one morality that is true, and any other moral system is false. There are many things in the world that have value, but this does not mean that each value is just as good as another value, and the choice of one value at the expense of another value may not be an absolute matter like proofs in geometry, but relativism does not follow from this.
I think ethical issues are really not cultural issues. The fact that different cultures have different moral systems does not prove that morality is contingent, but only if you believe in relativism. It may be true that many cultures have different and even contradictory moral systems, but nothing can be concluded from this. There may be a situation where one culture is truly moral, and the others are not.
The bottom line is that the moral consideration is a pure theoretical-intellectual consideration, which does not rely on facts (scientific, or cost-benefit calculations), and is therefore a priori. I do not commit to the fact that morality must be analytical like mathematics, meaning that there is one and only true morality that cannot be wrong. It may be so, but it seems to me that the most basic values cannot be rationally justified. But of course a relativist position does not follow from this.
About the science. I don't want to say that science is entirely a cultural creation. When I said "contingent" I meant two things -
First of all, nature itself is contingent. Things like the number of fingers in humans, the mass of the earth, the charge of the electron, the gravitational constant, etc., are contingent facts that could have been different.
The second thing is that science itself advances with the help of exchanging theories and changing paradigms. That is, a fact that is considered correct today may turn out to be incorrect tomorrow. How can you base the moral law, which must be absolute and always valid, on a finding that could turn out to be wrong? That is, today it is forbidden to lie because one scientist developed theory X, but tomorrow it will be allowed because another scientist refuted theory X, and proposed theory Y which claims that lying is inherent in humans from birth. How can you call such a thing moral?
Amadeus and Yossi:
People with a naturalistic world view have nothing a priori except the laws of nature.
Morality is not a law of nature and therefore cannot be a priori.
So is it relative?
In the end - yes - but not in a way that damages it to the point of irrelevance.
What do I mean?
Because morality - even though it is not an a priori law of nature - is based on a set of traits, fears and urges that most humans and even quite a few animals share, therefore it can be treated as an absolute law of nature for any practical need.
I do not accept the claim that the common human qualities can give rise to conflicting moral systems.
Indeed, contradictory systems were created in our culture that claimed to represent morality, but it is clear to each of us what was immoral in them and it is clear to us - not because of the education we received but because of what evolution planted in us.
Therefore, it is not surprising that, for example, a religious person who tries to convince with his claim that religion brought morality to the world will often use the example "thou shalt not murder" and will never use the example "murder the homosexual".
why is it happening? Because he knows in the secret of his heart - even if he claims that religion is the mother of morality - that the "kill the gay" law is not moral and it will not be a convincing example.
He also knows that the law "Thou shalt not murder" will convince because he knows (even if he does not face it) that his interlocutor (even though he is not religious) knows for himself that the law "Thou shalt not murder" is moral.
In my opinion, the elder Hillel's definition of the Torah on one foot as "what is hateful to you, you shall not do to your friend" is a very striking definition of what we call morality and is shared by the vast majority of human beings.
One of the differences between humans and other animals is that humans are able to calculate the consequences of their actions more accurately and over a longer range than other animals.
Therefore, humans are also able to predict the consequences of many of their actions on the well-being of others (and they know what the well-being of others is due to the fact that both they and the others developed in the same evolutionary process that, as I explained in my article on altruism - also developed in them the ability to feel empathy).
We know that stealing is immoral because we hate people stealing from us.
We know that hurting someone physically is immoral because we hate being hurt.
But we also know that the enactment of laws that are not enforced is in many cases immoral because of our ability to calculate the future (for example - a parking ban that is not enforced actually creates a reserved parking space for the benefit of criminals).
This is the basis for the assumption that the better we understand the world, the better our ability to determine what would be correct to describe as moral will improve.
To the system: Is there something wrong with response 11 - that justifies a delay since 2.17:XNUMX a.m.?
Joseph,
In my words in response 9, I did not attempt to address the question of whether morality is based on an a priori 'criterion' or on several criteria.
