With these words, Moshe Arens, the Minister of Defense, tried in 1983 to convince the IDF to invest in the development of the "Ofek" photography satellite. The army opposed its development because it did not want to bear the expenses, struggles within the defense industries delayed the work, two failed launch attempts almost led to the closure of the project
26.9.2001
By: Amnon Barzilai *
"We will establish an Israeli space agency and place Prof. Yuval Naaman at its head", so it was agreed in a closed meeting that took place at the end of 1982. Among the main partners in the decision and those who were included in the secret were the Prime Minister at the time, Menachem Begin, the Minister of Defense, Ariel Sharon, and the Director General of the Ministry of Defense, Sub Major General (res.) Aharon Beit Halami.
The Israel Space Agency (ISA) was established mainly to sponsor the program for the development of the "Ofek" photography satellite and the "Shavit" satellite launcher. Naman, a Knesset member and head of the revival movement at the time, was also a participant in the move. As a world-renowned physicist, Naman understood the importance of the program. He agreed to take on the position of chairman of the SLA board of directors. The mastermind behind the plan was Prof. Haim Ashad from the Asher Institute for Space Research at the Technion, a member of the SLA steering committee. In publications abroad, the name of Ashad, considered the father of the Israeli space program, appears as the project manager of SLA.
The program entered Israel into the club of countries with the ability to launch satellites 13 years ago, on September 19, 1988. On that day, the Ofek 1 satellite was launched into space from the Shavit satellite launcher and entered orbit around the Earth. The operation is considered an initiative of the Israeli Space Agency and the word Salah was written along the body of the satellite launcher.
The project was also blessed by the security establishment. Currently, the "Ofek" administration in the Ministry of Defense is responsible for the space project, which deals with planning the launch of the future photography satellites. In a few months, if there are no significant faults, the Ofek 5 satellite will be launched into space and will replace the defunct Ofek 3. "Ofek" 5 is supposed to increase the depth of Israel's strategic warning and reduce its dependence on the photography services of civilian satellites operated by commercial companies, one Israeli and the other foreign.
Who needs satellites?
The predicament of strategic warning depth was the reason for the meeting requested by the head of the Security Council, Major General Yehoshua Sagi, with Defense Minister Ezer Weizman and Chief of Staff Major General Raphael Eitan, in mid-1979. At the meeting, Sagi said that the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt, signed on March 29, 1979, Poses an intelligence problem for the Aman. "I guess even in times of peace we will need a warning. But in times of peace, fighter jets equipped with cameras do not fly over countries with which we have an agreement," Sagi added.
At the meeting, Sagi said that the only solution to the problem would come from the development of photography satellites. The satellites will make it possible to bypass the political obstacle and help to photograph over all the countries, without causing complications. Weizmann and Eitan were not enthusiastic. "Do you have a feasibility study?" Weizman asked. Sagi replied in the negative. For a moment it seemed that the initiative was dead, as in the past.
Since the war of attrition, the frequency of photography flights over Egypt and Syria has decreased. The SA-2 and SA-3 missile batteries that the Soviet Union provided to the two countries deterred the Air Force from photography flights deep into Egyptian and Syrian territory. Concern for the safety of pilots and aircraft gave the main impetus to the development of pilotless aircraft (UAVs).
The difficulty in gathering intelligence increased after the Yom Kippur War. Following the separation talks with Egypt and Syria, new instructions were given regarding aerial photographs. Yitzhak Rabin, in his first term as Prime Minister, stated that any photography flight over Syria and Egypt must receive his approval. The consideration behind the instruction was mainly political. The government did not want the continuation of the photo flights to be a reason to stop the talks. Rabin's instruction became a practice, which was established even after Likud came to power.
The head of the AMN that preceded Sagia, Major General (Res.) Shlomo Gazit, shared with Prof. Neman in his hardships. Naman, formerly deputy head of the National Security Agency, served as a special adviser to Defense Minister Shimon Peres in the mid-seventies. "Rabin's instruction meant that the Air Force planes had to make do with oblique shots, which are less good," says Naaman. In January 1976, Naaman prepared an unpleasant surprise for Rabin. head
The government visited the United States and hosted Congress. In his book "Service Book" Rabin described the welcome that awaited him there: "I was pressed against the wall with embarrassing questions regarding the procurement lists we submitted to the US. On the question 'Why does Israel need a system of...satellites that costs about a billion dollars?' I had no answer except one, serious and open: 'We don't need such a system,' and indeed that's how I answered with sincerity." Rabin added: "The list included more details 'from the Haftara'... from the imagination of Prof. Yuval Naaman."
