War in space - soon in the skies above our homes?

A recent shift in US military strategy and provocative actions by China threaten to ignite a new arms race in space. Will placing weapons in space serve the national interest of any country?

by Teresa Hitchens

In war, do not engage in an uphill frontal battle against an enemy who holds control territories. Don't react to an enemy attack coming down on you from control surfaces. Pull the enemy to reach your room before entering the battle.

- Sun Tzu, Chinese military strategist, "The Art of War", about 500 BC

"Conquer the territories you control and hold them!" This is the accepted martial theory from ancient times. Now, when the humans and the machines they build reach outer space, it is no wonder that the world's military are raising their eyes to the space around the earth and see it as a key to modern warfare. Until recently, a norm was developed that disallows the weaponization of space, even though no international treaties have been signed that expressly prohibit the placement of non-nuclear anti-satellite systems or other weapons in orbit around the Earth. States have generally avoided such weapons for fear of upsetting the global balance of power and entering into an expensive arms race in space.

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But now those understandings may be cracking. In October 2006, the Bush administration adopted a new policy, the "National Space Policy", which states, in vague terms, that the United States has a right to "control space" and rejects "new legal rules or other restrictions aimed at limiting the United States' access to or use of space. " Three months later, the People's Republic of China shocked the world when it intercepted one of its aging Fengyun series weather satellites. The action produced a shower of dangerous debris orbiting in space and a flood of international protests, and needless to say considerable distress in American military and political circles. The interception was the first test in more than twenty years of a dedicated anti-satellite weapon system. China thus joined the USA and Russia, the only countries that adopted such technology. Many observers wondered if the test was the first swallow in a new era of space warfare.

Critics claim that there is no certainty that the development of weapons in space will increase a country's security. After all, by their very nature, it is relatively easy to locate and track satellites and even space weapons, and it is likely that even in the future they will remain very vulnerable to attack, no matter how sophisticated the means to protect them are. Moreover, the development of anti-satellite systems will almost certainly lead to an expensive arms race, and possibly a rampant one, if other countries also decide that they must compete. And even the experiments that will be required to test the space warfare technology, and of course the real space battle, will produce huge amounts of debris that will continue to circle the Earth. The debris, which may collide with satellites and manned spacecraft at speeds of several kilometers per second, will threaten satellite communications, weather forecasting, precise navigational means and even military command and control systems, and may return the world economy to the 50s.

"Star Wars" returns

From the dawn of the space age, military planners came up with ideas for anti-satellite weapons and means of warfare in space, and were eager to take advantage of the military advantages offered by the "dominant territories" that have no competitors. Perhaps the most notable attempt is the "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) - which received the derogatory nickname "Star Wars" from its critics. But in general, American military strategy has never adopted such weapons.

Space weapons are traditionally defined as systems designed to cause destruction, operating in outer space after being launched directly from Earth or placed in orbit around it. The definition includes anti-satellite weapons, systems that launch laser beams from the ground and are capable of deflecting them beyond the horizon using mirrors mounted on airships or satellites and systems placed in space and capable of firing projectiles or energy beams from space. (It is important to mention that all countries will probably refrain from using a fourth type of anti-satellite weapon: nuclear bombs that explode at high altitude. The wave of electromagnetic radiation and the highly charged particle cloud that will be created following the explosion will neutralize or destroy almost all satellites and manned spacecraft in orbit. )

But any claim that in any way concerns weapons in space arouses political controversy. Recently, proponents of these weapons have proposed expanding the longstanding definition outlined here to include two existing technologies that depend on space travel: intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and ground-based electronic warfare systems. The actual existence of such systems, at least according to their claim, takes the sting out of the debate regarding the development of "space" weapons because, according to the expanded definition, they already exist. However, whatever the exact meaning of the term may be, the questions that these weapons raise are not new to the think tanks and military planning circles in Washington: Is it worthwhile, or even possible, to integrate anti-satellite weapons and weapons fired from space into the national military strategy of the United States?

The new US national space policy and the Chinese experiment have renewed the urgency to discuss the issue, a discussion that is usually held behind the scenes. Many of the heads of the American security establishment expressed concern following the Chinese experiment. They fear that if any conflict arises over Taiwan, China could threaten the American satellites orbiting in low orbit. The commander of the Air Force of the US Army, Michael Mosley, in April 2007 compared the Chinese interception experiment to the launch of the Sputnik satellite by the Soviet Union in 1957, which considerably accelerated the arms race during the Cold War. Mosley also revealed that the Pentagon has begun testing US satellite defense systems and explained that outer space has become a conflict zone.

