One of the members of the investigative committee, the skeptic as to NASA's ability to make the required safety changes says that more rigid recommendations were needed and he authored another report in which he highlights concerns about the lack of oversight and mechanical failures in the shuttles
The shuttle Columbia at the time of the last launch, 16/1/2003
One of the members of the investigative committee, the skeptic as to NASA's ability to carry out the required safety changes, says that more rigid recommendations were needed and he authored another report in which he emphasizes the concerns about the lack of supervision and mechanical failures in the shuttles.
According to Air Force Brigadier General Duane Deal, additional measurements and warnings are required to prevent another space shuttle disaster. "I feel obligated to warn because if I know something could cause an accident and I don't do it, I won't be able to look at myself in the mirror," Dill said.
Dill said that he is obliged to vote on these issues after they were buried in the committee, according to him, and did not come at all or were softened in preparation for the final report of the commission of inquiry into the Columbia disaster.
His ten-page appendix that will appear in the next volume of appendices does not have an opposing position, he said. The appendix started as a minority opinion about a week ago, he comments, but many of the other 12 committee members jumped on the bandwagon.
"We are all proud of the report," he said, "but there are those who believe that it is necessary to do more, some believe that we were very vague. "But I'm sure there is a general agreement that our 207 days of work were good.
However, he questions whether NASA will fulfill all 29 recommendations of the report, and in particular those referring to additional observations and tests.
This appendix adds more recommendations, he wrote. "It was written from the point of view of those who participated in the investigation of dozens of accidents in space and in the air, and fear that the report bypassed some of the issues that are important to prevent the next accident from occurring.
NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe reiterated Thursday that NASA will follow all of the report's recommendations. "The changes will be carried out in an absolute, positive manner, and we will always focus on the responsibility of each of us and if we are not convinced that the flight is safe, we will not continue with the preparations," said O'Keefe.
Deal fears that NASA will smear Chapter 10 of the report, titled "Additional Significant Observations". Observations include inspection of worn shuttle parts, brittle bolts and lugs, and wing support panels. Failure of the systems that release the shuttle from launch at liftoff, and weak rings connected to the fuel tank and booster rockets. None of these problems have anything to do with the Columbia disaster - where foam from the outer tank hit during launch and she burned as a result. It might happen again. said.
The chapter also concerns the crew's ability to escape and escape, but there are no recommendations in it. Instead, Deal urges NASA to find ways to better protect the crew cabin in an emergency.
"Additional insulation between the interior walls of the crew cabin and its outer shell may provide protection from the heat, which is necessary for the cabin to remain in one structure," wrote Deal.
"More insulation might have helped. The seven crew members survived the breakup of their ship over Texas, but did not survive the heat entering the cabin.
One of the chapter's recommendations - an inspection of each shuttle at the Kennedy Space Center according to the quality control protocol - is requested by Deal to be carried out before the next shuttle flight.
According to him, about a third of the interviews conducted by the investigative committee concerned the fact that the examiners did not check some critical parts of the ferry, avoided in-depth tests, and used outdated equipment, and were trained by the subcontractors they were supposed to check. "I've heard this firsthand from people at all levels, from technicians to members of management, and we must not ignore it." said.
"Since this is what may cause the next accident, this section should be prominent and not buried somewhere in the report." said.
Deal said that under pressure to publish the report by the end of August after nearly seven months of investigation, "it is possible that mistakes or wrong decisions were made knowingly, and he did not tell us about it. Some things were deleted or dimmed or recharacterized.”
The chairman of the commission of inquiry, Admiral Harold Gaiman, said that Deal was the only member who wrote another report. "He was responsible for the safety part and has something to add to what we wrote in the report." Gahman said. He said that the final report started with a thousand pages, was edited and reduced to 400 pages and finally ended up with 248 pages, and therefore many things had to be deleted.
It could have ended differently * The rescue shuttle remained on the ground
It may sound like a science fiction movie, but the committee's report confirms that a daring rescue operation of the "Columbia" crew could have been carried out using another space shuttle
30.8.2003
Alex Doron, Ma'ariv, explains: It may sound like a science fiction movie, but the committee's report confirms that a daring rescue operation of the "Columbia" crew could have been carried out using another space shuttle. This, of course, provided that the decision-makers at NASA would listen to the warnings of the professionals regarding the serious damage caused to the shuttle.
The true condition of the shuttle and the danger posed to the crew were known to the space agency's control room as early as the seventh day of the mission. The possibility of repairing the shuttle in space was tested and defined as too dangerous and then the idea of rescue in space was first raised. For this purpose, the space shuttle Atlantis, which was scheduled to take off two months later, had to be quickly prepared for launch, so that it could be used as a rescue vehicle.
