Ahead of the sixth anniversary of the Columbia disaster, a new report was published on the crew's last seconds * In the report, members of a special committee established for this purpose recommend improvements in flight safety
Yesterday, Tuesday, NASA published a detailed report full of graphic aids telling what happened during the disintegration of the space shuttle Columbia on February 1, 2003. With the Israeli astronaut Ilan Ramon on board, among others. The purpose of the report is to detail what the agency learned from the Columbia disaster in regards to crew safety and the survivability of spacecraft in future flights.
The comprehensive 400-page report which can be downloaded at this link, contains information that has already been published over the years, but also minute-by-minute detail describing what happened to the shuttle during re-entry into the atmosphere, and also revealed that the commander and pilot tried to address a cascade of problems in the final minutes before the shuttle went out of control.
"This is the first comprehensive report available to the public dealing with human survival in space flights, and it provides essential information for future survival research. The result of this investigation is intended to add meaning to the sacrifice of the crew members' lives by making space flights safe for future generations." said the report.
The report is interesting to read, and it brings back to mind the events of the Columbia disaster that occurred six years ago.
The most important information revealed in the report is about the factors that are directly responsible for the astronauts' deaths and what needs to be applied in the development of helmet suits as well as the safety belts that tie the astronauts to their seats. While the lower part of the belts clamps the astronauts in place, the upper part is loose and when the spaceship lost control and spun around - something the report refers to as a dynamic spin of the environment - the upper part of the astronauts' bodies were thrown out and the body was hit with dull thuds. The helmets also did not protect the head as required.
However, the forces acting in the crew compartment in the last minute before disintegration caused the astronauts to suddenly lose air pressure which occurred so quickly that they did not have time to close the helmet lid. One of the astronauts was not even wearing the helmet and three were not wearing gloves.
The schedule shows that when the shuttle Columbia was 227 thousand feet above the Earth, hot gases penetrated the left side of the shuttle, due to a piece of foam from the external fuel tank that hit the wing during launch. The alarms went off and parts started falling from the shuttle. When the wing broke it no longer functioned and the shuttle computers could no longer compensate for the unequal forces acting on the spacecraft and it went out of control.
At 180 feet, the cabin separated from the shuttle, and then completely disintegrated in a matter of minutes due to thermal pressure and aerodynamic forces. The crew died from lack of oxygen and the trauma caused by the blunt blows. NASA came to the conclusion that with the technology that exists today, the astronauts could not be saved in the event of the disintegration of the passenger cabin, but it is possible that the crew members would have been saved, perhaps they would have arrived unconscious, if they had parachutes. However, the problem with the parachutes was that they were supposed to open automatically in the event that the astronauts were thrown from the spaceship, which probably didn't happen anyway.
In addition, the escape suits that exist today, if the astronauts were to wear them, are only sufficient from an altitude of one hundred thousand feet and below, and at a speed of 560 knots. The operating envelope of the shuttle is much larger than these numbers. The recommendations for strengthening the weak areas in the space suits will increase the chances of survival.
These are just two examples of the recommendations in the report that may be applied in the future, when it will not be possible to save the spacecraft itself, and an attempt will be made to save the lives of the astronauts. NASA has already made changes to harnesses and seat belts, and they are seeking to implement these changes in next-generation spacecraft to make spaceflight safer and more survivable in the future.
The rest of the recommendations in the report include, among others:
- The suits and seat belts should use the latest technology in a more integrated solution to reduce crew members' injuries and increase their survivability in an irregular acceleration environment. You should think about inserting internal wheels that will allow compensation for the rotation.
- The helmets will need to provide head and neck protection under non-nominal dynamic load conditions. The space station's internal wheels should automatically lock up once a non-nominal event occurs.
- It should be considered in the future spaceships to include already in the planning stage the ability to withstand more difficult conditions back into the atmosphere, and to train the crew members for these cases as well.
- It is advisable to prepare emergency rescue plans.
The report is accompanied by photographs taken on the main deck and flight deck, which were recovered from video cameras whose films were found among the wreckage, as well as from infrared images taken from the ground during Columbia's entry into the atmosphere.
The loss of the shuttle quickly became deafening and there was nothing the crew members could do. A minute-by-minute schedule showed that at 13:58:48 GMT, a partial transmission was received, in which Commander Rick Husband said "And, oh, oh." At this point the spacecraft and crew were still functioning properly. The last radio transmitter from Colombia "Roger" was interrupted at 13:59:32. The loss of control of the shuttle was recorded at 13:59:37.
The report lists several courses of action for further research, including the completion of the analysis of the Chalenger remains and their comparison with the Columbia findings.
13 תגובות
My previous response was of course intended to praise and I mistakenly wrote "Ami:" at the beginning.
It is not that now I forbid my people to read it.
Ami:
They came close to landing all their lives and especially the moment they took off.
The procedures probably did not try to cover the entire period of their approach to landing and the procedures that were prepared were also surely a function of the degree of proximity.
Apparently, when the ferry was working, it was allowed to walk around as they did at the time in question.
again. I don't know, but that's my guess.
If you want to criticize them or NASA, you are welcome to direct your criticisms to them.