I asked to refer only to the question of the feasibility of the reduction of morality - to science. In this context, I wanted to argue that it is not possible to reduce morality to a positive science whose starting point is materialistic and whose plane of reference is material 'facts'. In this context, I raised two main arguments, which I would like to repeat with additional clarification and detail:
1. For a scientific basis for moral theory, proven and adequate scientific information is required. It must be mediated by factual and rational philosophical links. These links do not belong to Empirica, by their very nature. Necessarily, the foundation for moral theory cannot be purely empirical science.
2. The application of scientific knowledge to the field of morality involves the perception and extraction of the meanings of the empirical factual findings and a system of logical inferences. The perception of the findings and the production of these meanings is at least in part - a function of a priori construction - mental and cultural. On the other hand, to the extent that the inferences are inductive - and even more so to the extent that they are deductive - then they also involve conditions that are a priori - mental and cultural. It therefore follows that scientific research - even to the extent that it may be applied to the field of morality - depends on cognitive construction, which partly stems from personal mental reality, and partly stems from social cultural construction. And here - it is clear that in order to determine the true value of this scientific knowledge for the purpose of application in the field of morality - one must know the mechanisms and laws of this very diverse and very complex construction, which is impossible from a positive scientific point of view, since it is impossible to make a complete reduction of the mental plane to the material plane , and it is also not possible to completely reduce the social level to the material level (that is, for both principled and practical reasons). Therefore, it is not possible to make a complete reduction of moral theory to any science that is empirical positivist.
For me, 'science' can provide 'facts', as part of the data infrastructure of moral Torah. Although these facts can have limited and temporary validity, nothing more, and therefore in certain aspects and parts of it (aspects that refer mainly to parts that do not belong to the 'core' of moral theory) - moral theory may have limited and temporary validity - contingent. However, in terms of my overall understanding of the question of whether there are a priori moral principles, I agree with you that the answer is positive, based on philosophical principles. Therefore, according to my method, moral theory will claim absolute truth value in the parts that refer to its 'core' (which includes useful tautological propositions - that is, definitions, as well as required axiomatic propositions).
To Amadeus, I completely agreed with the first part of your statement, but I did not understand how it fits with your claims in the second paragraph where you claim that morality is a priori. After all, in the first part, according to the example you gave regarding fascism and democracy, you point out that there may be two moral caveats contradicting each other that cannot be decided between. Although it does not seem to me that you are a relativist, how will you defend your assertion that morality is a priori?
I think what underlies your words is an important distinction between nature and culture. Since ethical issues are cultural issues (contingent and not a priori since the existence of a culture with a different moral system can be described contingently) then these questions are not decided by objective scientific investigation. However, another claim emerges from the second paragraph, and that is whether the science that claims objectivity is nothing more than a cultural creation with contingent claims that change from chapter to chapter. If so, then in both wings, the moral and the scientific, there are cultural claims. Why then not determine the next moral system with the scientific moral criterion?
That is, since we belong to a science-based culture, will we look for a scientific criterion and basis for morality? (This is in contrast to a culture of religion that bases its moral criteria on a religious basis) I do not claim that I agree with that but why reject it?
The way to disqualify this can be in the following two ways:
Or claim as Eddy in note 9 claims that there is no single moral criterion (therefore there is no a priori criterion)
Or show that this criterion fails to provide us with successful moral decisions.
Scientific knowledge is an essential basis, also for any moral theory.
But in the bottom line, it seems that the attempt to make a complete reduction of morality to scientific knowledge is not a successful attempt, and the author himself is aware of this. We can use science "where we can", but there are areas and issues where we cannot do so. There are areas that are scientifically 'unsolvable', and I would venture to say that most areas in our lives are like that.
It turns out that in order to apply scientific knowledge to the moral field, it is necessary that the knowledge be indeed 'scientific' - not purely speculative. Proven knowledge is required here. In addition, it is required that this knowledge be adequate. That is why it is required that it be sufficiently extensive and unambiguous enough, and that the rational links - factual and philosophical - be found that make it relevant and sophisticated enough to produce a moral theory that has volume and has practical applicability and efficiency in the life of the individual and in the life of society and the state.
