John Berry, who served as the director of the investigative committee alongside Chairman Gaiman, spoke at the Air Force House in Herzliya as a guest of Ness and the Fisher Institute, and also estimated that another Israeli astronaut will fly into space
Fragment of the left wing of Colombia
Many aspects of the Columbia disaster
NASA did not internalize the lessons of the Challenger disaster and the recommendations of the investigative committee at the time were buried together with the remains of the Challenger in an underground bunker, so says John Berry, who had time to be on both sides - in 1986 he was attached as an officer to NASA "A. 17 years later, retired Major General John Barry served as Executive Director of the Commission of Inquiry into the Space Shuttle Columbia disaster. Berry, a SAP executive, is visiting Israel as a guest of Ness, SAP's representative in Israel.
Berry says that although he did not know the name Ilan Ramon, being an assistant to Secretary of Defense Cheney, he praised his actions. In a meeting he held with General David Evari and the then Minister of Defense Moshe Arens immediately after the Gulf War in 1991 and thanked them for the reactor attack in Iraq ten years earlier which if it had not been carried out would have caused many risks to the forces.
I really like to deal with the capabilities of integration, I also work for a SAP company represented in Israel by Ness. The shuttle is a tool that is all about integration between many parts and many processes. Some have said that this makes her inherently insecure, but we don't think so. It is safe, if we know how to manipulate it correctly, but it is not an operational tool but is still, despite its advanced age, in a constant state of research and development. We were not in this situation before because of the disposable spacecraft and when we tested the Challenger it was not that old. There is no single reason that you can put your finger on and think in advance that it will cause a malfunction, but a chain of processes.
The report is intended first of all for families, then for the public in the US and Israel, and finally - also for NASA. We decided not only to examine the specific causes of the Columbia disaster in the spacecraft itself but in the entire space program and found that both technical and administrative causes contributed to the same extent. Not only the foam that hit the front part of the wing is the cause of the disaster, but the entire management chain collapsed. Corporate culture is important for any organization, small or large, private or public. Such things can happen in any bureaucracy.
The outer tank is completely covered with foam that has only one purpose - to prevent the formation of ice blocks, if they fall on the ferry their weight will be greater. During the Apollo era there was no such problem because the spacecraft was on top of all the fuel. I worked together with Admiral Gaiman who headed the investigative committee. The part that interested us is the areas where there is a connection between the shuttle and the external fuel tank - the bipod: the two legs that connect the shuttle itself to the fuel tank. It turns out that this bipod and the foam on it are built in a unique way for each flight. At least six times before, the foam block covering the bipod fell off. This time a block weighing 1.17 kg fell and split into three parts. Two of them fell to the side, while one gush of foam weighing about 700 grams hit the spaceship at a speed of 800 km/h.
When we came to examine the situation, it turned out that there was no serious record of the launch. NASA was convinced that the foam hit the bottom and not the side based on a picture from one of the cameras. The second camera was supposed to give us more data but it was not focused. You can hardly see if the foam is damaged or not. The part that took the hit was the front side of the wing. In total, they were a quarter of an inch (0.6 centimeters) in diameter. When the shuttle re-enters the atmosphere it encounters a heat of 3,000 degrees. And the wing sides made of reinforced carbon protect against the penetration of this hot air. During the penetration into the atmosphere two shock waves hit from below and above, the shock wave hit panel number 8. The pictures didn't help us but we had a lot of sensors. The shuttle is one big sensor. Columbia was the most monitored spacecraft. However, not all data is transmitted to the control center. Some of them are stored in a recording tape located at the rear end of the spacecraft. We happened to be able to recover this box almost unscathed and the data from a sensor that happened to be in panel number nine showed a record temperature measurement. This sensor detected already at takeoff that something was wrong. This is the data that NASA did not have in real time, so they came to the idea that the flight could continue as planned and not announce an emergency rescue procedure. The simulation experiment that was carried out in an attempt to see if there was damage in the impact was also done by an inexperienced technician because the department in question was moved from California to Houston and not all the experts agreed to move. Also the lack of parts from the left wing that probably fell in the Pacific Ocean compared to the abundance of parts from the right wing found at the crash sites strengthened our conclusion. In addition, we visited the assembly facility for the external fuel tank manufactured in New Orleans (the assembly plant was damaged by the Katrina disaster and has been paralyzed ever since, these days NASA is working on transferring the workers and components that can be moved to the Kennedy Space Center in Florida). It turns out that the same block of foam fell on six previous flights. Nas "A knew in real time only about four of them and we discovered two more by examining the photographs. So far there have been 50 injuries to the ferry, some from the landing but some also from falling foam. "We asked ourselves why sometimes it falls and sometimes it doesn't. We reached all the outer tanks at the factory in New Orleans. We found that there are differences in the form of carving, humidity, etc. It depends on who carved that day."