But Rabin's accusations were directed at the wrong address. "I was the one who submitted to Yuval the request to purchase satellites from the USA, because the Air Force refrains from photographing enemy territories except in Lebanon," says Gazit. "But we did only superficial work. Beyond submitting the application, we did nothing."
Four years later, Sagi worked more deeply. At that time AMAN had at its disposal a huge budget of about half a billion dollars. Following Major General Sagi's meeting with Weizmann and the Chief of Staff, Aman approved approximately five million dollars from his budget to test the feasibility of building satellite launchers, satellites and telescopic cameras at the Aerospace Industry (TAA), the Weapons Development Authority (Raphael) and Al-Op. The industrial plants were asked to finish the work within ten months. At the same time, Sagi appointed a chief projector at the Amman for the subject of satellites.
With Sagi's approval, a meeting with Weizman was scheduled for the projector. The project later said that Weizmann was the first obstacle in the path of the space program, but he also gave it a chance. Weizman requested that the plan be presented, for a second opinion, also to Col. (Res.) Emanuel Perat, the man who built the nuclear reactor at Dimona. Perat gave his blessing.
The project also met with Dov Raviv, director of the MLM plant for systems engineering of the Aerospace Industry (TAA). According to foreign publications, MLM was engaged in the development and production of a surface-to-surface missile. The story of the missile began already in the sixties. In a report published in the "New York Times" in January 1966, it was written that Israel had signed a secret agreement with France for the purchase of medium-range surface-to-surface missiles. In 1989, a year after the "Ofek" launch, the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London claimed that the "Comet" satellite launcher is the basis for the Israeli "Jericho" surface-to-surface missile. Seven years later, the French company Dassault revealed the story of the missile, which it developed for Israel. According to foreign publications, the company transferred the continuation of development and production to MLM, following the imposition of the French embargo on arms sales to Israel.
At the meeting, Raviv was asked if his factory is capable of developing and producing a satellite launcher. He was also asked if the plant could produce a satellite that would carry a camera capable of transmitting images with a separation capability (resolution) of three meters (that is, the photography would allow the identification of any object with dimensions of three meters or more). Raviv claimed that the plant could launch into space a satellite weighing 250 kg, which would circle the earth in a low orbit. Thus began the collaboration, which lasted more than ten years.
The ambitious Raviv wanted MLM to be Israel's missile and satellite factory, but the TAA management thought otherwise. The feasibility study commissioned by Aman for the construction of satellites came to her at a blessed time. Following the fall of the Shah in Iran and the rise to power of Ayatollah Khomeini, in February 1979, the cooperation between Israel and Iran in the development of advanced weapons systems came to an end.
One of the victims of the termination of cooperation with Iran was the Mbat plant of the TAA in Judea. At the beginning of 1980, the head of the field of future naval missiles at the factory, Dr. Moshe Barlev, whose staff was left without a job, was tasked with preparing a feasibility study for building satellites. Dr. Patrick Rosenbaum, head of missile and guided bomb control, was appointed as his deputy. "None of us knew what a space was," says Barlev. "Each of the group is required to learn by himself, through books and journals, about topics such as materials in space, the mechanics of orbits in space, heat transfer in space and more."
Raviv did not give up. He turned to Dr. Gabi Birin, a physicist who worked at MLM, and tasked him to form a team of engineers to design a photography satellite. At the same time, a team of scientists at Raphael also worked on the feasibility study. No one imagined that the quarrel that would break out between all those involved in the project would postpone the launch date by three years.
American suspicions
Yehoshua Sagi, during whose time the intelligence satellite project was started, was the only head of the AMN that grew up within the intelligence corps. Hence his special attitude to aerial photographs. "The best information is what you can see with your own eyes", says Sagi. Unlike listening to phone lines, which can be jammed, or electronic signals that are vulnerable to deception, there are no means that can disrupt what the camera lens picks up. An experienced photo decoder can tell the difference between a real weapon array and a dummy array. The most notable limitation of an image is its inability to testify to the enemy's intentions.
