This is the twelfth test of the "Arrow" missile and the seventh test of the weapon system. This experiment is a routine development experiment that is part of the Weapons System Improvements Contract (ASIP) signed between Israel and the US.
Avi Blizovsky and a concentration of sources
Illustration: Ministry of Defense
The wording of the press release of the Ministry of Defense spokeswoman as delivered a little while after the experiment
On Thursday, 29/7/04 at 20:25 (Israel time) the "Arrow" weapon system performed a successful system test. This is the twelfth test of the "Arrow" missile and the seventh test of the weapon system.
This experiment is a routine development experiment that is part of the Weapons System Improvements Contract (ASIP) signed between Israel and the US.
The experiment was carried out at the Point Magu test field in the USA and its goals were to test the performance of the "Arrow" system against a target that represents a real threat in a realistic scenario that cannot be tested in Israel for safety reasons of the test field.
The target launch simulated an operational scenario and all the components of the weapon system worked in their full operational configuration.
When the target was launched, the weapon system went into action: the radar detected the target and transmitted its data to the fire management center which calculated a defense plan against it. The defense plans were transferred to the launcher which launched the interceptor missile. The arrow interceptor completed its course successfully and destroyed the target.
The "Arrow" weapon system was jointly developed by Israel and the United States and is managed by the Wall Administration in the Ministry of Defense in cooperation with the Administration of Defense Against Ballistic Missiles in the US Department of Defense. The main contractor for the development of the system is the MLM plant of the TAA.
The "Hats" weapon system includes: "Oran Yerok" warning and fire control radar made by Elta, the fire management system "Etrog Zahav" made by Tadiran Systems, a launcher control center "Agoz Haav" and an operational launcher and missiles made by TAA/MLM. In addition, components produced by the TEA, TAS, Rafael and others participated in the experiment.
The target, which represents a true target in our region, was launched from a platform in the middle of the sea and was provided by the American Targets Office of the MDA.
The "Arrow" weapon system is operational in the Air Force and the success of the test is an important step in proving its effectiveness and in responding to the growing threat of ballistic missiles in our region, and emphasizes the cooperation between the US government and Israel on the issue of defense against ballistic missiles.
A successful test for the "Arrow" in the USA: intercepted a Scud missile for the first time
30/7/2004
Israel and the US conducted a successful test yesterday of the "Hatz" anti-missile missile. This was reported by the Ministry of Defense and the Aerospace Industry. In the experiment, which took place in the USA, the Arrow for the first time successfully intercepted a Scud missile in flight. The interception was made over the Pacific Ocean.
The experiment has been planned for nearly two years. During it, a Scud missile was used that was in the possession of the Americans. The test took place at 8:25 in the evening, Israel time, when the missile was launched from the US Navy's Point Magoo test field in California, near Los Angeles, towards the Pacific Ocean.
The Ministry of Defense stated that the purpose of the test conducted yesterday, the 12th of the missile and the seventh of the entire weapon system, was to test the performance of the Arrow system against a target that represents a real threat, "in a realistic scenario that cannot be tested in Israel for reasons of the safety of the test field."
The target launch simulated an operational scenario and all the components of the weapon system worked in their full operational configuration. With the launch of the target, the weapon system went into action. The radar detected the Scud a minute after its launch and transmitted the target data to the fire control center, which drew up a defense plan against it. The defense plans were transferred to the arrow launcher, which launched the interceptor missile and it completed its course successfully - and destroyed the target. The activation of the Arrow system was carried out in cooperation between the US Department of Defense, the "Wall" administration of the Ministry of Defense and the Israeli Air Force.
The Minister of Defense, Shaul Mofaz, said last night following the success of the experiment that "this is a central pillar of Israel's defense system. The success of the experiment is further proof of the technological superiority of the Israeli defense industries." Mofaz added: "We are in an era of uncertainty. The countries of the third circle continue their efforts to obtain unconventional capabilities together with a long-range launch capability." According to the Minister of Defense, "The Arrow is the best missile of its kind in the world and is a 'force multiplier' in the future campaign. Just as importantly, it strengthens Israel's deterrence."
Aryeh Herzog, head of the wall administration, who was at the test field in California, told Channel 1 last night that the test was perfect. "Acquiring the target and destroying it were perfect. We are all happy. The operational implication is that the Air Force has an outstanding system. We knew it all along, but now we have further proof. We will continue developing the system. We want to gain capability against future threats, such as those developing in Iran. We are convinced that we will be able to deal with the expected challenges in time."
A previous test of the Arrow missile was conducted on December 17, 2003. In this test, the Arrow missile destroyed a target that resembled a ballistic missile, flying at an altitude of about 65 km (about 200 feet). The test was carried out at Palmahim Beach, and was conducted as part of an improvement program for the Arrow missile system, which is carried out in cooperation between Israel and the United States. In the previous experiment, the 11th, the arrow flew towards the target for more than a minute and destroyed it with a direct hit. This, even though the arrow is not intended to hit the body of the target missile but to explode near it.
The arrow and the target - a strategic achievement - and not just a technological one
Amir Oran, Haaretz, voila!