But as mentioned, the technical aspect is important, and NASA was wise to stop the flights until it studies the issue and solves it. But the organizational culture is just as important. We came to the conclusion that NASA failed in its culture. We looked at history and history told us that we had problems in the past. There were budget problems due to A lot of decisions were made in NASA and in Congress, and a lot of the responsibility was transferred to the subcontractors. Even if the subcontractors tried, there was also the matter that the foam falls from the top didn't work
We went to the integration office and found that it was an office that only made sure that there was no damage to the shuttle during the launch.
There was one person who was in charge of safety in both Houston and Kennedy. The same people who were responsible for the launch were also responsible for the next launch. When I was an F-16 pilot. As a new manager enters the position there is a fear of changes, this also happens when moving a company. NASA lost all its experts in cuts and the move from California to Texas. When budget and time problems start affecting safety. The safety people were also of low rank. Sally Reid was the only one who was on two committees (I was a NASA employee - I need to respond). Sally Reid told me 'I I'm hearing echoes from the Challenger. I asked the NASA people where the CASE STUDY is on the Challenger and how many safety managers studied it when they took office? It turned out that none of them were. It is the US Navy that uses the Challenger case to learn how a large organization fails in a complex way. If you are going to be a complex organization, you also need to be a learning organization - learn from the mistakes. NASA was confident and thought it couldn't go wrong. Is it true that the same person should be in charge of budget, schedule and safety? We went to see what was going on in the nuclear fleet. Nuclear submarine commanders have a lot of authority - almost like God's under water. Except in the matter One - he cannot ignore the problems in the nuclear reactor, he must get an independent opinion.
"You have to listen to the little things. The two big disasters happened because of foam and the O-ring - simple things. There are 800 points of failure in the ferry. And each of them has documentation and a rating. These two things have a low priority because of their simplicity. Maybe on the road when there is a flat tire you can move to the side The way and change a tire. In space, small things can have a big impact. After the Challenger disaster, they did not address anything after that ".
"NASA also did not perform a risk analysis. There were no reports, except in some cases Power Point, and even these Power Point files could not be found if the person who wrote them retired. In addition, email is something that surfaces organizations. The problem with emails is that they are not always addressed. There were engineers That level of discussion did not reach the top. The leadership did not like to receive bad news in all the places where I worked, that I would not give them bad news Listen to weak signals. If a fault happens because of something that happened for the first time - there's nothing to do, but if something happens many times and no one listens, it's a failure."
"To sum up, we had 29 recommendations. 15 of them dealt with returning to flight and 14 pertain to the longer term. We are disappointed that the foam fault was not fixed, but there were many things that were successfully carried out such as placing cameras, arriving at the space station as a city of refuge for an emergency, and more. 3 of the 15 were not fulfilled, but after analyzing the risks, it was decided to continue flying. Among the recommendations for the more distant future, we also called for the replacement of the ferry fleet with a completely new aircraft. We support the continuation of the operation The American is in space. I am also convinced that there will be another Israeli astronaut who will take off safely and return safely. Our journey to space will continue."
Question from the audience - why continue with manned space flights if airplanes are switching to drones?
"Artificial intelligence cannot deal with complex issues such as tracking ground activity even in airplanes. Space has an environment that requires vigilance. No robot can do what the astronauts did in Apollo 13. There is also the eureka factor - through humans we can discover new technologies. Also Unmanned flights have a balance between manned and unmanned flights"
Dr. Yoav Yair, who was one of the leaders of the MEIDEX research operations, asked why the committee did not have personal recommendations
To which Berry replied: Our goal was to conduct an investigation of the causes of the malfunction under confidentiality and a promise that the witness would not be sued. This is so that people can say whatever is on their mind and this was important for discovering all the problems that were involved in the corporate culture. We did not agree to accept as assistants to the investigation committee people who were involved in the malfunction and NASA agreed to this. We left the conclusions to NASA."
