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The Dragon and Space: About Space Warfare in China - Part II

The Chinese experiment and its consequences

The first part of the article

Chinese space program

The Chinese space program began in the 1956s. Chinese leader Mao Zedong saw space as an important destination to glorify China's name and image, and called for the development of a satellite back in 1, a year before the launch of the world's first satellite, Sputnik 1, by the USSR. [1970] The goal, to achieve independence in the field of launching (the development of the satellite, the launcher and the satellite control and control system) was finally achieved in 1, with the launch into space of the first satellite of the People's Republic of China, Dongfang Hong XNUMX.

Over the years, China has developed a series of launchers, capable of launching satellites into any orbit that is needed. In addition, since the 2003s, China has been conducting a series of commercial launches for international customers, including the USA. China is the third country in the world (after the USSR and the USA) to develop a manned space program. The first Chinese space pilot was successfully launched into space in October XNUMX.

It is very difficult to produce a complete picture of the Chinese space establishment because, in a deliberate manner, various bodies related to it are scattered throughout the country, some disguised as government research institutes, academic institutions, factories, and military units. An estimate of the number of people actually involved in China's space program is also not easy to prepare. A reasonable number of over 500,000 people directly involved in China's space programs can be put forward, and the real number is likely to be higher.

A central part of the bodies operating in the field of space in China is known (in a misleading and deliberate manner) as "academies". It should be emphasized that this designation does not imply academic activity as is customary in the West, but rather as a general cover for the purposes of hiding information and misleading external parties from receiving a complete and clear picture of what is happening in China. Some of China's space activities are done under the direct supervision of various government ministries, a fact that makes assessment even more difficult.

Much space activity is carried out directly by some of China's government ministries. There is a lot of bureaucratic clumsiness in Chinese space activity, and it is difficult for an outside observer fed by visible materials to accurately assess where one body's authority begins and where there is overlap. In China, there are hundreds (perhaps more) of research and development institutes, experimental facilities, academic institutions, factories and production systems related in some way to the country's space program. A significant part of the facilities are located in the Beijing and Shanghai areas.[2]

The Chinese space program, for its capabilities in all areas of activity (development of satellites, launchers, control and control) gave birth to China's military space programs, which are apparently directed by the political echelon, and are actually carried out by those parts of the Chinese space establishment that are subordinate to the military. From the few policy documents published by China[3] it is difficult to establish an orderly doctrinal development of space warfare concepts. At the same time, publications that were published by the Chinese military (in Chinese only) and came to the attention of researchers in the West, show that there is extensive preoccupation in the Chinese military with military space programs, space warfare and the benefits of achieving space superiority, even if limited in time and space.[4]

Space fighter in China

China is the only country that is currently - openly - testing space warfare systems. China covers the entire range of space weapons, including jamming and jamming of commercial communications satellites; Launching into space of a microsatellite into geosynchronous orbit (the event is suspected to be the placement in space of a parasitic satellite or a manipulative space mine); Laser glare of an American observation satellite that passed over China - an action that caused the satellite to be temporarily unable to carry out its mission; And the highlight - destroying a satellite in orbit using an anti-satellite missile.

The Chinese satellite FY-1C
The Chinese satellite FY-1C

The destruction of the FY-1C satellite (an old and non-functional Chinese satellite) was carried out on January 11, 2007, by a missile equipped with an explosive warhead. When the missile reached the height of the target (about 850 km) and near it, the missile's warhead exploded and dispersed a large metallic spray in space. The spray hit the target satellite and destroyed it, creating another spray, known as Space Debris. The United States Air Defense Command, which monitors space debris and debris, has so far identified and cataloged over 3000 pieces of satellite debris measuring 10 cm or larger, and over a million smaller pieces. This is the worst ever event of space debris creation and in its one test, China created more dangerous space debris than all the debris events since the launch of Sputnik 1 50 years ago. Because of the height of the explosion, the fragments will remain in space for many years - most of them for over a hundred years.[5]

The first publication regarding the destruction of the satellite by China appeared in the electronic edition of the American magazine Aviation week and space technology, on January 17.1.2007, 6. [7] It is widely believed that the US was aware of the experiment a short time in advance, and that the magazine reported on The experiment was the result of a deliberate leak on behalf of the US Department of Defense.[XNUMX]

China initially denied the test, but after a week announced that it had successfully tested a satellite interception system, "for defense purposes" only. It should be emphasized that the condemnation of China's move was rather weak (see below), and some see this as a kind of "kosher" for other countries to walk the path to space warfare systems.

