With these words, Moshe Arens, the Minister of Defense, tried in 1983 to convince the IDF to invest in the development of the "Ofek" photography satellite. The army opposed its development because it did not want to bear the expenses, struggles within the defense industries delayed the work, two failed launch attempts almost led to its closure the project
26.9.2001
By: Amnon Barzilai *
"We will set up an Israeli space agency and put Prof. Yuval Naaman at its head", so it was agreed in a closed meeting held at the end of 1982. Major General (res.) Aharon Beit Halami.
The Israel Space Agency (ISA) was established mainly to sponsor the program for the development of the "Ofek" photography satellite and the "Shavit" satellite launcher. Naman, a member of the Knesset and head of the revival movement at the time, was also a participant in the move. As a world-renowned physicist, Naman understood the importance of the program He agreed to take on the role of chairman of the SLA board. The mastermind behind the plan was Prof. Haim Ashed from the Asher Space Research Institute At the Technion, a member of the SLA steering committee. In publications abroad, the name of Ashad, considered the father of the Israeli space program, appears as SLA's project manager.
The program entered Israel into the club of countries with the ability to launch satellites 13 years ago, on September 19, 1988. On that day, the Ofek 1 satellite was launched into space from the Shavit satellite launcher and entered orbit around the Earth. The operation is considered an initiative of the Israeli Space Agency and the word Salah was written along the body of the satellite launcher.
The project was also blessed by the security establishment. Currently, the "Ofek" administration in the Ministry of Defense is responsible for the space project, which deals with planning the launch of the future photography satellites. In a few months, if there are no significant malfunctions, the Ofek 5 satellite will be launched into space and will replace the defunct Ofek 3. "Ofek" 5 is supposed to increase the depth of Israel's strategic warning and reduce its dependence on the photography services of civilian satellites operated by commercial companies, one Israeli and the other foreign.
Who needs satellites?
The plight of the depth of strategic warning was the reason for the meeting requested by the head of the IDF, Major General Yehoshua Sagi, with Defense Minister Ezer Weizman and Chief of Staff Major General Raphael Eitan, in the middle of 1979. At the meeting, Sagi said that the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt, signed on March 29, 1979, Poses an intelligence problem for the AMN. "I suppose that even in times of peace we will need a warning. But in times of peace, fighter jets equipped with cameras do not fly over countries with which we have an agreement," Sagi added.
At the meeting, Sagi said that the only solution to the problem would come from the development of photography satellites. The satellites will make it possible to bypass the political obstacle and help to photograph over all the countries, without causing complications. Weizmann and Eitan were not enthusiastic. "Do you have a feasibility study?" Weizman asked. Sagi replied in the negative. For a moment it seemed that the initiative was dead, as in the past.
Since the war of attrition, the frequency of photography flights over Egypt and Syria has decreased. The SA-2 and SA-3 missile batteries that the Soviet Union provided to the two countries deterred the Air Force from photography flights deep into Egyptian and Syrian territory. Concern for the safety of pilots and aircraft gave the main impetus to the development of pilotless aircraft (UAVs).
The difficulty in gathering intelligence increased after the Yom Kippur War. Following the separation talks with Egypt and Syria, new instructions were given regarding aerial photographs. Yitzhak Rabin, in his first term as Prime Minister, stated that any photography flight over Syria and Egypt must receive his approval. The consideration behind the instruction was mainly political. The government did not want the continuation of the photo flights to be a reason to stop the talks. Rabin's instruction became a practice, which was established even after Likud came to power.
The head of the IDF that preceded Sagia, Major General (Ret.) Shlomo Gazit, shared Prof. Na'am in his hardships. Na'im, formerly the deputy head of the IDF, served as a special adviser to Defense Minister Shimon Peres in the mid-seventies. "Rabin's instruction meant that the Air Force planes had to make do with oblique shots, which are less good," says Naaman. In January 1976, Naaman prepared an unpleasant surprise for Rabin. head
The government visited the United States and hosted Congress. In his book "Service Register" Rabin described the welcome that awaited him there: "I was pressed against the wall with embarrassing questions regarding the procurement lists we submitted to the US. On the question 'Why does Israel need a system of...satellites that costs about a billion dollars?' I didn't have any answer except one, serious and open: 'We don't need such a system,' and indeed that's how I answered with sincerity." Rabin added: "The list included more details 'from the Haftara'... from the imagination of Prof. Yuval Neman."
