The Dead Sea region is a unique tourist and industrial asset. In the past thirty-five years, the Ministry of Tourism and the Investment Center have invested hundreds of millions of NIS in the promotion of industry and the development of tourism in the region. As early as 1971, the relevant government ministries knew about the constant rise in the water level in Pool 5 and the danger
State Comptroller, Report 56 B for 2006
The tourism in Ein Bokek and Hami Zohar (hereafter - the tourist areas) are located next to one of the evaporation pools used to extract minerals from the Dead Sea (hereafter - Pool 5). Due to the deposition of salt at the bottom of the pool, the water level in the pool rises approximately 20 cm per year, and as a result the level of the ground water also rises. The rise in the level of the pool may cause the beach and the buildings on it to flood, and the rise in ground water may endanger the foundations of the hotels located on the beach. In the report A review on this issue, published by the State Comptroller's Office in 2003, stated that all the entities related to the development of the mentioned tourism areas already knew in 1971 that the rise in the level of the pond could cause the beach to flood in the future, they encouraged the development of these areas without providing a permanent solution to the problem, and as a result it is now necessary to invest many tens of millions of dollars in the solution. In the months of February-June 2005, the State Comptroller's Office examined what has been done to solve the said problem since then September 2002, the date of completion of the previous audit (hereinafter - the follow-up).
The follow-up revealed that in February 2004, an examination of four alternatives for a permanent solution was completed by an external consultant on behalf of the Ministry of Tourism, and he recommended one of them. In July of that year, the issue was discussed in the socio-economic cabinet, and it was decided to approve an engineering feasibility study of the recommended alternative. The Director General of the Ministry of Tourism was also tasked with checking, with the assistance of external parties, the estimated cost of implementing each of the four alternatives to the permanent solution. It was further determined in the decision that "the Minister of Tourism will submit a proposal for a decision to the government by January 1, 2005 for the selection of a permanent solution for the protection of the Dead Sea However, until the end of the surveillance, June 2005 - about six months after the date set in the decision - no minister submitted Furthermore, the Ministry of Tourism did not contract with an engineering company to carry out the engineering feasibility study, and the cost of implementing the alternatives was not calculated. At the time of the end of the monitoring, the State Comptroller's Office appointed ten entities that at some point were responsible for handling the permanent solution.
In the absence of a permanent solution that would prevent the beach from flooding, only temporary solutions were given to the problem. The first temporary solution, which was completed in 1995, was the construction of a protective embankment in Ein Bokek and the construction of underground systems to drain the groundwater and pump it through three pumping stations and flow it into Pool 5, so that they do not damage the foundations of the hotels and commercial buildings in the area. The future value of the cost of the works is estimated at approximately NIS 80 million. Due to a serious work accident that occurred in 1997 during maintenance operations at one of the pumping stations, maintenance operations at the stations were stopped, and for five years they were only partially activated. Monitoring revealed that in July 2004 the steering committee determined that the protective measures established in 1995 in the tourist area in Ein Bokek failed, and the decision Temporarily solve the problem of flooding with a new method to lower the groundwater - drilling dozens of wells in the area and installing a pump in each well, and pumping the groundwater and transferring it from the wells to pool 5. In April 2005, the total cost of planning and establishing the new protective measures was estimated at approximately NIS 61 million.
Between the government and the Tamar Regional Council, in whose domain the tourist areas are located, and the hotels in these areas, there are disputes as to the way in which the additional costs involved in protecting the beach will be divided between them, and this is delaying the execution of the actions to degrade the groundwater using the new method.
The Ministry of Tourism for the first time assigned the management of the permanent solution to the flooding problem of the Dead Sea coast to the Administration for the Development of Tourism in the Negev (hereinafter - the Administration) - an association established in 1989 at the initiative of the Ministry. The administration initiated an engineering-economic examination of possible permanent solutions and for this purpose was assisted by a foreign company engaged in the design of dams (hereinafter - Foreign Company A), and in 1991 submitted to the Ministry a proposal for four possible alternatives for handling the problem and recommended the construction of one of them - a closed lagoon in the tourist areas, subject to inspection of the resistance of the dams that are supposed to surround it in an earthquake.