The debris ring from the destruction of the Chinese satellite (in red), satellites in LEO orbits (green) and the orbit of the International Space Station (continuous green line)
The debris ring from the destruction of the Chinese satellite (in red), satellites in LEO orbits (green) and the orbit of the International Space Station (continuous green line)

מקור:

It is worth quoting a Chinese researcher named Wang Hucheng, who published a sharp article in a Chinese magazine with a clear anti-American orientation, which sheds light on the reasons for the Chinese experiment:[8]

"For countries that can never win a war with the United States by using the methods of tanks and planes, attacking an American space system may be an irresistible and most tempting choice."

The above quote, which appeared in a newspaper controlled by the government, has the potential to give even more than a hint of the purpose of the experiment that was carried out in January 2007. It seems clear to China that it cannot deal with the US as an equal against an equal in the conventional arena, and in the nuclear field it is not only a hand on the bottom, But the price of a nuclear retaliation would be unacceptable, and so the space arena, where America has a distinct advantage over the rest of the world, remains as an arena where it is possible to produce "equal-breaking" weapons in the form of a system for combating satellites.

Furthermore, some see the Chinese experiment as a kind of call for the US to sit down with China at the negotiating table, where various issues that bother China in the deployment of American forces in the Taiwan region will be discussed, including the American space assets that look out over China.

A review of the titles of books published in recent years by the Chinese military evokes thoughts about the depth of engagement in the strategy of space warfare in China:[9]

* Military Astronautics
* Introduction to military satellites and their applications
* Advancing into space
* Space armament applications

All the books mentioned above were published in China in 2005, and were published in the Chinese army, by the army publishing house, and distributed in the Air Force units, command and control, and of course in the military units related to China's space programs. In addition to the obvious contexts of space warfare, these essays note China's growing interest in the revolution in military affairs, known as the RMA, and the central role of space within this conceptual revolution.[10]

Physical results of the experiment

The US air defense system (NORAD), which is also responsible for alerting the Defense Forces, has been maintaining tracking systems for space objects for years. The technological limitations that exist today allow fragments and fragments to be tracked in low orbits, provided that their size is at least 10 cm. As of July 9.7.2007, 3197, NORAD tracks 10 fragments that are at least 10 cm in size. Estimates of fragments 11 cm or less in size range from half a million to two million.[XNUMX]

The simulations of the experiment prepared by the experts of the American company AGI, showed that under certain conditions the International Space Station (with a crew of 3 astronauts) could be damaged by the fragments of the satellite. Furthermore - due to the fact that the target satellite moves in a polar orbit, and at a high altitude relative to LEO satellites (about 850 km), over time drifts will occur in the orbit of the fragments from the satellite, and they will stop moving in the way they are moving now - a kind of ring in a polar orbit - Rather, they will drift to the sides, and finally they will cover the whole earth in multiple orbits, which will combine with the orbits of hundreds of satellites moving in LEO orbits of various types.

Reports that the International Space Station had to perform evasive maneuvers from the debris were published on several websites dealing with space, and were denied by the American space agency NASA. The maneuver, which was carried out in early February, only three weeks after the Chinese test, was later approved by the control center of the Russian space agency.[12]

Confirmation that American satellites are also diverted from their normal orbit in order to avoid collision with the remains of the Chinese satellite, was given by NASA's Goddard Space Center: the research satellite TERRA was diverted from its orbit, because the control center calculated and found that there is a 7% chance that it will be hit by crises, if A quick maneuver will not be performed. This news was highlighted and was the title of the popular weekly Space News in the issue of 9.7.2007/13/XNUMX.[XNUMX]

The prediction of staying in orbit of the fragments of the Chinese satellite. It is easy to see that the fragments of the satellite will be a problem even in 100 years. (Source: http://celestrak.com/events/asat.asp)
The prediction of staying in orbit of the fragments of the Chinese satellite. It is easy to see that the fragments of the satellite will be a problem even in 100 years. (Source: http://celestrak.com/events/asat.asp)

From a careful observation of the fragments' trajectories, it is clear that collisions with satellites are inevitable. The only question is when and which satellite will the fragments hit. It can be determined with high certainty that there is a high probability that collisions between the fragments of the Chinese satellite and other satellites have already occurred, but no significant damage has yet been caused to these satellites, and therefore the matter is not publicized. (It is also possible that future attacks on satellites and causing damage will result in a certain arrangement with China, in terms of compensation for the prevention of publication).