Congress' response followed the expected political lines. Conservative hawks opposed to China, such as Sen. John Kiel of Arizona, immediately called for the development of anti-satellite weapons and space-based interceptor systems to counter Chinese capabilities. For now, more moderate politicians, including Massachusetts representative Edward Markey, have urged the Bush administration to open negotiations with the goal of banning the use of space weapons.

International power games

Another concern, and possibly even greater, is reflected in the fact that several other countries, including one of China's regional rivals, India, will need to develop attack and defense capabilities in space. For example, the American trade publication Defense News quoted unnamed Indian security officials as saying that their country has already begun developing its own kinetic weapons (non-exploding projectiles that destroy the target by impact) and anti-satellite laser systems.

If India turns to this path, there is no doubt that its main rival, Pakistan, will follow suit. Like India, Pakistan also has a highly developed ballistic missile program, which includes medium-range missiles capable of carrying anti-satellite systems. Even Japan, the third Asian power, may join such a space race. In June 2007, the Japanese House of Representatives began to consider the approval of a bill, which the current government of Prime Minister Fukuda supports, allowing the development of satellites "for military purposes and to maintain the security of the country".

And as for Russia, following the Chinese experiment, President Putin once again emphasized Moscow's opposition to the weaponization of space. However, he refused to criticize Beijing's actions and instead chose to blame the United States. It was American efforts to build an anti-missile defense system, Putin argued, and America's increasingly aggressive plans to place military positions in space that pushed China into action. And yet, Russia itself, as a major space power that has integrated satellites into its national defense system, will find it difficult to give up joining the arms race in space.

With the civilization of the countries capable of operating in space [see box on the left], those who support the development of a solid combat strategy in space are convinced that the armament of the sky is inevitable and that the USA will do better if it reaches firepower in space first. According to them, anti-satellite weapons and weapons systems in space will be necessary not only to protect American military and commercial satellites, but also to prevent future adversaries from exploiting their capabilities in space to improve the performance of their forces on the battlefield.

However, an arms race in space will undoubtedly cause a violation of the balance of power and hence also increase the risk of a global conflict. Reckless competition, whether in space or elsewhere, will prevent any possibility of maintaining a balance between the rivals. Even if the powers succeed in achieving stability, there is no guarantee that both sides will understand that this is indeed the case. As soon as one of the parties feels that he is behind in the race, he will be tempted to preemptively cure the blow to prevent further deterioration. Ironically, the same is true for the side that will believe they are leading the race and will be tempted to strike first, before the opponent catches up. And finally, an arms race in space will increase the danger that a technological mistake will ignite a war. After all, in the empty expanses of space it is very difficult to distinguish with certainty between a deliberate action and a mistake.

Kinetic interceptors

According to estimates by both US military and intelligence officials and independent experts, the Chinese appear to have destroyed their weather satellite using a kinetic vehicle launched on a two-stage medium-range ballistic missile. Technologically, directly launching such a weapon against satellites is one of the simplest ways to intercept a satellite [see box on the right]. About a dozen countries and associations are able to reach low orbit around the Earth (at an altitude of about 100 to 2,000 kilometers) using a medium-range rocket. Eight of these countries are also able to reach geostationary orbit (about 36,000 kilometers above the Earth).

But the main technical obstacle in the production of a kinetic weapon is not the ability to launch, but rather the ability to precisely maneuver and the guidance technology necessary to navigate the weapon to the target. It is not clear how well China controls these techniques. The weather satellite intercepted by the Chinese was operating when it was hit, so the Chinese operators knew its exact location at any moment.

Ground lasers

The Chinese direct interception experiment came after reports in the media in September 2006 that the Chinese had also succeeded in marking American spy satellites using a laser beam sent to them from the ground [see bottom box on page 83]. Did Beijing really try to "blind" satellites or damage them in some other way? It is impossible to know, and there is no agreement in the official circles in Washington as to the intention of the Chinese. Perhaps China was simply testing the ability of the network of low-power laser rangefinders it operates to track US space surveillance equipment.

Even if that was the goal, the experiment was a provocative one. There are satellites that do not need to be electronically "fried" to put them out of action. An experiment conducted by the US military in 1997 with the MIRACL (advanced chemical laser in the mid-infrared range) system proved that low-power beams can disrupt, or temporarily blind, optical collection satellites. The spy satellites are therefore vulnerable to such an attack.

The US and the former Soviet Union began conducting laser-based anti-satellite weapon tests as early as the 70s. Engineers in both countries focused on the many problems involved in building high-powered laser systems that could reliably destroy satellites in low orbit from the ground. Such systems can be guided by "adaptive" optical systems: mirrors that change their shape continuously and compensate for the atmospheric distortions. However, the amount of energy needed to feed high-powered lasers is enormous, and even so, the range and effectiveness of the beams will be considerably limited due to scattering, dimming by smoke or clouds, and difficulty in keeping the beam focused on the target long enough to cause damage.

