Prof. Benny Miller and Roy Kahanovitz analyze the chances and risks of regime change in Iran, the possibility of the collapse of the government structure, and the regional and international implications of the elimination of Ali Khamenei and senior regime officials.

By: Prof. Benny Miller, School of Political Science, University of Haifa

US and Israeli leaders have raised the possibility that as a result of their military action against Iran, regime change will occur in Iran. Is such an outcome likely and what are the possible consequences?

There will be few who would disagree that the fall of the current extremist regime is desirable. Clearly, its replacement is highly desirable. This is a murderous regime of terror at home against its own citizens and an aggressive regime abroad that is causing regional instability through a nuclear program and the establishment of the "Shiite Resistance Axis" under its leadership and funding, which has equipped and trained a series of dangerous terrorist organizations in the Middle East: Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and the Shiite militias in Iraq, and has also supported the brutal repression of opponents of the regime in Syria until the fall of Assad's regime of terror. The Sunni Hamas also joined the axis out of the concept of "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" — that is, that Israel is a common enemy for Hamas and the Shiite axis.

A central goal of the "Resistance Axis" is war on Israel and its weakening until its destruction. This goal was expressed in Hamas' attack on Israel on October 7 and the other members of the axis joining, in one form or another and to one degree or another, in attacks on Israel.

But the practical question is whether regime change is a practical and positive outcome? If we examine the historical record, the answer is not positive. First of all, regime change as a result of air action alone by external forces is practically unprecedented. Some argue that the precedent of the Serbian army's withdrawal from Kosovo in 1999 after NATO bombing for over 70 days exists. However, regime change in Serbia itself—the ouster of the authoritarian and aggressive President Milosevic—occurred only more than a year later due to protests by the Serbian public.

The other cases are much more problematic. The most recent prominent case in the Middle East of external military intervention — which was mainly from the ground — was the regime change in Iraq in 2003 as a result of a massive invasion by coalition forces led by the US. Saddam Hussein's murderous regime did fall and Saddam himself was executed, but the results of the intervention and regime change were extremely problematic. First of all, a sectarian civil war broke out in Iraq between the Sunnis and the Shiites. Murderous terrorism spread in the country and far beyond it — culminating in the rise of the Islamic State, which has committed extremely severe acts of cruelty, mainly in Iraq and Syria but also far beyond that, including in the West.

However, the main beneficiary of the regime change was Iran in two ways: first of all, the change in the balance of power in the Gulf in its favor, with the enormous weakening of its main rival — Iraq — which had until then blocked Iran's penetration into the heart of the Arab world. The consequences of the second sense were no less serious: following the change in the regime to democracy (at least in terms of holding elections), the Shiite majority — which until then had been disadvantaged under the dominance of the Sunni minority — became politically dominant; some of the Shiites in Iraq were closely linked to Shiite Iran, and this enabled Iranian entry into Iraqi politics — a move that allowed not only significant Iranian political influence, but also the establishment of Shiite armed militias that, although composed of Iraqi citizens, are in fact loyal to the regime of the ayatollahs in Iran, while being equipped, trained, and financed by Iran. This was a crucial step on the path to building the radical anti-Israeli Shiite resistance axis, which greatly increased instability in Iraq and, in fact, in the entire Middle East and beyond.

Another case of increased instability as a result of an external move for regime change is the case of Libya in 2011 during the Arab Spring. The West intervened from the air — ostensibly for humanitarian protection of civilians — but in reality for the benefit of the rebels against the tyrannical regime of Muammar Gaddafi. This intervention did indeed help the rebels on the ground in Libya to overthrow Gaddafi's regime. But what were the consequences? Libya became a leading example of a failed state — alongside Iraq — with the outbreak of a brutal civil war involving a number of internal, regional, and international factors. The instability also spread far beyond Libya's borders: to North Africa and parts of Africa itself, to the Middle East, and indeed to Europe — as the chaos in Libya enabled a large wave of migration from Africa and the Middle East into European countries. This wave of immigration had very significant internal political consequences in Europe — immigration greatly strengthened extreme right-wing populist parties and in any case helped create significant political divisions in Europe.

The US regime change in Afghanistan — despite the enormous investment in blood and money (similar to what happened in Iraq) — also failed in the end, and after 20 years of hard war, the Americans withdrew in disgrace from Afghanistan — which returned to the brutal, extremist control of the jihadist Taliban organization.