The operational requirement from the Israel Defense Forces and Rafale in the photography satellite project was an outgrowth of the needs of Amn. The Intelligence Division demanded that the images provided by the satellite would make it possible to distinguish between objects that are 1.5 meters in size. At such a level of separation it is possible to distinguish between a truck and a tank. The assessment at AMAN was that due to the financial constraints, which would dictate the dimensions of the launcher, it would be possible to build a small satellite weighing only 80 kg. At Aman they believed that it would be possible to launch the first photography satellite in 1986
In an interview published in the "Washington Post" on May 19, 1984, Sagi, who had good relations with the head of the CIA William Casey, told how in one of their meetings he asked to use the services of the American photography satellites. The USA developed huge satellites, KH-11, which were equipped with cameras weighing a ton that transmitted images from space with a resolution of 20 cm. The good connections did not help the error. Casey flinched. He explained that the American photography satellites are a national collection source, which the USA does not share with any country.
On June 7, 1981, the Israeli Air Force bombed the Iraqi nuclear reactor "Osirak". The operation was carried out without assistance from the US and the Air Force had to look for another source for aerial photographs of the Iraqi reactor. However, a crack opened in the wall of American resistance. After the bombing, the Americans agreed to show pictures of the reactor from their space photography database. Israelis who viewed the pictures taken by the American satellites marveled at their quality. But the lessons learned from the bombing of the Iraqi reactor strengthened the position in AMN that it was not to rely on the Americans and that the development of the satellite and the launcher should continue.
The Aerospace Industry found a foreign customer
In May 1980, Weizmann resigned from the position of Minister of Defense. Begin assumed the position of Acting Minister of Defense, which he held until the elections of July 1981. At the end of 1980, the work on the feasibility study of the launcher and the satellite was completed and Sagi turned to Begin to obtain additional approval that would allow the advancement of the project.
At that stage, questions arose for the first time about the scope of the financial investment in the project. The first estimate was that the cost of the project would be about 250 million dollars. "But for those who know what a first estimate is, it is clear that the expenditure should be quadrupled. In other words, this is a billion dollar project," says a person who was involved in the decision-making process.
Prime Minister and Defense Minister Begin held a comprehensive discussion regarding the budgeting of the space project. IAI found a "foreign client" who was willing to participate in the financing of the project. Thus, IAA submitted a much cheaper offer than the one submitted by Rafael. The agreement with the foreign client allowed for a more generous budget for building a larger launcher. The arrangement made it possible to finance the project outside the defense budget.
The secret agreement lasted all the years of the project's development. On July 14, 1994, Joe Morrisa, the Minister of Defense of the South African government, caused a stir when he published details of the cooperation between Israel and South Africa in the development of missile technology. The security ties between the two countries began in the early 70s and intensified in the 80s when South Africa replaced Iran as the main customer of Israeli weapons systems. The scope of the contracts signed with the Ministry of Defense of South Africa was about 2.3 billion dollars towards the end of the 80s
Rafael defeats TAA
Ariel Sharon's entry into the Ministry of Defense, after the 1981 elections, required renewed approval of the satellite project. Sharon, like his predecessors, supported the project, but reformed the structure of the research and development organization (R&D) of the defense establishment. Sharon decided to add to the R&D organization project managements that operated independently. Aharon Beit Halami, head of R&D, was appointed director general of the Ministry of Defense. Rafael's CEO, Dr. Ben Zion Neve, was appointed head of the Weapons and Infrastructure Development Administration (MADA). The change of men in the Ministry of Defense affected the competition between Rafael and TEA regarding the leadership of the project.
The TAA management decided that the MBT plant, led by Barlev's team, would lead the development of the satellite. At the beginning of 1982, a recommendation called the Ofek Program was submitted for the development of an observation satellite. The plan included schedules, pre-planning for a ground station, budgets and personnel requirements. The team also made a model of the satellite. The recommendation was to develop the satellite and the launcher independently, without relying on foreign knowledge.