Ag, a young and energetic engineer from the center of the country, a second-generation MLM plant employee of the Aerospace Industry and until recently an officer in the Air Force, managed last night with a masterful hand the meeting of the "Arrow" with the Scud-B in the skies of California. The Israeli engineer demonstrated professional control over the complex process of launching the anti-missile missile for the targeted countermeasures of his old enemy, somewhere over the 100 nautical kilometers that separate two US Navy bases - Point Mago north of Los Angeles and San Nicolas Island in the Santa Barbara Channel , in the Pacific Ocean. In both, the island and the base area, in the distant past lived Indians from tribes with the intriguing name "Humsa".
"All the best and appreciation to you," one of the heads of the missile defense program at the Pentagon said to the IG and its colleagues at the end of the experiment. He meant technology - but the real achievement embodied in it and the operational capability of the IDF's "Defensive Sword" unit is strategic: more capacity for targeted countermeasures of attacking missiles, less incentive for attacks, less pressure on the decision makers, who will be able to take risks for peace and war.
The Americans, who have Scud missiles from the former Warsaw Pact countries and recently also from Libya, brought the target missile, the launch and test facilities - and of course the money, about 10 million dollars, to the test.
The Israelis - themselves, the "Arrow", the "Oran Yerok" radar (separately from the launcher, as an image for the radar stationed at the Palmachim base and the battery in Ein Shemer) and many hopes. Yesterday's test was called "Carvan 1", to separate it from the series of "Arrow" tests in Palmachim, which is called "Harif", and which, if the interception of the Scud was also included, would be called Harif-13. The slaves of superstitions will see this as a sign of their success in outwitting Bish-Mazal, but the people of the "Homa" administration in the Ministry of Defense, in the aerospace industry (in addition to MLM, the leader in the development of the missile, the "Alta" plant, whose "Alta" plant plays a central role in the development of radar systems) and in the Air Force , are convinced that luck did not win yesterday - but many years of investment of talent, resources and labor.
The Scud-B, a Russian-made surface-to-surface missile and a continuation of Nazi Germany's V-2 rocket, threatened Israel for the first time from Egypt - this is the missile whose deployment there, under Soviet control, provided Anwar Sadat in 1973 with a sense of balance to the strength of the Israeli Air Force. The range of the Scud, 300 km, allowed it to reach from the west of the Suez Canal to the Haifa Bay, into Sinai and to the IDF forces in the Yom Kippur War, which seven of its soldiers
Killed by the launch of the missile at the local initiative of the Soviet military delegation, in the last hours of the war.
After the war, Egypt provided Scud-B missiles to North Korea, in exchange for the North Korean fighter squadron that was sent to assist Egypt in October 1973. Based on the Soviet missile that arrived from Egypt, North Korea developed missiles that it transferred to Iraq. At the same time, and as a counterweight to the power of Iraq under the rule of Saddam Hussein, Syria and Libya transferred similar missiles to Iran, and it called them "Shihab-1". The different versions of Scud-B were at the center of the "war of the cities" between Baghdad and Tehran.
The "Wall" program is designed to find a local answer to this threat - from Iraq, Iran, Syria (which is still equipped with Scud-B, in addition to long-range missiles, the launchers of which are capable of scattering and moving away from Israel; chemical and biological warheads can be mounted on all these types of missiles), Libya and countries whose regimes The pro-Westerns may collapse and leave Israel facing strong and renewed enemies (Egypt, Saudi Arabia). A dozen years of global supervision over the arming of Iraq and at the end of the American campaign to overthrow Saddam and occupy Baghdad, put an end to the original threat that gave birth to the "Arrow" - but not to other threats.
One of the heads of the "Arrow" responded last night by dismissing the question, what can be learned from an experiment that was so carefully planned, since in war the enemy will not dare to announce when and from where the missile will arrive. The man replied that even in military tensions, the scene of threats is scanned just like in the experiment, in which the exact date of the launch disappeared from the IG team. "In the theater," he said, "a good show is exciting every time, even if it was preceded by rehearsals and performances."
The "Arrow" now has a 100 percent achievement against the "Scud", because it was a single and first experiment. Two previous tests, with American Patriot Pac-3 missiles, ended in a draw - one interception success versus one failure. Following the analysis of the findings of the operation of the Patriot in Iraq last year, the Americans claimed that according to the definition of the achievement required for interception, all the launches were successful - albeit too often, when the system was fed with incorrect data and caused American and British planes to be shot down. According to Israeli experts, this is indeed evidence of an improvement in the Patriot's quality, compared to its poor performance in 1991, but it was only achieved against Iraqi missiles at a range that does not reach half that of the Scud B.
The critics of the "Arrow" will continue to claim that the financial investment in it is not justified, and that it shifts the center of gravity of Israeli security theory from attack to defense. The budgetary question is indeed worthy of discussion, but the events of recent years, in Israel and around the world, show that a country betting on the exclusivity of its offensive power is exposed to too great risks from parties who refuse to cooperate with its logic (Saddam in 1991, suicide terrorism since 2000). Internal limitations of a shaky national consensus and external limitations of a global kosher crisis may prevent the realization of warnings designed to achieve deterrence. Leaving the civilian population hostage, out of a complacent assessment that the enemy will fear a reaction to a "Scud" or an attack, is not a responsible policy.
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