The question is whether the Iranian case might be different and instead of the extremist rule of the ayatollahs, a more moderate regime might arise that would not threaten the entire Middle East region?

So far, there are no clear signs of such a change, although there are three types of players who could bring about the long-awaited change:

1. Protest - As we saw at the beginning of the year, there is a large audience of citizens in Iran, mainly young people, who are willing to take enormous risks to overthrow the ayatollahs' rule. From the West and Israel's perspective, this is an ideal audience for a change of government because it seems that these people want to bring about a completely different type of regime - which will probably also be very moderate and will not cause instability in the Middle East. They might even bring about a progressive and enlightened democratic regime that will cooperate with its neighbors in the region for economic development and social progress. However, the problem is that in terms of the balance of power - at least so far - the scales are completely tilted in favor of the regime's repressive forces, since the protesters are unarmed. Therefore, even assuming that the majority of the public opposes the regime, the protest in itself - as long as it is not armed - is not capable of overthrowing the regime.

Of course, things could change, especially if there is a process of defection from Iranian security forces who may feel that the regime is in the process of weakening due to US and Israeli attacks. For now, there are no signs of significant defection from the oppressive regime forces — mainly the Basij and the Revolutionary Guards.

2. It is possible that in the army — which is more commonly seen as the "people's army" — there will be such a process of defection of armed elements, and then the balance of power could shift significantly against the regime. So far, there are no signs of this.
3. Another internal factor that could work towards regime change is the ethnic minorities in Iran — who together make up almost half of the population: Azeris, Arabs, Baluchis, and Kurds. The latter two groups in particular are likely to have separatist aspirations and may even be armed. According to unconfirmed reports, the US may be considering supplying weapons to the Kurdish minority. The question regarding the minorities — and especially the Kurds — is whether they will work towards regime change in Iran as a whole or for the secession of the Kurdish region? In any case, there is a possibility — which is difficult to assess at this stage — that the weakening of the regime and the activities of minority groups could turn Iran into a failed state that would radiate instability to the region, but probably especially in relation to its close neighbors — Turkey and the Gulf states — through waves of refugees and perhaps also terrorist elements. In this case, due to the great geographical distance, Israel may be affected much less — although instability is not good for anyone in the region or beyond.

However, there are question marks regarding the balance of power between the minorities and the central Iranian government, and it is difficult to assess the resilience of the minorities and whether most or some of them will join an armed rebellion against the regime.

In conclusion, the record of regime change through external military intervention is problematic in the 21st century. In the most prominent cases in the Middle East—Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya—the interventions have increased internal and regional instability, and to a large extent, international instability. Since Iran is a country that has largely created regional instability, success in regime change in this case may well stabilize the Middle East. The question now is whether regime change is likely to succeed—and whether the current destabilizing regime will be replaced by a moderate regime in Iran that will contribute to regional stability—or whether there will be no regime change, and if so, whether a failed state could emerge that will contribute to instability, albeit in a completely different way than the type of instability emanating from the current regime.

The "Roar of Hari" and the earthquake with the assassination of Ali Khamenei and senior regime officials in Iran: internal, regional and global implications and the question of the future

By: Roy Kahanovitz, Researcher and expert on Iran, author of the book “Iran and the Persian Gulf”, Research Fellow at the Institute for Maritime Policy and Strategy, Fellowships Unit, Dean of Students, University of Haifa

The dramatic and historic events we have witnessed in the past two days, centered on the assassination of Iran’s leader, Ali Khamenei, and the top brass of the Revolutionary Guards, are not just a brilliant tactical event of immense intelligence and operational capability, but a veritable geopolitical earthquake, dismantling the foundations on which the Middle East has rested for the past four decades. The “decapitation” doctrine — a military and political strategy that aims to harm, to the point of destruction, the top echelon of a state or organization, with the assumption that this will lead to structural collapse and paralyze the ability to respond, thereby bringing a quick end to the conflict — which was deployed against the Iranian theocracy, may mark the end of an era and the beginning of a “live experiment” in managing strategic chaos on a global scale.