In order to rescue the astronauts, Columbia had to stay in space for two more weeks, until February 15. Atlantis had to take off between 10 and 15 a month, depending on the weather, with four crew members: a commander, a pilot and two "spacewalk" experts.
The meeting between the two shuttles was supposed to take place on the first day of the first Atlantis in space. The two shuttles had to approach each other with their dedicated cargo compartment doors open. The people of Columbia had to float in space using the special equipment used for this purpose, enter Atlantis and return with it to Earth.
The Columbia, abandoned by its crew, was maneuvered for an attempted landing or sinking in the Pacific Ocean, or was left in space for a complex repair operation to be conducted at a later date.
This is Houston, it'll be fine
The "Columbia" crash: no lessons were learned from the Challenger disaster, even though 17 years have passed since then
27/8/2003
Now it's official: the committee that investigated the space shuttle disaster states that the heads of NASA ignored the warnings of the engineers, who warned of the damage caused to the shuttle during the launch. was to rescue the seven astronauts * the "Nearby" agency
The poor organizational culture at NASA and the disregard for safety issues are largely responsible for the "Columbia" shuttle disaster, in which seven astronauts lost their lives, including the late Lt. Col. Ilan Ramon. This is the main lesson of the investigative committee to look into the disaster, which published its conclusions yesterday.
About half of the report, which spans 248 pages, refers to the way in which the American Space Agency (NASA) is conducted. As for the technical circumstances of the disaster, the report confirms what was already published in the interim report, about three months ago. A piece of the foam insulation casing fell from the fuel tank during launch, hitting the front of the left wing and causing several of the shuttle's heat insulation tiles to break off. 11 days later, during the shuttle's re-entry into the atmosphere, the hole in the insulation layer caused the shuttle to overheat. At an external temperature of 1,500 degrees Celsius, with a damaged insulation layer, there was no chance left for the spacecraft and its crew members.
But the main conclusion of the commission, chaired by retired admiral Harold Gaiman, is that the disaster could have been prevented had it not been for a "culture of poor organization" that had taken root over the years at NASA.
The committee determined that the decision makers at the space agency ignored the warnings of engineers and mid-level professionals, who warned verbally and in writing about the serious damage to the shuttle's wing shortly after takeoff and even photographed the malfunction. This was, according to the report, part of the management culture at NASA, where senior officials used to belittle and ignore the comments of mid-level and junior employees. Cases of insulation foam separating from external containers also happened during previous launches and NASA managers accepted this as a routine and not dangerous event, but this time it ended in a major disaster.
The committee also states that if the decision makers at NASA had recognized the danger the shuttle was facing, the astronauts could have been rescued ahead of time using the space shuttle Atlantis and their lives could have been saved. NASA managers, as the report states, "failed and did not live up to their commitment to do everything possible to ensure the safety of the crew."
The committee states that no real lessons were learned from the space shuttle Challenger disaster in 1986 in which seven astronauts died, and that in the 17 years that have passed since then there has been only a minimal improvement in the safety level of the shuttles. "The flaws have been rooted in NASA's organizational system for twenty years and played a significant role in both disasters," the report states.
In the opinion of the committee, the equipment that became obsolete due to incessant budget cuts and the dizzying race to determine the achievements at any cost, led to acceptance with defects, some of which were known in advance. The committee warns that if there is no real improvement, it is only a matter of time until the next disaster.
Although the committee did not recommend removing senior officials from their positions at the space agency, officials in the field of aviation and space in the US estimate that the conclusions may eventually lead to the resignation of all the heads of NASA.
The report includes 27 recommendations, 15 of which deal with flight safety management. Besides the need to change NASA's organizational culture, the investigative committee states that an external safety committee should be established for the space agency, so that it will monitor future shuttle launches. Additional recommendations: use of many cameras that will be operated from different angles, for continuous monitoring of the entire appearance into space; use of photography satellites, spying and ground radars to monitor the flights; take off only in full daylight; Each space shuttle will have to carry emergency equipment such as a robotic arm (which was not in Columbia), which can be used to carry out repairs on the spacecraft during the flight; In the future, the emergency systems will also have to include a special rescue and escape vehicle for the team, for disaster situations. The committee also recommended that in the future, a sophisticated aircraft, dedicated to space missions, will replace the existing shuttles. Despite the harsh criticism, the investigative committee states that the ferries' flights must be renewed in the future, after exhausting all the necessary recommendations and changes.
The family of the late Col. Ilan Ramon is now studying the committee's conclusions. "At this stage we are not responding to the media in everything related to the Columbia crash and the conclusions of the investigative committee," Gadi Ramon, Ilan Ramon's brother, said yesterday.