In 1991, after receiving the aforementioned proposal, the Ministry of Finance and the entities that participated in the inspection order discussed the desired alternative, but did not make a decision on this matter. In February 1997, the director general of the Ministry of Tourism issued a letter of appointment to a steering committee for the formulation of a permanent solution (hereinafter - the steering committee). The head of the committee was appointed the deputy director for planning and development in the ministry, and its members were representatives from the administration, From the Ministry of Finance, from the government tourism company[44], from the Ministry of Finance, and from the regional council. The steering committee held several discussions in 1997-1999, but nothing was done to promote a permanent solution. For example, no drilling was done to examine the effect of earthquakes on the dams that are supposed to surround the closed lagoon - information that is a prerequisite for its construction. In January 1998, the Ministry of Tourism transferred the responsibility for handling the issue of the permanent solution from the administration to the government company for tourism, but in September of that year the government decided to transfer the handling of the issue to the Minister of Finance (see below).
2. In November 1999[45] the Minister of Tourism appointed a new steering committee. The committee was chaired by the Director General of the Ministry of Tourism, and its members were representatives of the bodies that were on the previous steering committee and a representative of the Ministry of National Infrastructures (hereinafter - the Ministry of Infrastructure). The duties of the committee stipulated in its letter of appointment are similar to the duties of the previous committee, and it was stipulated that it must formulate its recommendations by January 15.1.00, 2001 Until the end of 2001, the committee held several discussions, but in the end it did not advance the permanent solution either XNUMX the government transferred the responsibility for handling the issue from the Ministry of Finance to the Ministry of Infrastructure.
3. In May 2002, a committee of CEOs headed by the CEO of the Ministry of Infrastructure was established (instead of the steering committee headed by the CEO of the Ministry of Tourism that was established in 1999) and it decided to establish a professional team (hereinafter - the professional team) to submit recommendations for action to it. In August of that year appointed The chairman of the committee called the "Professional Team for Examining Engineering and Economic Alternatives for Solving the Rising Water Level", and the team was tasked to submit Final report within a year.
The follow-up revealed that after about a year and a half, in February 2004, the professional team submitted a final report to the Ministry of Infrastructure, with a recommendation to divide Pool 5 into two separate pools, the eastern border of one of which (the lagoon) would reach approximately 300 m from the shoreline, in front of the hotels, and to harvest the salt which will accumulate in the lagoon to keep it at a constant water level. It was also recommended to create an opening in it for a channel that would lead to another pool, into which water would be poured
The lagoon if for some reason water from pool 5 breaks into it and threatens to flood the tourist areas (hereinafter - the open lagoon alternative); In the remainder of Pool 5, MI will continue to raise the water level by an additional 6 meters until the year 2030, when its concession expires; the execution of this alternative will be subject to engineering feasibility tests. The cost of the open lagoon alternative was estimated at 86 to 106 million dollars, according to the discount rate where the calculation was made [46] The other alternatives that were tested were: harvesting the salt in every pool area 5 to maintain the water level Permanent: Abandonment of 1,500 hotel rooms close to the beach and the possibility of flooding the area (hereafter the flood alternative) by raising the embankment by an additional 6 meters (as recommended by the administration in 1991). Finance at the Ministry of Infrastructure revealed that the cost of preparing the professional team's report amounted to approximately NIS 2.64 million: 0.63 million NIS were paid to the team leader's consulting company and about 2.01 million NIS to foreign company A.
Even the recommendation of the aforementioned team was not used to promote the permanent solution. In March 2004, the Minister of Infrastructure and the Minister of Tourism at the time submitted a proposed decision to the Government Secretariat, according to which the government will decide on one of two alternatives that are sufficiently safe: the open lagoon alternative and the flooding alternative. The ministers stated that considering the time needed for the statutory and engineering planning of the chosen alternative and its implementation, which due to the constant rise of the water level in Pool 5 must be completed by the end of 2007, an immediate decision by the government on the matter is required.
However, it was only at the end of July 2004 that the issue came up for discussion in the government. The issue was discussed in the socio-economic cabinet, and it was decided to approve an engineering feasibility study at a cost of up to 10 million NIS for the open lagoon alternative and to task the CEO of the Ministry of Tourism with contracting an engineering company to carry out the study. The CEO was also tasked with checking, with the assistance of outside parties and at a cost of up to NIS 2 million, the estimated cost of implementing each of the alternatives proposed for the permanent solution, provided that there is no relationship between the said outside parties and the parties operating in the area. It was also determined in the decision that "the Minister of Tourism will submit a proposed decision to the government by January 1, 2005 to choose a permanent solution for the protection of the Dead Sea coast". However, at the end of the follow-up, June 2005 - about six months after the date set in the decision - the Minister of Tourism had not yet submitted the proposal, and the Ministry of Tourism had not even contracted with an engineering company to carry out the engineering feasibility study of the open lagoon alternative.