But Rabin's accusations were directed at the wrong address. "I was the one who submitted to Yuval the request to purchase satellites from the USA, because the Air Force refrained from photographing enemy territories except in Lebanon," says Gazit. "But we only did superficial work. Beyond submitting the application, we did nothing."
Four years later, Sagi worked more deeply. At the time, the AMN had a huge budget of about half a billion dollars. Following the meeting of General Sagi with Weizman and the Chief of Staff, the AMN approved about five million dollars from its budget to test the feasibility of building satellite launchers, satellites and telescopic cameras in the Aerospace Industry (TAA), in the Development Authority Weapons (Rafal) and Al-Op. The industrial plants were asked to finish the work within ten months. At the same time, Sagi appointed a chief projector in the AMN for the subject of satellites.
With Sagi's approval, a meeting with Weizman was scheduled for the projector. The project later said that Weizmann was the first obstacle in the path of the space program, but he also gave it a chance. Weizmann requested that the plan be presented, for a second opinion, also to Col. (Res.) Emanuel Perat, the man who built the nuclear reactor at Dimona. Perat gave his blessing.
The project also met with Dov Raviv, director of the MLM plant for systems engineering of the Aerospace Industry (TAA). According to foreign publications, MLM was engaged in the development and production of a surface-to-surface missile (SAM). The story of the missile began already in the sixties. A report published in the "New York Times" in January 1966 stated that Israel had signed a secret agreement with France for the purchase of medium-range surface-to-surface missiles. In 1989, a year after the launch of Ofek, the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London claimed that the Shavit satellite launcher is the basis for the Israeli Jericho surface-to-surface missile. Seven years later, the French company Dassault revealed the The story of the missile, which it developed for Israel. According to foreign publications, the company transferred the continued development and production to MLM, following the imposition of the embargo. the French for selling arms to Israel.
At the meeting, Raviv was asked if his factory is capable of developing and producing a satellite launcher. He was also asked if the factory could produce a satellite that would carry a camera capable of transmitting images with a separation capability (resolution) of three meters (that is, the photography would make it possible to identify any object with dimensions of three meters or more). Raviv claimed that the plant could launch into space a satellite weighing 250 kg, which would circle the earth in a low orbit. Thus began the collaboration, which lasted for more than ten years.
The ambitious Raviv wanted MLM to be Israel's missile and satellite factory, but the TA management thought otherwise. The feasibility study commissioned by AMN for the construction of satellites came to her at a blessed time. Following the fall of the Shah of Iran and the rise to power of Ayatollah Khomeini in February 1979, the cooperation between Israel and Iran in the development of advanced weapons systems came to an end.
One of the victims of the termination of cooperation with Iran was the TAA's Mbat plant in Yehud. At the beginning of 1980, the head of the field of future sea missiles at the factory, Dr. Moshe Barlev, whose staff was left without a job, was tasked with preparing a feasibility study for building satellites. "None of us knew what a space was," says Barlev. "Each of the group is required to learn by himself, through books and journals, about topics such as materials in space, the mechanics of orbits in space, heat transfer in space and more."
Raviv did not give up. He turned to Dr. Gabi Birin, a physicist who worked at MLM, and tasked him also to form a team of engineers to design a photography satellite. At the same time, a team of scientists at Raphael also worked on the feasibility study. No one imagined that the quarrel that would break out between all those involved in the project would push the launch date back by three years.
American suspicions
Yehoshua Sagi, during whose time the intelligence satellite project was started, was the only head of the intelligence agency that grew up within the intelligence corps. Hence also his special attitude to aerial photographs. "The best information is what you see with the eye," asserts Sagi. Unlike listening to telephone lines, which can be jammed, or electronic signals that are vulnerable to deception, there are no means that can disrupt what the camera lens perceives from a photo decoder An experienced can distinguish between a real weapon array and a dummy array.