Another question from the audience was, did NASA have a quality control system? The answer was: "There was, but the problem is that if something didn't work as planned, there was no one to listen to them. We tried to understand what caused the foam to fall. There is a different approach now at NASA - for example the loss of oxygen in the space station - at first they thought there was a leak but came to the conclusion that it was something that could wait for the next shuttle to replace parts. There were two who objected. You can never reach a consensus. The key word is integration - that we bring together all The resources and knowledge of the people so that everything goes smoothly.
The director of the investigative committee will visit Israel as a guest of Ness and the Fisher Institute
16/8/2005
Retired Major General John Barry, who served as Executive Director of the Commission of Inquiry into the Space Shuttle Columbia disaster, will visit Israel in early September as a guest of Ness Technologies and the Fisher Institute for Strategic Air and Space Research. Major General Barry currently serves as Vice President of Defense and Security Affairs at the SAP company represented in Israel by Ness Technologies.
As part of his visit, Major General Barry will participate in a special gathering of the Fisher Institute for Strategic Air and Space Research at the Air Force Base in Herzliya. The gathering will be dedicated to the Columbia disaster.
Retired Major General John Barry served over 30 years in various command positions in the US Air Force. Among other things, he was a White House Fellow at NASA and a liaison officer to the White House during the Challenger spacecraft disaster. He also served as a military assistant to the US Secretary of Defense during the two US wars in Iraq and during the disarmament of the former USSR. He also served as the head of strategic planning at the US Air Force Headquarters.
Major General John Barry is a fighter pilot with 3,000 flight hours in F-16 and Phantom aircraft, including 270 flight hours in combat operations.
Berry: Ilan Ramon could have been saved"
25/8/05
"NASA's treatment of the issue of flight safety before the Columbia disaster resembles an operation of Russian roulette," says Major General John Berry, acting director of the Columbia Space Shuttle Disaster Investigation Committee, in an exclusive interview with the "7 Days" supplement
"NASA's treatment of the issue of flight safety before the Columbia disaster resembles an operation of Russian roulette," says Major General John Berry, acting director of the Columbia Space Shuttle Disaster Investigation Committee, in an exclusive interview with the "7 Days" supplement. He criticized the American space agency: "It is disappointing to examine the organizational culture of NASA in the years before the disaster. The safety of the operation was placed in a very low place. NASA's attitude to the defects in the shuttle was like Russian roulette: you put one bullet in the gun and pull the trigger. And nothing happens. Click again, and nothing happens. So in the end something bad must happen."
Berry, who gave a special interview ahead of his planned visit to Israel next month, also estimated that it was possible to save Ilan Ramon and the other six crew members on Columbia's last flight: "Yes, Ilan Ramon could have been saved. The Atlantis shuttle was almost ready for launch, a crew could have been organized of four to board Atlantis and go rescue the seven from Columbia. It was pretty risky business, but my feeling is that NASA would go for it. If only they would acknowledge the fact that they have a problem, of course."
Regarding last month's Discovery shuttle flight, the first flight since the Columbia disaster, Berry said that "many things have been fixed, but I'm still concerned.
It is certainly disappointing to see that after two and a half years of work, NASA still does not know what caused the separation of the insulation foam after takeoff. And I am especially concerned by the fact that it was again found out that some of our recommendations were not implemented. I would have expected that, at least on the first flight after the accident, NASA would show great effort and determination absolute to prove that everything is under supervision and that the correction of the faults from the past is maximal. If even now NASA is not following our recommendations convincingly, then what will happen in ten flights?"
However, Berry expressed support for the continuation of manned missions to space, and said that he hopes that the shuttle will cease to be an operational tool within a few years. "There is enormous symbolic value in man's presence in space. The goal is to send people to the moon again, and later perhaps to Mars. It is already clear to everyone, even in NASA, that the shuttle is not an operative tool at this stage and that a change is needed in the space exploration program. I hope that it will be possible to send a man to Mars in my lifetime ".
Y., whose rank is equivalent to that of a major in the IDF, a former senior fighter pilot in the US Air Force and currently the vice president for security and defense affairs of the software company SAP, is coming to Israel as a guest of the high-tech company Ness Technologies, and will be the keynote speaker at a conference on the Columbia disaster to be held at the Institute Fisher on September 8.
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