But for the people of TAA, there is a bitter disappointment. Beit HaLachemi and Neveh decided that Raphael would be the main contractor in the development of the satellite. The satellite launcher, it was decided, would be developed by the MLM factory. The two large engines of "Shavit" will be built at the Givon plant of the military industry, the third engine will be developed in Raphael. The Ministry of Defense presented Rafael with one condition - Mbat would be a secondary contractor in the project. This condition was, as it turned out, in the hands of Raphael.
The satellite project suffered another shock with Sharon's resignation from the position of Minister of Defense in February 1983, following the conclusions of the Kahn Commission on his responsibility for the Sabra and Shetila massacres. Moshe Arens was appointed Minister of Defense. Arens didn't need much explanation about the importance of photography satellites. As someone who previously served as chief engineer of the IAA, Arens saw the photography satellites and the development of the launchers as a national project.
But changes at the top of Amn delayed the project. In August 1983, Yehoshua Sagi retired from the position of head of Amn. The new AMN head, Major General Ehud Barak, dismissed the importance of the project. He claimed that the IDF and the IDF do not need photography satellites and that it is possible to be satisfied with photographs of the Air Force, even if these are taken from Israeli territory, at a high altitude and at an angle.
Arens: "As soon as Ehud said 'no need', there was no IDF budget to continue the work. This is a syndrome in the IDF. The commanders fear the development budgets. They thought that the army would be harmed by the project. They did not understand that they are building a force multiplier, which gives the IDF priority and a quality advantage that can only be achieved by developing in Israel." Barak's opposition to the satellite raised fears that the project would die.
TAA defeats Rafael
Shortly after his entry into the Ministry of Defense, Arens appointed Yitzhak Ariav as Director General of the IAEA. At the same time, additional appointments were made. Major General (Res.) Menachem Marom was appointed Director General of the Ministry of Defense. The commander of the Air Force, Major General David Evri, retired and was appointed chairman of the board of directors of the IAA. General Amos Lapidot was appointed commander of the corps. The heads of the IA began to pressure the management of the Ministry of Defense to hold a re-discussion of the decision to hand over the development of the photography satellite to Raphael. Among other things, Dov Raviv met for a private conversation with Arens.
In order to convince the heads of the Ministry of Defense to re-discuss the decision, the IAA management claimed that Rafael does not intend to fulfill the condition that it stated that it must participate in the Mbat plant in the project as a subcontractor. TEA also leaked information about the price offer submitted by Rafael to the Ministry of Defense. In the same proposal, Rafael demanded more than 300 million dollars to carry out the project. Moshe Barlev, on behalf of the TAA, formulated a price proposal according to which the cost of the project would be about 110 million dollars, about a third of Rafael's proposal. The Ministry of Defense finally decided to transfer the project to the IEA.
Rafael's CEO at the time, Dr. Ze'ev Bunan, says: "We tried to give correct estimates, which were too optimistic even then. Others gave deficient estimates. Friends came to me with complaints and asked why I didn't behave in a similar way. I didn't think it was realistic. In any case, it turned out that it was an addictive game between the Ministry of Defense and the TAA. Let's put things on the table. Arens, with the help of the CEO, managed the affairs. The satellite affair cost Raphael dearly. We lost a big and very important project."
The decision to transfer the project to TEA was also due to Barak's refusal to finance the project from the AMN budget. "Rafael was worried that she wouldn't be able to meet the price," says Arens. "I decided that the IAA would be the main contractor, because I thought it would be good for both the satellite and the launcher to be developed in the same framework. Later it turned out that the budget required to complete the project was much larger."
Cover for security activity
"It was convenient to do everything through us. The defense establishment was helped by the space agency for the purpose of covering its activities, because no one is willing to help if it is about military satellites. It would have turned into a political problem", says Prof. Naman, chairman of the first board of directors of Sala.