The operational requirement from the Israel Defense Forces and Rafale in the photography satellite project was an outgrowth of the needs of the IDF. The Intelligence Division demanded that the images provided by the satellite make it possible to distinguish between objects that are 1.5 meters in size. At such a level of separation, it is possible to distinguish between a truck and a tank. The IDF assessment was that Due to the financial constraints, which will dictate the dimensions of the launcher, it will be possible to build a small satellite weighing only 80 kg. AMN believed that it would be possible to launch the first photography satellite in 1986
In an interview published in the "Washington Post" on May 19, 1984, Sagi, who had good relations with the head of the CIA William Casey, told how in one of their meetings he asked to use the services of the American photography satellites. The USA developed huge satellites, KH-11, which were equipped with cameras weighing a ton that transmitted images from space with a resolution of 20 cm. The good connections did not help the error. Casey flinched. He explained that the American photography satellites are a national collection source, which the US does not share with any country.
On June 7, 1981, the Israeli Air Force bombed the Iraqi nuclear reactor "Osirak". The operation was carried out without assistance from the US and the Air Force had to look for another source of aerial photographs of the Iraqi reactor. However, a crack opened in the wall of American resistance. After the bombing, the Americans agreed to show photographs of the reactor from their space photography database. Israelis who viewed the photographs taken by the American satellites were amazed at their quality. But the lessons learned from the bombing of the Iraqi reactor strengthened the position of AMN that it should not rely on the Americans and the development of the satellite and the launcher must continue.
The Aerospace Industry found a foreign customer
In May 1980, Weizmann resigned from the position of Minister of Defense. Begin assumed the position of Acting Minister of Defense, which he held until the elections of July 1981. At the end of 1980, the work on the feasibility study of the launcher and the satellite was completed and Sagi turned to Begin to obtain additional approval that would allow the advancement of the project.
At that stage, questions arose for the first time about the scope of the financial investment in the project. The first estimate was that the cost of the project would be about 250 million dollars. "But for those who know what a first estimate is, it is clear that the expenditure should be quadrupled. That is, it is a billion dollar project," says a person who was involved in the decision-making process.
Prime Minister and Defense Minister Begin held a comprehensive discussion regarding the budgeting of the space project. IAI found a "foreign customer" who was willing to participate in the financing of the project. Thus TAA submitted a much cheaper offer than the one submitted by Raphael. The agreement with the foreign client allowed for a more generous budget for building a larger launcher. The arrangement made it possible to finance the project outside the defense budget.
The secret agreement lasted all the years of the project's development. On July 14, 1994, Joe Morrisa, the Minister of Defense of the South African government, caused a stir when he published details of the cooperation between Israel and South Africa in the development of missile technology. The security ties between the two countries began in the early 70s and intensified in the 80s when South Africa replaced Iran as the main customer of Israeli weapons systems. The scope of the contracts signed with the Ministry of Defense of South Africa was about 2.3 billion dollars towards the end of the 80s
Rafael defeats TAA
Ariel Sharon's entry into the Ministry of Defense, after the 1981 elections, required renewed approval of the satellite project. Sharon, like his predecessors, supported the project, but reformed the structure of the research and development (R&D) organization of the defense establishment. Sharon decided to add to the R&D organization project managements that operated independently. Aharon Beit Halami, head of R&D, was appointed director general of the Ministry of Defense. Rafael's CEO, Dr. Ben Zion Neve, was appointed head of the Weapons and Infrastructure Development Administration (MADA). The change of men in the Ministry of Defense affected the competition between Rafael and TAA regarding the leadership of the project.
The TAA management decided that the MBT plant, led by Barlev's team, would lead the development of the satellite. At the beginning of 1982, a recommendation called the Ofek Program was submitted for the development of an observation satellite. The plan included schedules, pre-planning for a ground station, budgets and personnel requirements. The team also made a model of the satellite. The recommendation was to develop the satellite and the launcher independently, without relying on foreign knowledge.
But the people of TAA are in for a bitter disappointment. Beit Halami and Neveh decided that Raphael would be the main contractor in the development of the satellite. The satellite launcher, it was decided, will be developed by the MLM factory. The two large engines of "Shavit" will be built at the Givon factory of the military industry, the third engine will be developed at Rafael. The Ministry of Defense presented Rafa'el with one condition - Mbat would be a secondary contractor in the project. This condition was, as it turned out, in the hands of Raphael.