Looking at the forecast of debris remaining in orbit (Figure 4), it can be understood that the results of the event from January 11.1.2007, XNUMX will continue to be a problem and a nuisance in space for at least the next hundred years. Different options for cleaning the space have been brought up many times in the past, usually at various scientific conferences, but as of this time, there are no operative plans for cleaning the space from debris and fragments.

International reactions to the Chinese experiment

A week passed since the experiment was carried out until word of its existence was published. The reactions to the experiment were rather weak, and did not include high-level statements by heads of state, but only by speakers (for example, there was a somewhat hesitant announcement by the White House spokesperson, as well as a spokesperson on behalf of the British Prime Minister). The messages expressed "concern" about the test, but there was no understanding that a "red line" had been crossed, what's more, that the test was directed against China's own satellite. Reference to the issue of the spray and the large amount of space debris created by the experiment was much more widely expressed in the professional space press, and even in it, the political ranks that were willing to speak out were not particularly senior.

If you take into account the publications that China blinded an American photography satellite with a laser, causing a temporary neutralization of its photography capability when it passed over it, and the lack of official reactions from the USA (at least on the public level), the lack of reaction in the world must be seen in a gloomy light, as other countries can see In this way, giving permission for anti-satellite activity, including one that can be carried out by a country that is not particularly advanced, but is equipped with a long-range TK, which can be converted into an improvised anti-satellite weapon, which will scatter a lot of spray at the peak of the ballistic arc after its launch. Such a weapon - if developed and used - could deny the use of space from many countries, since it is not discriminating and accurate - it has the ability to create a very large amount of fragments and spray, which can make the densest environment of satellites - the LEO orbits - unusable for years. It is understood that the international retribution for an action that denies space on a global scale is expected to be particularly difficult, but the lack of a practical response to the Chinese experiment is cause for concern.

Why did China perform the experiment?

The most intriguing question about the experiment is why it was carried out. If China wanted to demonstrate its capabilities in the field of space warfare, it could have satisfied itself with a secret advance notice to the US, and a close suit near the target satellite, without the interceptor missile detonating. This suit was tracked by the US and it was enough to signal China's ability in the field of anti-satellite space warfare. Furthermore, a high-profile experiment, as it was carried out, a year and a half before the Olympics in Beijing, is intended to signal the degree of China's great self-confidence, which is not afraid of a severe international reaction.

There is debate among space experts and policymakers around the world as to the reasons that motivated China to conduct the experiment as it did. It should also be remembered that for years China has been leading a rigid line of creating an international regime that would prohibit experiments in Hal and the deployment of various combat systems there. A partner in this way in the international arena, and especially in the UN, is Russia.

It seems that conducting such an experiment, with long-term and global consequences, does not serve China's interests, in a request to prevent the US from deploying space combat systems, and achieving its absolute supremacy in space, as it has stated that it intends to do.

An interesting opinion has recently been expressed[14] according to which China's blatant activity in the field of space warfare, and its reactions after the fact, came in order to hide its military weaknesses and its strategic inferiority vis-a-vis the USA. A central argument that can support this type of opinion is the fact that China shows relative openness in publications that see light in China (and come to the attention of the West) regarding the developed concepts on the subject of space warfare, and the demonstrations of the ability to dazzle with lasers and direct damage to the satellite (January experiment), while on other issues it adopts a policy of ambiguity , fraud and concealment (so for its nuclear policy, or its attitude to the Taiwan issue). It is possible, and there are Chinese statements backed by actions, to imply to the US that a future conflict in the Taiwan area will not be easy for the US, as a country that has placed its trust in its space assets, to manage its military moves. It may not be possible to neutralize all US space capabilities in the face of a future conflict with China, but it will be possible to cause enough damage to make such a conflict more difficult for the US.