Beyond the problem of knowledge, there is a more fundamental problem, concerning the nature of science. Science investigates what is perceived as material phenomena, 'facts'. On the other hand, the meanings of scientific research depend on cognitive construction, which partly stems from personal mental reality, and partly also social cultural. Therefore, scientific research cannot be the absolute basis for moral theory. It can be (and in fact - must be) part of the factual infrastructure, but not much beyond that.
As for myself, I'm not sure even Michael Shermer can claim to have the required elements in hand. I am not sure that his material positivist view qualifies him to see the status and role of science from a realistic angle.
It also seems to me that the problem begins with him in that his perception, and also his knowledge at least in the areas of moral theory (and maybe not only) are not sufficient. They might be enough to mistakenly consider oneself a 'skeptic'…. But if he is indeed such an avowed 'skeptic' - I am amazed that his belief in the virtues of almighty science is so extreme. With such 'skepticism' it is possible to reach deep 'religiousness' or charlatanism. I guess Michael Shermer would not want to be placed in either this category or any other, but for that he would have to be a little less avowed and a little more authentic skeptic.
Scratched and not original at all.
First of all, the principle "to build a system of moral values, based on science, in which we quantitatively determine whether any factor increases or decreases well-being" is not a new thing, but simply a reformulation of classical utilitarianism from the Beit Midrash of Bentham and Mill. Utilitarianism is a pretty bad theory from a practical point of view (because of stupid and impractical cost-benefit calculations), and anti-human from the essential point of view.
Secondly, the naturalistic fallacy remains the same. It is impossible to turn moral issues into scientific problems that can be solved empirically. It is like saying that with the help of chemical tests of the composition of colors it is possible to determine the value of works of art, or with the help of studies in acoustics to determine the value of musical works.
The argument that "if it is not possible to base the moral principles and values on the basis of the way things are actually conducted, that is, on reality, then what should they be based on?" He's a bit funny because who said everything has to be based on empirical observations? What about the math for example? The logic? And what about the principle that "everything should be based on reality", is it possible to prove it with the help of reality testing?
Not everything is an empirical scientific question, and there are fundamental questions that are a matter of logic and definitions, or intuition and principled decisions that must be made. For example, is it possible to scientifically decide which is better, fascism or democracy? The first gives unconditional value to the individual person, and the second gives unconditional value to the state or the people, and places them above the value of each individual person. These are two conflicting value frameworks that speak a completely different language, what kind of experiment in neuroscience or evolutionary theory could decide which is better? It is a choice that each person must make, and once he has made it, it is impossible to convince him that he is wrong without abandoning the values he has already set as the dearest to his heart.
Morality is something that must be a priori, it cannot be based on contingent data that can change from day to day. Today scientists say that there is an X neuron in the brain that determines that, from an evolutionary point of view, humans prefer one thing, and tomorrow scientists will say that a Y neuron determines that humans prefer something else. It is quite difficult to decide ethical questions, which are sometimes fateful and affect the lives of many people, based on the speculative studies of scientists. It also follows that people with non-advanced science are less moral people. Were there no moral people before Darwin because they did not know "human nature" properly? It's pretty clear that if you don't need to know evolution to decide moral questions, then it necessarily follows that moral questions are completely unrelated to evolution.
I wonder if Michael Shermer once read Machiavelli and realized with a shock how relevant it is
Well, the Hidan website is a website of a secular group.
What is important are the linked sources.
What a beauty. Here the cultural evolution of man continues to soar and rises a step in the scale of humanity (humanity) and morality. Indeed, morality develops together with man and his culture. Very interesting article.
Yes, a really excellent source is the website of Mechabat Turki.
And Homo erectus is also Homo sapiens, neither a last link nor shoes.
http://www.darwinism-watch.com/index.php?git=makale&makale_id=1220
A lot of bickering but what's the bottom line?
Great minds think alike