The satellite project suffered another shock with Sharon's resignation from the position of Minister of Defense in February 1983, following the conclusions of the Kahn Commission on his responsibility for the Sabra and Shetila massacres. Moshe Arens was appointed Minister of Defense. Arens didn't need much explanation about the importance of photography satellites. As someone who previously served as chief engineer of the IAA, Arens saw the photography satellites and the development of the launchers as a national project.
But changes at the top of AMN delayed the project. In August 1983 Yehoshua Sagi retired from the position of head of AMN. The new head of the IDF, Major General Ehud Barak, dismissed the importance of the project. He claimed that the IDF and the IDF do not need photography satellites and that it is possible to be satisfied with photographs of the Air Force, even if these are taken from Israeli territory, at a high altitude and at an angle.
Arens: "As soon as Ehud said 'no need', there was no IDF budget to continue the work. This is a syndrome in the IDF. The commanders are afraid of the development budgets. They thought that the army would be damaged by the project. They did not understand that they were building a force multiplier, which gives the IDF priority and a quality advantage that can only be achieved through development in Israel." Barak's opposition to the satellite raised concerns that the project will perish
TAA defeats Rafael
Shortly after entering the Ministry of Defense, Arens appointed Yitzhak Ariav as Director General of the Israel Defense Forces. At the same time, additional appointments were made. Colonel (res.) Menachem Marom was appointed Director General of the Ministry of Defense. The Commander of the Air Force, Colonel David Evri, retired and was appointed Chairman of the IA Board of Directors. Colonel Amos Lapidot was appointed Commander of the Corps. IA leaders began to pressure the management of the Ministry The confidence to hold a repeat discussion on the decision to hand over the development of the photography satellite to Raphael. Among other things, Dov Raviv met for a one-on-one conversation with Arens.
In order to convince the heads of the Ministry of Defense to re-discuss the decision, the IA management claimed that Rafael does not intend to fulfill the condition that stated that it must participate in the Mbat plant in the project as a subcontractor. The IA also leaked information about the price offer submitted by Rafael In the same proposal, Rafael demanded more than 300 million dollars to carry out the project. Moshe Barlev, on behalf of the TAA, formulated a price proposal according to which the cost of the project would be about 110 million dollars, about a third of Rafael's proposal. The Ministry of Defense finally decided to transfer the project to the Israel Defense Forces.
Rafael's CEO at the time, Dr. Ze'ev Bunan, says: "We tried to give correct estimates, which were too optimistic even then. Others gave deficient estimates. Friends came to me with complaints and asked why I didn't behave in a similar way. I didn't think it was realistic. In any case, it turned out that it was a game between the Ministry of Defense and the TA. Let's put things on the table. Arens, with the help of the CEO, managed things. The satellite affair cost Rafa'el dearly. We lost a big and very important project."
The decision to transfer the project to TA was also due to Barak's refusal to finance the project from the AMN budget. "Rafael was worried that it would not be able to meet the price," says Arens. "I decided that the TAA would be the main contractor, because I thought it would be good for both the satellite and the launcher to be developed in the same framework. Later it turned out that the budget required to complete the project was much larger."
Cover for security activity
"It was convenient to do everything through us. The security establishment used the space agency to cover its activities, because no one is willing to help if it's military satellites. It would have turned into a political problem," says Prof. Naaman, chairman of the first board of directors of SLA.
As a research body, Salah was allowed to purchase images from commercial satellites, such as the French "Spot". The level of separation of "Spot" was low. The camera only noticed objects 10 meters in size and larger. In the order submitted for the development of the space project, Salah stated that it was a scientific experiment , where two generations of experimental satellites will be built. In the third generation, it is written, a commercial communication satellite will be built. The program was published in an official brochure in ..1987
The central figure in the SLA was Prof. Haim Ashad, and researchers from the academy were invited to participate in various committees alongside him. The SLA secretary was appointed Dr. Barlev, the head of the administration at Mbat, the factory that was tasked with building the satellite. It was agreed that due to the secrecy of the "Ofek" program, only Prof. Naman would appear in the media, if necessary, to provide information about Israel's space program. Salah's official publications state that Ashad is a member of the agency's steering committee.