On the domestic level in Iran, Khamenei’s death reveals the fragility of the government structure. The Iranian regime, since its inception in 1979, has been designed as a centralized system in which the “wilayat al-faqih” (rule of the jurist) is the axis connecting the military, the economy, and religion. In the absence of an agreed successor, and combined with the elimination of the senior command echelon of the Revolutionary Guards, Iran has fallen into a state of “governmental inertia” — management by habit. While the mechanisms of repression are trying to demonstrate strength, the vacuum created at the top of the pyramid gives the Iranian public — and especially the younger, secular, and socially connected generation — a rare and historic window of opportunity to rise up against the regime. The most optimistic scenario predicts a rapid internal collapse and a transition to a technocratic government, but the risk of a bloody civil war remains higher than ever.

It is important to note that the Iranian constitution stipulates that upon the death of the leader, an interim leadership council will run the country until a new leader is elected by the “Assembly of Experts.” However, until such an election is made, the reality on the ground will likely be much more turbulent: the Revolutionary Guards, who hold the real power in Iran, could easily marginalize the clerics and place a “puppet” leader of their own at the top of the pyramid, or establish a military junta to protect their assets. It is no secret that the name of Mojtaba Khamenei, the son of Ali Khamenei, has often been mentioned as a potential successor, but without broad religious legitimacy, he could find himself surrounded by power struggles within the religious establishment in Qom.

Much has been said about the importance of Khamenei and the leadership of the Revolutionary Guards in maintaining the Islamic regime in Iran. However, yesterday (28.02.2026) Saleh Azadi, head of the intelligence department of the Emergency Command — a body that played a central role in the harsh suppression of protesters — was assassinated. This significant assassination may be an initial signal to the citizens of Iran that help has finally arrived and that they must prepare for a day of order — to take to the streets when the threat to their safety has been removed, at least partially.

The assassination of Iran’s top leadership — the second in eight months — has shocked the country again, even though this time they had prepared themselves in advance as part of learning the lessons of the Twelve-Day War. The Iranian economy, already shaky, could collapse even further. One scenario involves the flight of the ruling elites, who realize that the ship is sinking — which could lead to a deep crisis in the value of the local currency and a complete collapse of the rial. Another scenario could involve panicked citizens trying to withdraw their money at once, bringing the already weak financial system to a complete standstill.
In the regional arena, Khamenei’s elimination could collapse the “Ring of Fire” concept in an instant. For years, Tehran has built an array of “proxies” — proxies, such as Hezbollah, pro-Iranian militias in Iraq, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and more — designed to deter Israel and the United States.

But this network has proven to be completely dependent on central guidance and funding. Without the “brain” to operate it, all the proxies face an existential dilemma: whether to take a militant step in the service of an ideology whose leaders have been beheaded, or to retreat to the local national space to maintain their power and security. The collapse of the Shiite axis, which began with the assassination of Qassem Soleimani in January 2020, will not only weaken regional terrorism, but will also open the door — to the extent that the leaders of the countries are able to exploit it — for the growth of a formal Sunni-Israeli defense alliance, which will reshape energy and security agreements in the region.

The international implications are no less significant. For Putin’s Russia, Iran was a “strategic lung” and a vital arms supplier to the war effort in Ukraine. Tehran’s weakening directly harms Russian combat capability and isolates Moscow on the global stage. China, on the other hand, finds itself facing a potential energy crisis due to instability in the Gulf, but the strength of the American-Israeli blow may deter it from challenging Western hegemony in the coming years.

In conclusion, the world of the “day after” Khamenei is one in which the immunity of sovereign terrorist leaders has expired. While the immediate risks include widespread rocket escalation and disruptions in the global economy, the long-term potential is unprecedented: the removal of the Iranian nuclear threat from Israel and the entire region, the weakening of the global “axis of evil,” and the possibility of a governmental renaissance in Iran. The success of the move will be measured not by the strength of the explosion in Tehran, but by the ability of the international community to reach out to the Iranian people and build on the ruins of the theocracy a regional order based on prosperity and shared security. The Middle East will not return to what it was — or so we hope. And this also raises the question: Will the world’s decision-makers know how to shape the resulting chaos into a stable and sustainable peace?

More of the topic in Hayadan:

• What is behind the dramatic attack that sparked war, and how close did Iran really come to a nuclear bomb?
• The nuclear and us - questions and answers following the agreement with Iran
• Danger, fascism
• Iran prevents women from enrolling in dozens of courses at universities
• Iran's ballistic missile program and the relationship to the space program - a review following the barrage of missiles fired at Israel