Larry Wrtzel, a retired colonel and who served as the US military attaché in China, recently[15] raised another interesting issue, which should be brought into general consideration of trying to trace China's motives in carrying out the satellite destruction experiment. Wurtzel points out that in China, discussions are being held between law and space law experts and military officials, on issues related to the degree of legality in attacking combat-supporting space assets, such as communication satellites or meteorological satellites. There is a debate within the Chinese military, as to the ways to implement China's stated policy in the field of space, and the field of space warfare is one of the tools on the way to making China a space power.

In the context of dealing with space law, it is interesting to note that legal experts in China are trying to conduct a move that will expand the area of ​​sovereignty of countries above the surface to include space, and thus China is actually implying its desire to prevent the passage of foreign satellites above it, and to minimize the ability of the United States to produce intelligence and support its military forces in the region China.

When China looks at space, it mainly sees US space assets and advanced capabilities. China sees the American reports submitted to Congress, the position papers written by the Air Force and the US Space Command as a threat to it, and to its activities in space.[16] The war games run by the US Space Command (the Schreiber games, named after General Schreiber, the father of the US ballistic missile force) are perceived by China as a threat, and for good reason - in the unclassified parts of the games, published by the US, the threat attributed to combat Space is China, and the arena for activities is Taiwan.

The Chinese fear of an American space threat can lead to the conclusion that a conflict between these two space powers is inevitable. I believe that the Chinese scriptures and China's actions in space can be seen as a signal and a call for talks with the US, and the ability to reach a space coexistence that will also take care of the aspects of China's international prestige, as a leading space power (and against this background, a historic visit of the head of NASA to Beijing Yen can mark a positive future direction for the space relations between the countries).

The debate about space warfare in the United States

Every few years a public debate rages in the United States between independent research institutes and the military and the Ministry of Defense. An old and familiar debate is the debate about the necessity of anti-ballistic missile defense systems. A "younger" debate, but loud, deals with the necessity and logic of systems for space warfare.

The main argument of the space weapon cheaters that the United States wishes to develop and deploy is that there is currently no real threat to American space assets, while the United States' entry into the field will cause a space arms race, which will endanger all satellite activity in space, including that of other countries.

Several research institutes propose a "code of conduct in space", according to which countries will refrain from developing and deploying space weapons systems. Several books that have recently been published present these views, and reason that the tremendous superiority of the United States in space on the one hand, and in weapons systems on the ground on the other hand, makes the need for a space defense system and space warfare systems redundant, since any rational country is deterred from attacking American satellites. Furthermore, the argument was also raised that the United States might respond to an attack on its space assets with a nuclear attack (a completely improbable argument, which was also proven to be incorrect, when the American satellite was dazzled by a Chinese laser and the United States refrained from responding to it).

Both supporters of space weaponization and its opponents find in the Chinese conduct surrounding the January 2007 test confirmation and confirmation of their preliminary claims. However, it seems that the very premise of weaponization in space, according to which it is a future and theoretical problem, suffered a severe blow in the actual execution of the experiment. At the same time, the opponents of weaponization in space continue to claim that China does not have the same rights as other countries, and therefore US military space developments are a danger and an encouragement to other countries to turn to the path of space warfare. Due to the brevity of the paper, I did not expand on the subject of the conflict within the US, and it will also be expanded in the framework of future research.

Looking ahead

There is no doubt that the attempts to turn space into an area of ​​human activity completely free of weapons is noble and worthy, but the historical reality shows that it is impractical. In the coming years we will see more and more types of systems for space warfare, first from powers such as the United States, China and Russia, and then from other countries. By the way, any country equipped with simple ballistic missiles can very easily turn them into primitive anti-satellite weapons - we must remember that at the height of the ballistic missile's flight, it is in space, and if it is equipped with an explosive warhead with a large amount of spray, the missile can scatter a cloud of fragments that will surround the Earth and damage the satellites Many, without diagnosis. Countries that see space as an essential pillar in their security concept would do well to prepare ahead of time for space warfare for its various characteristics, for example: building anti-glare systems for observation satellites; shielding and hardening of essential parts in satellites; achieving a rapid recovery capability from an attack on their space assets (for example by preparing backup satellites, on the ground or in space); and other ways, according to the operational need and the political situation in these countries.