The activity within SLA was extremely convenient. It allowed the managers directly responsible for the development of the launcher and the satellite, Raviv and Barlev, and their subordinates, to participate in international conferences in the field of space without being approached with embarrassing questions. SLA gave the state coverage to the "Ofek" program. The activity within the SLA also proved that the State of Israel, not necessarily the army, sees the occupation of space as a national mission. From the point of view of the army, the "Ofek" program was a stepchild. It was not interested in it.
At the expense of fighter jets
In September 1984, a unity government was established. A few months earlier Arens brought the space project to the approval of the government. With Yitzhak Rabin's entry into the Ministry of Defense, in that unity government, the Ofek program was a fait accompli.
Rabin learned that the Israel Defense Forces is leading two controversial projects. One is open and known - the "Lavi" aircraft. The other - the space project, which is progressing under a heavy shroud of secrecy. The debate over the need for a photography satellite and satellite launchers, as well as the need for a blue fighter jet - Laban, broke out with the entry of General Avihu Ben Nun to the Air Force Commander's office in 1987
The Air Force was mainly concerned about the budgetary burden of the space project being placed on its shoulders. In the mid-80s, Rabin managed a comprehensive plan to cut the defense budget. Ben Nun did not want the acceptance of responsibility for the space project to come at the expense of purchasing fighter planes. In internal discussions at the General Staff, harsh claims were made against investments in the development of an expensive product, which the army does not need.
"I said in the discussions that the images that 'Ofek' was supposed to provide would not make it possible to produce the intelligence required by the Air Force for depth purposes," says Ben Nun. "We could have purchased photos from 'Spot'. As far as I'm concerned, there is no difference between photography with the resolution promised by 'Ofek' and photos with a resolution of five meters that I received from 'Spot'."
The Air Force saw the project as a private whim of technologists in the defense system and the defense industries, who joined together in an attempt to prove that they were capable of launching satellites into space. In internal discussions in the defense establishment, it was said that the Air Force needed tactical intelligence in real time, but the Ofek program had no such pretensions. The Air Force also claimed that the ability to continuously look from space can be achieved by a network of 24-18 photography satellites, floating simultaneously in space. It was clear that such a network was a task beyond Israel's financial strength.
According to the plan, the Israeli photography satellite was supposed to orbit the Earth in a low orbit. The Air Force estimated that as a result the satellite would sink and burn up within a short period of time. The army saw this as proof of the scope of the heavy investments required to ensure real-time intelligence. From the Air Force's point of view, a satellite that does not provide operational intelligence for an attack is too expensive.
But the appointment of Major General Amnon Lipkin Shakh to the head of IMN in place of Ehud Barak in 1986 created a problem for the Air Force. Unlike his predecessor, Shakh believed that IMN needed photography satellites. He believed that "even if it is not measurable in terms of products, satellite photography has a strategic value, even if not intelligence, from the very fact of Israel's presence in space." Shakak's approach was similar to the line adopted by Rabin. Rabin also saw the "Ofek" program as a technological breakthrough from a national point of view, not necessarily a military one.
Shakhak's firm support for the satellite and Ben Nun's opposition to the project made the decision of the Chief of Staff, Major General Dan Shomron, easier. In 1987, about a year before the launch of Ofek 1, it was decided that the photography satellite would be the responsibility of AMN. For the first time since the program started, the photography satellite had a father.
The launch of Ofek 1 on September 19, 1988
After a day's delay, "Ofek" 1 was launched on the three-stage satellite launcher "Shavit" from the Palmachim test site. The launcher was equipped with solid fuel. The first rocket engine (the first stage) contained a solid propellant weighing about nine tons, the second rocket engine contained about three tons of solid propellant. The role of the third stage, which weighed about 350 kg, was to put the satellite into orbit around the Earth. Due to the geographic constraints and Israel's small size, the satellite is launched from east to west, against the direction of the Earth's rotation.