It should be noted that at the end of the follow-up, the State Comptroller's Office named ten bodies that at some time were responsible for dealing with the issue of the permanent solution. It was also brought up that due to the large number of bodies dealing with the issue of the permanent solution, their frequent rotation and the lack of coordination between them, one body may have acted contrary to the instructions of the other. For example, in July 2002, the Director General of the Ministry of Infrastructure, whose office was responsible for dealing with the issue of the permanent solution, asked the Directors General of MMI and the Ministry of Tourism to avoid the mistakes of the past and to stop any planned marketing of lands whose level is lower than the expected maximum level of water in Pool 5, until to find a proper solution to the problem of protecting the beach. However, MMI ignored this request, despite the continued rise in the water level in the pool And the uncertainty regarding the future of the tourist areas published four times in the period July 2003-March 2005 a tender for the purchase of two lots adjacent to the edge of the pool intended for the construction of a hotel. In February 2005, the Ministry of Tourism drew the attention of the CEO of MMI to the request to freeze the engagements in the tourist areas, and as a result, the last tender was cancelled. It should also be noted that MMI is the owner of the lands in these areas, and therefore also has a major interest in the permanent solution, its representatives were absent from 13 meetings out of 14 that took place between October 2002 and March 2005 in the executive committee or the last steering committee.
In 2003, the groundwater level began to rise simultaneously with the rise of the water level in Pool 5, and as a result, wetness was created on the beach. Since the pumping stations emitted toxic gases that made it difficult to handle the pumps, the pumps in the stations were replaced with pumps that are easier to maintain. The new pumps were activated in the north of the Ein Bokek area at full capacity and evacuated seven times greater amounts of water than what was supposed to be evacuated according to the plan, but despite this the groundwater did not drop to the required level.
At the last steering committee meeting in July 2004, the chairman of the committee said that it is clear to the committee and the Ministry of Tourism that the protective measures established in phase A/1 have failed, and part of the retaining wall is not functioning. This is reflected in the large amounts of water that are removed under the northern part of the hotel area and the danger posed as a result For the hotels and infrastructures in the tourist areas, it was found that the public bodies that handled the implementation of phase A/1 - The Ministry of Tourism and the Ministry of Finance - did not examine the reasons for the failure of the protective measures established therein and did not draw the necessary lessons. It should be noted that the cost of implementation of phase A/1 from the capital to June 2005, was estimated at NIS 80 million, at June 2005 prices. In the Ministry of Tourism's reply to the Ministry The State Comptroller from September 2005 stated that the ministry requested "the consulting company employed by the HMT [the company Government Tourism] to look into hiring a legal advisor who, among other things, will look into the issue."
According to the Office of the State Comptroller, an examination by a legal advisor on the subject is not enough, and lessons must also be learned with regard to the work of the headquarters that preceded the execution of phase A/1, to the coordination between the bodies that handled the implementation of the project and to its engineering planning and execution. The learning of the lessons in the matter in question is of great importance in view of the need to carry out additional works in the future to protect the tourist areas from flooding and to find a permanent solution to the flooding problem.
The words of the chairman of the professional committee and the external engineering consultant of the Ministry of Tourism show that a comprehensive plan for the protection of the beach against flooding, which defines the scope of the protected area and the period of protection, has not yet been drawn up. According to the State Comptroller's Office, decisions on these issues are a necessary condition for continuing the decision-making process on promoting a solution Without them, it will not be possible to compare the various alternatives to the permanent solution, choose the appropriate alternative and allocate the necessary budgets for its implementation.
The Dead Sea region is a unique tourist and industrial asset. In the past thirty-five years, the Ministry of Tourism and the Investment Center have invested hundreds of millions of NIS in the promotion of industry and the development of tourism in the area. As early as 1971, the relevant government ministries knew about the constant rise in the water level in Pool 5 and the danger posed by this to the hotels located on the edge of the pool, and despite this they continued to promote Construction of hotels on the beach.