If everyone worked according to the procedures Michael, the report would probably look different. How can it be said that no one suspected, while a group of astronauts are approaching landing - one of them is not in his chair, three without gloves, one not wearing a belt... and how no one suspected NASA, while they supervise and monitor every step - not to mention in dangerous moments, such as during takeoff and landing ?
Did the astronauts play cards before landing and forget procedures? Was all the staff at NASA in the bathroom at those moments or were they talking on the phone??? What refresh and update is there to talk about here?
Are you telling me that you think they followed the procedures and no one suspected??? It's just like a plane approaching landing, and the pilots are traveling on the plane or sleeping, the flight attendants are handing out food, the passengers are walking around in the aisles and in the control tower listening to music and not paying attention to the plane that is about to land... this is absolutely absurd. These are not unfulfilled procedures.
The issue is not the dismal result, but the published report, which looks like an attempt to place the blame on the astronauts (who of course cannot respond) and clear NASA of any responsibility.
Simply on the matter, it seems like one big (and unsuccessful) cover-up attempt, and what interests me, beyond the level of this respectable forum (which for some reason, these days, contains "experts" for every topic in the universe with the exception of the present case), is the puzzling fact that no one in the global media He did not find it appropriate to raise any questions regarding this strange report...
Hanan:
I don't know what you expect from people here.
Apparently no one here knows NASA procedures, so no one can give you a serious answer.
Your three questions present an interesting escalation with the first asking about the procedures and the third already implying that everyone has committed a crime by not following the same procedures that you don't know about.
I assume that everyone worked according to the procedures and no one suspected that the shuttle was "seconds from disaster".
Just so that this phenomenon does not happen again, the procedures have been updated.
It's strange that no one has anything to say on the subject, or everyone takes advantage of the fact that there is a state of war and avoids dealing with this disturbing report....
In the above article it is said:
"The forces acting in the crew compartment in the last minute before breakup caused the astronauts to suddenly lose air pressure which occurred so quickly that they did not have time to close the helmet lid. One of the astronauts was not even wearing the helmet and three were not wearing gloves. The schedule shows that when the shuttle Columbia was at an altitude of 227 thousand feet above the Earth, hot gases penetrated the left side of the shuttle..."
In "YNET" it was written, among other things:
"According to the report, three of the crew members were not wearing gloves, which provide protection against a drop in air pressure. One of the astronauts was not in his seat, another was not wearing a helmet, and another astronaut was not wearing a seatbelt. If they had followed all the procedures, the astronauts might have lived a few more moments..."
The following questions are asked:
1. According to NASA procedures, how long before entering the atmosphere, the astronauts must be ready for the process. When are they supposed to be seated, dressed and belted?
2. At an altitude of 227,000 feet, were the astronauts supposed to be strapped in and ready in all respects for landing?
3. If this is a violation of the rules and procedures (in such a blatant and unusual way, at least with regard to the articles), how is it possible that none of the astronauts were careful about it and how is it possible that the NASA control room did not address it in real time? How is it possible that the violation of the procedures is so unusual Did it go smoothly both for the astronauts and for the NASA control team?
Hanan Sabat
http://WWW.EURA.ORG.IL
I am:
And I wonder how it is that there are people who are not aware of this.
I wonder why this disaster affected so much of the public so strongly?
Danish:
Today the spacecraft are tested before entering the atmosphere.
This is one of the lessons from the Columbia disaster.
It's a shame that this lesson wasn't learned earlier, but that's the situation and it's been known for a long time.
At that time, there was no emergency plan for the rescue of the astronauts either.
Today we try to be prepared for it.
It should be understood that lessons are not meant to affect the past but the future.
In my eyes, the language of ambiguity that is always used in reference to the Columbia disaster is wonderful. Only in the (partial) Israeli aspect, an Israeli perished in this disaster, who without exaggeration was a 'national asset', who, on a human level, left behind a widow and four orphans.
What does it mean: "It is desirable to prepare an emergency rescue plan"? ? ?. If there was a rescue plan ready, could they have been saved? Does this mean that the structural damage to Columbia at the time of takeoff was known and it was decided to put Columbia into the atmosphere anyway?
Ran analyzed a few days ago in his article the structural importance of a spaceship entering the atmosphere, why aren't spaceships tested before entering?
My father wrote a book on the subject - was it not possible to repair the defect in space?, was it not possible to plan a rescue mission during Columbia's stay in space (about two weeks)?, why could they not join the space station?
From the list of reports and articles on the subject, I did not come across a direct reference to the reason for the failure - return to the atmosphere with structural damage to the body. Why?
May their memory be blessed
I had just left the gym and was starting to drive home when my son called me and said "Columbia is crashing".
I still remember the feeling that went through me - not "crashed" but "crashing".
The immediate connotation of the use of the present tense is of an ongoing process that Colombians are consciously experiencing as part of. It's not a matter of sabang and we're done - it's progress in a process whose end is already known.
If at that time you were driving on Highway 4 from the North Ra'anana Junction to the Central Ra'anana Junction and saw an elderly man crying while driving - you probably saw me.
It is not so pleasant to lose aerodynamic stability at 10/5 MAC. It just breaks down into pieces, including the body's organs. Even in 550K there are such forces that nothing can be done. There is nothing to do, the phase of being alien to the atmosphere is a violent phase to lose a wing in.