"Ofek" weighed 1 NIS 156 kg and was defined as a "technological experimental satellite". There was no camera on it and it entered a low elliptical orbit around the Earth. The satellite completed one lap around the Earth once every 98 minutes and rotated parallel to the equator, 40-30 degrees north of it.
The launch of the satellite requires advance preparation in many areas. Unlike tests of other weapons systems, it is impossible to hide the launch of a satellite from a launcher that is about 12 m long. The Palmachim test site is located south of the western neighborhoods of Rishon Lezion, so eyewitnesses could pass the news about the launch within minutes. According to the UN Charter, every country is required to report on the launch of a satellite. The launch forced the Israeli government to officially reveal its launch capability into space for the first time. Until the launch date, Israel's official spokespeople did not refer to this capability. Secrecy in the field of satellites was related to policy the ambiguity
Doron Soslik, Deputy Vice President and Head of the Communications Division at the Israel Defense Forces, was appointed by the security establishment to be responsible for briefing the Israeli and international media. Soslik: "There was a combination of technological, security and political aspects, all of which had to be taken into account." Until the launch, according to foreign publications, Israel had launched TKK from time to time, but it never addressed this. With the launch of "Ofek" it was clear that Israel's ability to launch into space would be displayed and exposed for all to see.
As expected, the world media focused on the satellite launcher "Shavit" and was less interested in the "Ofek" satellite. 1 In the May 1989 issue of the journal "Engineers and Architects" appeared a rare quote from the mouth of Prof. Ashad: "The effort that was made so that 'Ofek' 1 would succeed no matter what Enormous. One failure is enough to cause severe demoralization and knock us down. That's why we acted in a similar way to the situation in which we put Gatkes, both likes and take a belt for your pants so they don't fall off."
The launch also had a political aspect. The Knesset elections were set for November 1, 1988, while the original launch date was about a month and a half before, on September 18 (the launch was finally on September 19). Rabin remembered the launch of the Shavit 2 missile on the eve of the 1981 elections. So that the Likud would not accuse him of an election exercise, Rabin decided that he would not come to the launch site in Palmachim. He saw the launch, with Hebrew, on a screen installed in his office. Rabin also forbade the hosting of non-Muslims on the site. He rejected the request of Prof. Neman, whom he saw as a political personality, to be present at the launch.
The project may collapse
Seven years, some of them full of disappointments, passed between the launch of "Ofek" 1 and the launch of the "Ofek" 3 photography satellite. Until the launch, on April 5, 1995, it sometimes seemed that the project might collapse. On April 3, 1990, Ofek 2 was launched into space. The weight of the satellite was 160 kg, only four kilograms more than the weight of the first satellite. From this fact, it can be concluded that in fact there has been no significant improvement in the lifting capacity of the launcher. That is, the satellite still cannot carry A large camera. This figure did not prevent "Newsweek" from announcing the day before the launch that Israel is developing the Jericho 3 missile, which reaches a range of 6,000 km.
In the first half of the nineties, two more launches were made. Both launches failed and the launcher, along with its precious cargo, fell into the sea. In the defense establishment, the project was given the derogatory nickname "Lancel" (anti-submarine satellite). Following the failures, Dr. Barlev began looking for a replacement for "Shavit". An interesting option was found in Russia. Immediately after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia expressed a willingness to sell satellite images to anyone interested. Russia has also expressed willingness to launch the Israeli photography satellites from the Russian satellite launcher "Mulania". Barlev's independent action earned him the wrath of the security establishment, but sowed the first seeds from which the joint activity with Russia to launch commercial photography satellites grew.
The defense industries exerted heavy pressure on the defense system. The technology stored in the field of satellites and the telescopic camera with a resolution of 1.5 meters developed by Al-Op, according to foreign publications, was unique in the world. Since everything is derived from the launch capability of "Shavit", a photography satellite has been developed that is much smaller than other photography satellites in the world.
