Mansur Ijaz
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A particularly disturbing picture regarding the intentions of the terrorists was recently revealed among the ruins of the buildings of the al-Qaeda organization - where plans and diagrams for the production of nuclear weapons were discovered. These revelations sharpen the understanding of the need for a vigorous American policy for the security of nuclear, chemical and biological materials. Even if the possibility of terrorists being able to produce nuclear bombs is unlikely - there is still a significant danger that they will use radioactive material in "low-tech" bombs.
The main security problem posed by al-Qaeda today is access to radioactive materials in Pakistan. For a decade we focused on the former Soviet Union. Since the end of the Cold War, 175 attempts to smuggle nuclear materials have been foiled there. But in the case of Russia, a reasonable solution is found: the Nan-Logger program to improve the security measures of the nuclear materials, technology and knowledge, designed to compensate the parts of the former USSR for disarming nuclear weapons. This week the House of Representatives will decide whether to fund the next phase of the program.
The Nan-Lugar initiative can serve as a precedent for addressing the Pakistani problem. Neither Pakistan nor India signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or on the Prevention of Nuclear Tests - but their reluctance to comply with international norms should not affect our determination to improve the security measures of nuclear materials in South Asia.
While Islamabad is estimated to possess material capable of developing 40-25 intermediate-yield bombs, most of its nuclear equipment is held separately as components, not as complex warheads. Storage procedures were changed on October 7 when the American bombings of Afghanistan began. The separately stored uranium and plutonium cores and their detonation assembly systems have been moved to six secret sites, in a manner designed to allow rapid assembly and placement, but even so it is difficult to gain control of this equipment. Even if al-Qaeda obtained radioactive material from its supporter in a Pakistani plant, as some reports suggest, it would still be necessary to manufacture the material for a fission core with detonation switches and launch cases. Such an effort would be difficult to carry out in a cave in Afghanistan. But we can't count on the terrorists to always stay in the caves.
On October 7, Pakistan's president and army chief, Pervez Musharraf, also established a nuclear weapons monitoring system, but self-monitoring is not enough. Since 1990, the American sanctions have prevented the possibility of transferring technology with the potential for military use, including technologies to improve nuclear security. Restrictions should be relaxed to allow the transfer of technology needed to protect Pakistan's nuclear equipment. The Bush administration must make American security measures - such as alarm systems, closed-circuit video cameras, etc. - available. These would greatly reduce the likelihood that a fanatic follower of bin Laden at a Pakistani nuclear facility would be able to deliver uranium or plutonium to terrorists.
If we do not help the Musharraf government, as we did in the case of Russia, there is a real possibility that terrorist organizations will obtain not only plans but also materials for the production and operation of weapons of mass destruction. Also, the debate in the ruling circles in Pakistan may intensify whether to share the nuclear knowledge with other Muslim countries. It is hard to think of less desirable developments for us.
Ijaz, a nuclear scientist, is chairman of Crescent Investment Management in New York. His father was one of the pioneers of Pakistan's nuclear program. Woolsey was the head of the CIA in 1995-1993
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