As a research body, SLA was allowed to purchase images from commercial satellites, such as the French "SPOT". The level of separation of "Spot" was low. The camera only noticed objects 10 meters in size and more. In the order submitted for the development of the space project, Salah stated that it is a scientific experiment, in which two generations of experimental satellites will be built. In the third generation, it is written, a commercial communication satellite will be built. The program was published in an official brochure in ..1987
The central figure in the SLA was Prof. Haim Ashad, and researchers from the academy were invited to participate in various committees. Dr. Barlav, the head of the administration at Mbat, the factory that was entrusted with the construction of the satellite, was appointed secretary of the SLA. It was agreed that due to the secrecy of the Ofek program, only Prof. Naman would appear in the media, if necessary, to provide information about Israel's space program. Salah's official publications state that Ashad is a member of the agency's steering committee.
The activity within the SLA was extremely comfortable. It allowed the managers directly responsible for the development of the launcher and the satellite, Raviv and Barlev, and their subordinates, to participate in international conferences in the field of space without being asked embarrassing questions. Salah granted the state coverage to the "Ofek" program. The activity within the SLA also proved that the State of Israel, not necessarily the army, sees the occupation of space as a national mission. From the point of view of the army, the "Ofek" program was a stepchild. He wasn't interested in her.
At the expense of fighter jets
In September 1984, a unity government was established. A few months earlier Arens brought the space project to the approval of the government. With Yitzhak Rabin's entry into the Ministry of Defense, in that unity government, the Ofek program was a fait accompli.
Rabin learned that the TA is leading two controversial projects. One is visible and known - the "Lavi" plane. The second is the space project, which is progressing under a heavy shroud of secrecy. The debate about the need for a photography satellite and satellite launchers, as well as the need for a blue-and-white fighter plane, broke out with the entry of Major Aviahu Ben Nun to the Air Force Commander's office in 1987
The Air Force was mainly concerned about the budgetary burden of the space project being placed on its shoulders. In the mid-80s, Rabin managed a comprehensive plan to cut the defense budget. Ben Nun did not want the acceptance of responsibility for the space project to come at the expense of purchasing fighter planes. In internal discussions at the General Staff, harsh claims were made against investments in the development of an expensive product, which the army does not need.
"I said in the discussions that the images that 'Ofek' was supposed to provide would not allow the intelligence required for the Air Force to be produced for depth purposes," says Ben Nun. "We could purchase photos from 'Spot'. As far as I'm concerned, there is no difference between a photograph with the resolution promised by 'Ofek' and pictures with a resolution of five meters that I received from 'Spot'."
The Air Force saw the project as a private whim of technologists in the defense system and the defense industries, who joined together in an attempt to prove that they were capable of launching satellites into space. In internal discussions in the defense system, it was said that the Air Force needed tactical intelligence in real time, but the Ofek program had no such pretensions. The Air Force also claimed that the ability to continuously look from space can be achieved by a network of 24-18 photography satellites, floating simultaneously in space. It was clear that such a network was a task beyond Israel's financial strength.
According to the plan, the Israeli photography satellite was supposed to orbit the Earth in a low orbit. The Air Force estimated that as a result the satellite would sink and burn up within a short period of time. The army saw this as proof of the scope of the heavy investments required to ensure real-time intelligence. From the Air Force's point of view, a satellite that does not provide operational intelligence for an attack is too expensive.
But the appointment of Major General Amnon Lipkin Shakh as head of the Air Force in place of Ehud Barak in 1986 created a problem for the Air Force. Contrary to his predecessor, Shakh believed that AMAN needed photography satellites. He believed that "even if it is not measurable in terms of products, satellite photography has a strategic value, even if not intelligence, from the very fact of Israel's presence in space." Shakak's approach was similar to the line adopted by Rabin. Rabin also saw the "Ofek" program as a technological breakthrough from a national point of view, not necessarily a military one.
Shakhak's firm support for the satellite and Ben Nun's opposition to the project made the decision of Chief of Staff Major General Dan Shumron easier. In 1987, about a year before the launch of Ofek 1, it was decided that the photography satellite would be the responsibility of AMN. For the first time since the program started, the photography satellite had a father.
The launch of Ofek 1 on September 19, 1988
After a day's delay, "Ofek" 1 was launched on the three-stage satellite launcher "Shavit" from the Palmachim test site. The launcher was equipped with solid fuel. The first rocket engine (the first stage) contained a solid propellant weighing about nine tons, the second rocket engine contained about three tons of solid propellant. The role of the third stage, which weighed about 350 kg, was to put the satellite into orbit around the Earth. Due to the geographical constraints and the small size of Israel, the satellite is launched from east to west, against the direction of the earth's rotation.