As the United States initiated its strategic defense program, it conducted laser experiments in Hawaii. Among other things, the ability to tilt the rays using a mirror installed on a satellite was tested. The laser experiments continued at the starfire optical range at Kirtland Air Force Base in New Mexico. Pentagon budget documents from the 2007-2004 fiscal years show that "anti-satellite operations" were among the missions assigned to the Starfire Research Center, but the phrase was removed from the 2008 fiscal year budget documents after Congress reviewed the issue. The starfire system includes adaptive optics that make it possible to narrow the launched laser beam and in this way increase its power density. Such a capability is not required for photography or surveillance, and this increases the suspicion that the starfire system could be used as a weapon.

And yet, despite decades of work, combat-ready systems of directed energy weapons are probably still out of reach. An Air Force planning document, for example, predicted in 2003 that a ground-based weapons system capable of "launching laser beams through the atmosphere [that would disable or destroy] [low-orbit] satellites" would be available between 2015 and 2030. Given the state of research today, even those dates seem optimistic .

satellites in a common orbit

Recent developments in the miniaturization of sensors, the development of powerful satellite computers, and efficient rocket propulsion engines increase the possibility of the application of a third anti-satellite technology: tiny attack satellites [see top box on opposite page]. One example that demonstrates the capability is the US Air Force's "Experimental Satellite Series" (XSS) project designed to develop tiny satellites designed to perform "independent near environment operations" near larger satellites. The first two satellites in the program, XSS-10 and XSS-11 were launched in 2003 and 2004. Ostensibly, the tiny satellites are intended for external testing of large satellites, but there is no doubt that they could also strike target satellites or carry explosives or directed energy warheads such as radio frequency jamming systems or powerful microwave transmitters. US Air Force budget documents show that the XSS project is related to a program called "Advanced Weapons Technology," which studies military uses of laser and microwave systems.

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union developed a joint anti-satellite orbital system: a maneuverable interceptor carrying an explosive warhead that was launched by rocket into orbit close to a target satellite orbiting the Earth at low altitude. The Soviets conducted experiments with this system and even declared it operational. It was in fact a sophisticated "space mine", but since its last demonstration was in 1982 it is likely no longer operational today. Such an interceptor, if built today, would likely be based on a tiny satellite that would be placed in an orbit that crosses the paths of some of its possible targets. It will be possible to activate it by remote control when it approaches the target.

In 2005, the US Air Force introduced a program that could provide "targeted situational alertness" and "fault characterization" to friendly satellites in geostationary orbit. The budget for the program, called ANGELS (an English acronym for surveillance using independent nano-satellite sensors for the assessment of space in the immediate environment), implies that it focuses on achieving "high-level defensive capabilities in space" that will include "a warning sensor to detect direct launches or installations in a common orbit." It is clear that such nano-satellite monitors could also be used as offensive weapons if aimed and steered at enemy satellites.

And the list goes on. A "parasitic satellite" will track or even attach to a geostationary satellite. The Farsat satellite, mentioned in the appendix of [Donald] Rumsfeld's Space Commission report in 2001, "will be placed in a 'storage' orbit in space (and may contain many tiny satellites) relatively far from the target, but ready for navigation for destruction."

And finally, the U.S. Air Force has previously proposed a space-based radio wave weapon system. The system "will include a group of satellites that will carry powerful radio transmitters that will be able to disrupt/destroy/disable a wide variety of electronic means and command and control systems at a national level."

Air Force planning documents from 2003 predict that such technology could be realized after 2015. But outside experts believe that orbital weapons that operate using radio waves and microwaves are already applicable today and could be deployed in space in the near future.

Space bombers

Although it does not meet the definition of a space weapon, the Pentagon's "Common Air Vehicle" (CAV) or "Supersonic Technology Vehicle" project is included in the discussion of space weapons because, like the intercontinental ballistic missiles, this aircraft will also move in space to attack targets on a sphere Haaretz [see upper box on the next page]. Unpowered, but capable of supersonic flight and high navigation, the CAV will be launched from a future supersonic space plane, glide down from its orbit in space into the atmosphere, and drop conventional bombs on ground targets. The US Congress recently began funding the project, but for fear of igniting an arms race in space, it banned any action that would allow placing weapons on the CAV. Although engineers are making steady progress in developing the technologies important to the CAV project, it will be decades before the aircraft, and the space plane that will carry it, can take off.