bibliography

ספרים

David Hobbs, Space Warfare, Salamander press, London, 1986

Cosmic study on space traffic management, International Academy of Astronautics, France, 2006

China's space program, from conception to manned spaceflight, Brian Harvey, Praxix/Springer, London, 2003

Joan Johnson-Freese, Space as a strategic asset, Columbia University Press, NY, 2007

reports

Outer space and global security, UNIDIR, UN press, 2003

Technical problems in the verification of a ban on space weapons, UNIDIR, UN press, NY, 1993

Prevention of an arms race in outer space: a guide to the discussions in the conference on disarmament, UNIDIR, UN Press, NY, 1991

Studies

Daganit Paikovsky, Israel in Space - The Contribution of the Space Program to the National Security of the State of Israel, Tel Aviv University Press, 2005

magazines

"Star Wars - a current/supervised view", by Tal Inbar, "Galileo - a journal of science and thought", Issue 107, July 2007

China Security, World Security Institute, Washington DC, 2006

Newspapers

NASA moves Terra satellite to avoid debris caused by Chinese A-Sat Test, by Brian Berger, Space News, July 9 2007

Will China construct a great wall in space? Defense news, July 9, 2007

Internet sites

http://www.astronautix.com/craft/asat.htm

http://www.astronautix.com/lvs/asat.htm

http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/publications/STSPACE11E.pdf

http://www.orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/library/2007_STSC_SD_Mitigation_Guidelines.pdf

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-10/12/content_5193446.htm

http://celestrak.com/events/asat.asp

http://celestrak.com/NORAD/elements/1999-025.txt

http://www.thespacereview.com/article/907/1

ראיונות

A meeting of the author with Major General (retired) Kenneth Israel, currently Vice President of Lockheed Martin, held in Geneva on June 19 and 20, 2007

[1] China's space program, from conception to manned spaceflight, Brian Harvey, Praxix/Springer, London, 2003, pp 25-27

[2] The data is taken from research currently being carried out by the Center for Space Research at the Fisher Institute for Strategic Air and Space Research, and has not yet been published.

[3] For example, China's Space Activities in 2006, an official document published by China's state news agency: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-10/12/content_5193446.htm

[4] See for example China's space mission and - Security in space, in China Security, world security institute, Washington DC, 2006

[5] See continuous monitoring of the results of the Chinese experiment on the website: http://celestrak.com/events/asat.asp

[6] See: http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=space&id=news/CHI01177.xml

[7] In the author's meeting with Major General (retired) Kenneth Israel, currently Vice President of Lockheed Martin, held in Geneva in June 2007, Hella claimed that he knew that China had informed the US of its intention to hold the test for at least a few days some before it was held. The general expressed his astonishment as to why China was not satisfied with a close suit near the target satellite, and decided to destroy it anyway.

[8] Joan Johnson-Freese, Space as a strategic asset, Columbia University Press, NY, 2007, p 96

[9] Chen Yali and Eric Hagt, China book shelf, in China Security, world security institute, Washington DC, 2006, pp 128-138

[10] Regarding the relationship between the space component and the RMA, see for example Daganit Paikovsky, Israel in Space - The Contribution of the Space Program to the National Security of the State of Israel, Tel Aviv University Press, 2005, pages 22-24

[11] For the updated NORAD fragment catalog see: http://celestrak.com/NORAD/elements/1999-025.txt

[12] See: http://celestrak.com/NORAD/elements/1999-025.txt

[13] NASA moves Terra satellite to avoid debris caused by Chinese A-Sat Test, by Brian Berger, Space News, July 9 2007, as well as in the Internet edition at: http://www.space.com/news/070706_sn_china_terra.html

[14] On The Space Review website: http://www.thespacereview.com/article/907/1

[15] Will China construct a great wall in space? Defense news, July 9, 2007, p. 21

[16] The ambitions of China, in Joan Johnson-Freese, Space as a strategic asset, Columbia university press, NY, 2007, p 223

* Tal Inbar is the head of the Center for Space Research, Fisher Institute for Strategic Air and Space Research

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