"Ofek" 1 NIS 156 kg and was defined as a "technological experimental satellite". There was no camera on it and it entered a low elliptical orbit around the Earth. The satellite completed one lap around the Earth once every 98 minutes and completed parallel rotations to the equator, 40-30 degrees north of it.
The launch of the satellite requires advance preparation in many areas. Unlike the tests of other weapons systems, it is impossible to hide the launch of a satellite from a launcher that is about 12 m long. The Palmachim test site is located south of the western neighborhoods of Rishon Lezion, so eyewitnesses could pass on the news of the launch within minutes. According to the UN Charter, every country must report on the launch of a satellite. The launch forced the Israeli government to officially reveal its launch capability into space for the first time. Until the launch date, Israel's official spokespeople did not refer to this capability. Secrecy in the field of satellites was related to the policy of ambiguity.
Doron Souslik, Deputy Vice President and Head of the Communications Division at the Israel Defense Forces, was appointed by the security establishment to be responsible for briefing the Israeli and international media. Soslik: "There was a combination of technological, security and political aspects, all of which had to be taken into account." Until the launch, according to foreign publications, Israel had launched TKK from time to time, but it never addressed this. With the launch of "Ofek" it was clear that Israel's ability to launch into space would be shown and exposed for all to see.
As expected, the world media focused on the satellite launcher "Shavit" and was less interested in the "Ofek" satellite.1 In the May 1989 issue of the journal "Engineers and Architects" appeared a rare quote from the mouth of Prof. Ashad: "The effort that was made so that 'Ofek' 1 would succeed no matter what Huge. One failure is enough to cause severe demoralization and knock us down. That's why we acted in a planning similar to the situation where you put on boots, as well as leeks, and also take a belt for the pants so they don't fall down."
The launch also had a political aspect. The Knesset elections were set for November 1, 1988, while the original launch date was about a month and a half before, on September 18 (the launch was finally on September 19). Rabin remembered the launch of the Shavit 2 missile on the eve of the 1981 elections. So that the Likud would not accuse him of an election exercise, Rabin decided that he would not come to the launch site in Palmachim. He saw the launch, with Hebrew, on a screen installed in his office. Rabin also forbade the hosting of Achaim on the site. He rejected the request of Prof. Neman, whom he saw as a political personality, to be present at the launch.
The project may collapse
Seven years, some of them full of disappointments, passed between the launch of "Ofek" 1 and the launch of the "Ofek" 3 photography satellite. Until the launch, on April 5, 1995, it sometimes seemed that the project might collapse. On April 3, 1990, Ofek 2 was launched into space. The weight of the satellite was 160 kg, only four kilograms more than the weight of the first satellite. From this fact it can be concluded that in fact there was no significant improvement in the lifting capacity of the launcher. That is, the satellite cannot yet carry a large camera. This figure did not prevent "Newsweek" from announcing the day before the launch that Israel is developing the Jericho 3 missile, which reaches a range of 6,000 km.
In the first half of the nineties, two more launches were made. Both launches failed and the launcher, along with its precious cargo, fell into the sea. In the defense establishment, the project was given the derogatory nickname "Lancel" (anti-submarine satellite). Following the failures, Dr. Barlev began looking for a replacement for the "Comet". An interesting option was found in Russia. Immediately after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia expressed a willingness to sell satellite images to anyone interested. Russia has also expressed willingness to launch the Israeli photography satellites from the Russian satellite launcher "Mulania". Barlev's independent action earned him the wrath of the security establishment, but sowed the first seeds from which the joint activity with Russia to launch commercial photography satellites grew.
The defense industries exerted heavy pressure on the defense system. The technology stored in the field of satellites and the telescopic camera with a resolution of 1.5 meters developed in Al-Op, according to foreign publications, was unique in the world. Since everything is derived from the launch capability of "Shavit", a photography satellite has been developed that is much smaller than other photography satellites in the world.