Some of the sensitivities shown by Congress in planning the CAV may stem from a different, and much more controversial, idea for space weapons with similar purposes: bundles of rods that would be dropped on Earth at superspeeds from facilities orbiting in space. For many years the planners of the US Air Force have been striving to place weapons in orbit in space with the aim of bombing targets on the ground, especially buried and armored bunkers and hidden stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction. The bundles, known as "Punishment from God" [literally in English: "Rods from God", the editors], will include large tungsten rods, six meters long and 30 centimeters in diameter each. The rods will be dropped from a spaceship and placed at tremendous speed to their target.

But the applicability of the idea is limited, both due to the high price and due to the laws of physics. It will be very difficult to ensure that the rods will not burn or warp due to the frictional heat resulting from entering the atmosphere and yet manage to maintain a precise and almost vertical trajectory. Calculations show that non-explosive rods will be no more effective than conventional ammunition. Moreover, the cost of putting these heavy projectiles into space would be outrageous. And so, despite the continued interest, Tribes of God will likely remain in the realm of science fiction.

Obstacles on the way to space

If so, what prevents the US (and other countries) from developing full-scale space weapons? The counterweight is threefold: political opposition, technological difficulties and heavy expenses.

The American political system is divided on the question of the wisdom of combining space warfare in the national military strategy. There are many risks involved. I mentioned earlier the general instability of an arms race, but there is also another stability problem, the stability between the nuclear powers. Spy and early warning satellites have traditionally played an important role in reducing the fear of a surprise nuclear attack. But if an anti-satellite weapon were to blind those space eyes, the resulting uncertainty and loss of training could quickly lead to disaster.

One of the most difficult technological challenges standing in the way of space weapons technology is the proliferation of debris in space that I alluded to earlier. Researchers at the US Air Force, NASA and the independent website Celestrak, which reviews what is happening in space, claim that the Chinese attempt to intercept a satellite left more than 2,000 pieces of debris, the size of a baseball or more, surrounding the Earth in a cloud located at an altitude of 200 to 4,000 kilometers. The intercept probably spread another 150,000 objects with a diameter of a centimeter or more. The high speed at which objects travel in orbit means that even the smallest pieces of space debris are dangerous to spacecraft of all types. Ground tracking stations are unable to reliably monitor or track objects smaller than five centimeters in diameter in low orbit and objects less than one meter in diameter in geostationary orbit, so satellites may not be able to avoid such fragments. In fact, to avoid the risk of colliding with the Chinese test debris, two American satellites had to change their course. A shooting war in space will increase the chance of creating a contaminated space environment that satellites will no longer be able to navigate safely.

The very placement of weapons on the track also poses difficult technical obstacles. The weapons, like any other satellite, will be vulnerable to external factors: space debris, projectiles, electromagnetic signals and even tiny natural asteroids. Shielding the space weapons is impractical mainly because it is bulky and heavy, which increases the launch expenses considerably. Most of the weapons in orbit will be self-contained devices, so malfunctions and operational errors are likely to occur. It is relatively easy to calculate the trajectory of objects in orbit, so it will be difficult to hide large weapons. Satellites in low Earth orbit are only above the target for a few minutes each time, therefore, if one of the weapons is to be permanently in range, many of them must be placed in space.

And finally, getting to space and operating in it are horribly expensive: between $4,000 and $20,000 per kilogram for the low coffee route, and between $30,000 and $40,000 for a geostationary route. Any weapon placed in space will require replacement every seven to 15 years and repairs in orbit are not cheap either.

Alternatives to space warfare

Considering the risk that warfare in space poses to national and international security, and the technical and financial obstacles that must be overcome, it would be wise for the partner countries in the space club to find ways to prevent the arms race in space. The United States focused on reducing the vulnerability of its satellite fleet and examining alternatives to its dependence on its services. Most of the other countries that have the capability to operate in space have turned instead to finding ways to achieve multilateral diplomatic agreements and other legal means. The range of possibilities extends from treaties that would prohibit activity against satellites and placing weapons in space to unilateral measures that would increase transparency and mutual trust.

The Bush administration strongly opposes any kind of negotiations on the issue. Opponents of multilateral agreements that would ban warfare in space claim that other nations (especially China) will sign them, but at the same time will secretly build stockpiles of such weapons, because it is impossible to detect violations of such agreements. They also claim that the US cannot sit idly by while its possible adversaries obtain resources in space that could improve their combat capability on the ground.