In preparation for the launch of "Ofek" 3, two camps were held in the defense system for the battle. On one side, many in the defense establishment stood up, demanding that the launch be postponed. On the other side, the industrialists led by Prof. Ashad showed up. Together with Dr. Berlav and Al-Op CEO Kobi Thorn, Ashad claimed that the capability developed in Israel should not be wasted and demanded that the launch be carried out immediately. The head of the Israel Defense Forces at the time, Brigadier General (Ret.) Uzi Elam and Director General Ivri decided in favor of the launch. Rabin confirmed. After the successful launch of "Ofek" 3, Chief of Staff Major General Amnon Shakh said that the Israeli photography satellite is a strategic asset , "but still not good enough for tactical intelligence."
Ashad's dream is coming true
In the mid-90s, discussions were held in AMN about the need for photography satellites. The conclusions were not encouraging. The reality was completely different from the one that prevailed in 1979. Israel was a generation away from the USA in producing images from space at a high level of separation. There was no surprise in this, but it was clear to the participants in the discussions that the USA is ready to sell or provide satellite photographs to countries defined as its friends, including Saudi Arabia. There was no assurance that such photographs would not pass into other hands. Russia also provides photographs from space to every country.
Another question posed by the head of the IDF at the time, Major General (Ret.) Uri Sagi, was whether the IDF needed a photography satellite or whether it would be sufficient to establish a ground station that would receive photographs from American satellites. Finally, the AMN decided that it was better to rely on an independent photography capability, since "those who allow photographs can also prohibit their supply in times of distress." The AMN were not satisfied with the Israeli satellite and decided to reach an agreement with the Americans on the provision of photographs.
At the same time, the AMN formed the "visual intelligence doctrine". Alongside the 8200 collection unit, the "Vizint" division was established, which brings together all visual means: observations, drones, aerial photographs from fighter planes and satellite photographs. The unit also deals with the organizational aspect : the processing of the images, the production of meanings and the dissemination of information in the IDF.
On January 21, 1998, the Ofek 4 launch failed and the defense establishment's approach to the photography satellite project changed. More than two years after "Ofek" 3 floated in space, the number of supporters within the IDF for the project increased. The Minister of Defense, Yitzhak Mordechai, and the Director General of the Ministry of Defense, Ilan Biran, decided to accept full responsibility for the project. Only then was all activity transferred from the SLA to the Ministry of Defense. Within MPAAT, the "Ofek" administration was established. For the first time, a multi-year plan (2010) was formed in the Ministry of Defense that dealt with "Ofek" programs until XNUMX and the amount of funds needed for the launch of photography and communication satellites.
The Air Force also changed its perception. The Commander of the Air Force, Major General (res.) Eitan Ben Eliyahu, believed that the structure of the Air Force should combine air and space. This perception is especially true as the circle of threat expands and the battlefields become more distant. Ben Eliyahu demanded that the responsibility for "Ofek" 3 be transferred from the Air Force to the Air Force. "The orientation of the Air Force required reliance on satellite capability in the field of real-time intelligence and communication," says Ben Eliyahu.
About two years ago, the Chief of Staff, Major General Shaul Mofaz, at the end of a series of discussions with the commander of the Air Force and the former head of the IDF, Major General Amos Malka, established the following agreement: the formulation of the requirements on behalf of the IDF regarding the photography satellites will gradually be handed over to the Air Force, while Coordination with Amn.
The ground receiving station is currently in the Mbat plant. Ben Eliyahu believes that the additional ground station for receiving satellite images will be built at one of the Air Force bases. Then the circle will also be closed and the full integration of air and space under the control of the Air Force will be created.
On December 5, 2000, the Israeli commercial photography satellite "Eros I-1" was launched from the Svobodni missile site in Siberia. The satellite, which belongs to the "Imagsat" company, was developed at the MBT plant. The telescopic camera installed in it was developed at Al-Op. The civilian satellite was a derivative of "Ofek."3 This fulfilled the dream of Prof. Ashad, in which Barlev and Raviv were also partners, to simultaneously develop Israeli photography satellites for military and civilian purposes.
ImageSat, which is owned by TAA, Elbit Systems and foreign investors, plans to launch seven to eight photography satellites into space. The next two satellites will be heavier than "Ofek" 3 and will weigh about 350 kg, so that they will carry larger cameras with high resolution more. The development of civilian satellites sheds light on the future quality of Israeli intelligence satellites.
* Until the end of 2002, the Hidan site was part of the IOL portal from the Haaretz-Walla group