In preparation for the launch of "Ofek" 3, two camps were held in the defense system for the battle. On one side, many in the defense establishment stood up, demanding that the launch be postponed. On the other side, the industrialists led by Prof. Ashad showed up. Together with Dr. Berlav and Al-Op CEO Kobi Thorn, Ashad claimed that the capability developed in Israel should not be wasted and demanded that the launch be carried out immediately. The head of Mafat at the time, Brigadier General (Ret.) Uzi Elam and CEO Ivri decided in favor of the launch. Rabin confirmed. After the successful launch of "Ofek" 3, Chief of Staff Major General Amnon Shakh said that the Israeli photography satellite is a strategic asset, "but still not good enough for tactical intelligence."
Ashad's dream is coming true
In the mid-90s, discussions were held in Amman about the need for photography satellites. The conclusions were not encouraging. The reality was completely different from the one that prevailed in 1979. Israel was a generation away from the US in producing images from space at a high level of separation. There was no surprise in this, but it was clear to the participants in the discussions that the USA is ready to sell or provide satellite images to countries defined as its friends, including Saudi Arabia. There was no assurance that such photographs would not pass into other hands. Russia also provides photographs from space to every country.
Another question posed by the head of the AMN at the time, Major General (Ret.) Uri Sagi, was whether the AMN needed a photography satellite or if it would be sufficient to establish a ground station that would receive photographs from American satellites. Finally, the AMN decided that it would be better to rely on independent photography ability, since "those who allow photography can also prohibit their supply in times of need". Amman was not satisfied with the Israeli satellite and decided to reach an agreement with the Americans on the supply of photographs.
At the same time, the "Visual Intelligence Doctrine" was formulated in AMAN. Next to the 8200 collection unit, the "Vizint" division was established, which brings together all the visual means: observations, drones, aerial photographs from fighter planes and satellite photographs. The unit also deals with the organizational aspect: the processing of images, the production of meanings and the dissemination of information in the IDF.
On January 21, 1998, the Ofek 4 launch failed and the defense establishment's approach to the photography satellite project changed. More than two years after "Ofek" 3 floated in space, the number of supporters within the IDF for the project has increased. The Minister of Defense, Yitzhak Mordechai, and the Director General of the Ministry of Defense, Ilan Biran, decided to accept full responsibility for the project. Only then was all activity transferred from Salah to the Ministry of Defense. "Ofek" administration was established within Mapat. For the first time, a multi-year plan (2010) was formulated in the Ministry of Defense that dealt with the "Ofek" programs until XNUMX and the amount of funds needed for the launch of photography and communication satellites.
The Air Force also changed its perception. The Commander of the Air Force, Major General (res.) Eitan Ben Eliyahu, believed that the structure of the Air Force should combine air and space. This perception is especially true as the circle of threat expands and the battlefields become more distant. Ben Eliyahu demanded that the responsibility for "Ofek" 3 be transferred from the trainer to the Air Force. "The orientation of the Air Force required reliance on satellite capability in the field of real-time intelligence and communication," says Ben Eliyahu.
About two years ago, the Chief of Staff, Major General Shaul Mofaz, at the end of a series of discussions with the commander of the Air Force and the former head of the IDF, Major General Amos Malka, established the following agreement: the formulation of the requirements on behalf of the IDF regarding the photography satellites will gradually be handed over to the Air Force, while Coordination with Amn.
The ground receiving station is currently located at the Mbat plant. Ben Eliyahu believes that the additional ground station for receiving satellite images will be established at one of the air force bases. Then the circle will also be closed and the complete integration of air and space under the control of the Air Force will be created.
On December 5, 2000, the Israeli commercial photography satellite "Eros I-1" was launched from the Svobodni missile site in Siberia. The telescopic camera installed in it was developed by Al-Op. The civilian satellite was a derivative of "Ofek."3 This fulfilled the dream of Prof. Ashad, in which Barlev and Raviv were also partners, to simultaneously develop Israeli photography satellites for military and civilian purposes.
ImageSat, owned by IAA, Elbit Systems and foreign investors, plans to launch seven to eight photography satellites into space. The next two satellites will be heavier than "Ofek" 3 and will weigh about 350 kg, so they will carry larger cameras with higher resolution. The development of civilian satellites sheds light on the future quality of Israeli intelligence satellites.
* Until the end of 2002, the Hidan site was part of the IOL portal from the Haaretz-Walla group