Supporters of international treaties argue against them that non-negotiation entails high opportunity costs. An arms race in space could eventually lead to damage to the security of all countries, including the United States, and stretch the economic capabilities of the competitors to the breaking point. And while many supporters of space decommissioning admit that it will be very difficult to reach completely reliable agreements, because space technologies may be used for both military and civilian purposes, there are already effective agreements that do not require strict control. A good example of this is the Biological Weapons Convention. Systems to destroy satellites (as opposed to blocking them) are the most dangerous space weapons that can be built in the near future. Experimenting and using them (as opposed to deploying them in space) will leave a lot of waste in space, so it will be easy to ensure the observance of an agreement that prohibits their execution. Moreover, the countries signing the agreement knew that their space launches would be subject to surveillance from the ground, and any suspicious object they placed in space would immediately receive attention. The international protest that will arise following such open violations of the agreement will deter the violating countries.

However, since the mid-90s, the process to achieve a new international space regime has been delayed. The United States has blocked attempts by the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to begin negotiations on a treaty to ban weapons in space. China, however, refused to accept anything less than that. Therefore, all intermediate measures, such as unilateral measures that build training, control of traffic in space or a code of responsible behavior of the countries active in space, were blocked.

A war in space is not bound by reality. But the recent change in US policy and China's provocative actions have illuminated the fact that the world is approaching a crossroads. The nations must recognize that preventing the testing and use of weapons in orbit around the Earth is an important interest of theirs. The nations of the Earth will soon have to decide if they wish to keep space exploration going on peacefully, as it has been in most cases for the past fifty years. The alternatives are not desirable at all.

On February 20, 2008, after the article was written, the US Navy intercepted a US spy satellite that was out of order and about to crash in an unknown location. The interception, by means of a missile launched from the ship Lake Erie sailing in the Pacific Ocean, provoked international reservations on the grounds that it was in fact a test of a satellite interception system and a response to the Chinese interception. The Americans justified the first interception of its kind in US history by saying that it was intended to save human lives, because the satellite was carrying hydrazine, a very toxic rocket fuel - the editors.

key concepts

Although the "dominant territories" of outer space seemingly provide clear military advantages, so far the countries of the world have refrained from placing weapons in orbit around the Earth. This strategic restraint may be beginning to fade.

The "national space policy" adopted by the United States in 2006 probably paves the way for turning space into a future military area. Immediately afterwards, China conducted an experiment of launching an anti-satellite missile from the ground. A year later, the United States conducted a similar experiment.

However, weapons in space could ignite a costly international arms race. Satellites and weapons in space will remain vulnerable to attack, whatever the defenses are.
Also, space warfare, and even "live" tests of the weapons, could create such a large trash cloud around the Earth that it would no longer be possible to place satellites in orbit or launch manned spacecraft.

the main actors

Since the beginning of the space age, the list of countries, multinational bodies and private commercial associations that have demonstrated the ability to launch satellites into orbit, and hence also to intercept them, has grown longer and longer. The main concern of observers is that any US attempt to develop weapons in space will push the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation and other countries into an expensive arms race in space.

Ground weapons against satellites whose operation has been demonstrated - China, Russia, USA

Countries and entities that have reached geostationary orbit (36,000 km): European Space Agency (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom) , France, International Launch Services (Russia, USA), Japan, Sea Launch (Norway, Russia, USA)

Countries that reached the low coffee route only (between 100 and 2,000 kilometers) – India, Israel, Pakistan, Ukraine

When the dust doesn't settle

A military conflict in space could create a debris cloud that would envelop the Earth and cause damage or destroy satellites and manned spacecraft orbiting the Earth. At orbital speeds, even tiny objects can penetrate deep and cause damage to vital equipment mounted on space vehicles. The consequences of a nuclear explosion in space could be even more serious: the wave of electromagnetic radiation and the flow of charged particles would destroy all but the most protected electronic systems in orbit. A space war could return the global economy to the 50s because communications, navigation, weather forecasting and other advanced satellite services would be disabled for many years.

on the notebook

Theresa Hitchens (Hitchens) directs the Center for Information on Defense Issues in the city of Washington and heads the space security project that the center manages in collaboration with the Foundation for a Safe World. She wrote the book "Future Security in Space: Charting a Course of Cooperation" (2004) and edited the journal Defense News from 1998 to 2000. As a journalist she focuses on military, military industries and NATO issues. Most recently, Hitchens served as director of research at the British-American Council on Defense Information, a defense think tank.

And more on the subject

• Rumsfeld Commission Report, 2001
• Future Concepts of the US Air Force, November Report 2003
• Space Defense Physics, US National Academy of Sciences, 2005
• The motivation and consequences of the Chinese experiment
• The Center for Information on Defense Issues of the Institute for World Security