The "double-edged sword" of scientific research and publication

Beginning in the 90s, genetic engineering methods and the development of bacterial strains began to develop as a weapon in biological warfare. Could the publication of the scientific findings contribute to the misuse of these findings? And how can the terrorist use of the scientific findings be prevented?

Publication is one of the milestones of scientific research. The publication is not intended only to glorify the name of the publishing scientist and his research, but to make a real contribution to the advancement of science. The level of scientific research of a country or institution is assessed both by the number of scientific articles that the researchers publish and also by the number of its citations in other articles, the teacher's number of its importance.

The researchers publish their articles in good faith, out of a desire to share the new knowledge with their colleagues in the profession, and with the public in general, in the belief that they will indeed arouse interest and make a real contribution to the field in which they are engaged.

However, there is a fear that the results of scientific research will be misused in a disastrous way, for example in biological terrorism (bio-terrorism). Biological terrorism is not a new issue, the use of biological means as weapons is ancient and there are many examples of this. In the past, bacteria or toxins as found in nature were used as biological weapons. International treaties signed under the leadership of President Nixon in the USA limited the use of biological weapons and its importance diminished.

From the 90s, the newly developed scientific technologies were used. Genetic engineering methods were mobilized to develop new strains of bacteria for use as weapons in biological warfare, some of them even as spray powders.

Biological terrorism, which ignores international conventions, began to come to the fore as a potentially destructive and threatening factor after the attack on the Twin Towers in the USA on September 11, 2001, and especially after the anthrax envelopes were sent immediately afterwards. Then the Western and developed world realized that a new war had begun: a terrorist war in which non-conventional weapons were used, including biological weapons.

In recent years, precisely as a result of the progress of scientific research, bioterrorism has become even more threatening and dangerous. It turned out that the knowledge and methods for developing advanced and sophisticated biological weapons are published every day in the scientific press, including online journals on the Internet. Also, it is clear that the means to produce biological weapons are found in many laboratories in academic research institutions and governmental and other research institutes as part of the accepted research infrastructure.

The sources of knowledge are vast. Today, more than 10,000 life sciences journals are published in 100 countries. Also, thousands of abstracts are published, as well as about 4,000 newspapers that publish complete and detailed articles online. The published scientific information can provide the knowledge for the manipulations needed to turn harmless and even beneficial microorganisms into brutal weapons. All this can be done with the help of the scientific instruments found in all those laboratories.

The technologies needed to develop biological weapons are the same technologies used in biological research. Genetic engineering, biotechnology and nanotechnology can therefore turn from technologies developed to serve human health into technologies that destroy it.

The recognition of the possibility of "dual use" (DUAL USE of knowledge and scientific equipment for the purposes of developing biological weapons is troubling many countries, led by the USA, including Israel. The main question is how one can defend against the dual use of knowledge and equipment. Is it possible to classify studies according to their potential for dual use?

In Israel, a national committee was established to discuss the issue of biotechnology in the age of bioterrorism. Her conclusion was that all that can be done is to increase the researchers' awareness of the possibility of "dual use" and to develop a culture of "biosecurity". Following the committee's recommendations, the Knesset enacted in November 2008 a law aimed at "regulating research into biological pathogens". By virtue of the law, a national council was appointed and one of its duties is to advise the Minister of Health in formulating instructions regarding the possession of pathogens and the Director General of the Ministry of Health regarding the recognition of institutions authorized to possess and/or conduct research on pathogens. Apart from the role of the Council's oversight of research in licensed institutions, any research that reveals findings that have the potential to increase violence and/or increase the ability to transfer and/or change the host range of pathogens will be included in the supervision framework.

The law discusses only the regulation of research into pathogens and their possession. But perhaps indirectly he also discusses the dual use of the existing research infrastructures. The issue of scientific publications remains open.

The supervision of scientific publications seems almost impossible. Is an examination of the negative potential of using the information published in the article feasible? In my opinion, loading additional "millstones" on the Israeli scientist who is in competition with world science is unacceptable.

With the help of law and recommendations will it be possible to stop the misuse of scientific research? time will tell.

Bracha Reger is Professor Emeritus of Microbiology and Immunology at the Faculty of Health Sciences at Ben-Gurion University, former Chief Scientist of the Ministry of Health, member of the Higher Education Council and currently President of Ort Israel and Chairman of Ort's Academic Council