The African Union Peace and Security Council discussed the connection between droughts, floods, displacement, competition for water and land, weak institutions, and the rise of armed groups in one of the world's most vulnerable regions.
The African Union Peace and Security Council is expected to hold a dedicated discussion on the impact of the climate crisis on the security situation in the Chad Basin and the Sahel region today, May 4, 2026. The discussion, which will be held as part of the Council’s 1344th session, reflects the growing understanding in Africa that the climate crisis is not just an environmental issue. It affects food security, population movement, livelihoods, farmer-herder relations, government stability, and the ability of states to deal with armed groups.
According to a review by Amani Africa, the climate crisis is acting as a “threat multiplier” in the region. It is not the only cause of conflict, but it exacerbates existing vulnerabilities. With communities dependent on agriculture, fishing and grazing, any change in rainfall patterns, droughts, floods or the availability of land and water can quickly turn into an economic and social crisis. When combined with weak state institutions, poverty, long-standing neglect and the activities of armed groups, climate stress can become a factor accelerating security deterioration.
Lake Chad: Not just drying out, but an ecosystem and society under pressure
The Lake Chad basin, which stretches between Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon, has become a symbol of a combined environmental and security crisis in recent decades. The lake's surface area has decreased from about 25 square kilometers in the early 60s to only about 1,300 square kilometers in the 80s, a decrease of almost 90%. Today, its area varies according to rainfall patterns and generally ranges between 8,000 and 14 square kilometers.
However, the review highlights that the story is more complex than a simple description of a “dried lake.” Communities around the lake have adapted for generations to cycles of flooding, receding waters, and seasonal changes. The problem is that the combination of sharper climate fluctuations, more frequent and intense floods, rapid population growth, and ongoing conflict is eroding traditional adaptive capacities. The war in Boko Haram’s areas has damaged agriculture, destroyed infrastructure, disrupted local knowledge, and deepened feelings of marginalization and neglect. In such conditions, armed groups can exploit loss of livelihoods, distrust in the state, and competition for resources to recruit supporters and present themselves as providers of order, protection, or income.
The Sahel is warming faster than the global average
The Sahel region is considered one of the most vulnerable regions in the world to the climate crisis. According to the review, temperatures there are rising at a rate 1.5 times faster than the global average, and projections indicate a warming of at least two degrees Celsius by 2040. The significance is particularly profound because between 60% and 80% of the region’s inhabitants depend on agriculture, grazing and fishing – sectors that are highly sensitive to rainfall, drought, water availability and soil conditions.
As water and grazing resources become unstable, competition between different groups increases. Local disputes between farmers and herders, which could once be resolved through traditional mechanisms, sometimes escalate into violent conflicts. Movement of people and animals in search of water, food and work has always been part of the coping mechanisms of Sahelian communities. But as borders become more dangerous, infrastructure collapses and host communities struggle to cope, that very mobility can become another source of friction.
The review also points to a dangerous feedback loop: insecurity harms agriculture, limits access to land, destroys infrastructure, and weakens the ability of communities to cope with environmental shocks. In response, the climate crisis deepens poverty, displacement, and government fragility – all of which fuel continued conflict. This creates a system in which environmental and security crises reinforce each other.
It is not enough to respond after the disaster.
One of the key conclusions for the African Union debate is the need to improve early warning systems. According to the review, many systems still respond to events after they have occurred, and do not sufficiently incorporate climate indicators such as rainfall fluctuations, drought cycles, pressure on water resources, and land-use changes. Such integration could help identify hotspots of risk earlier, before local conflict escalates into widespread violence.
The African Union has already formulated several policy frameworks on the subject in recent years, including the African Union Strategy for Climate Crisis and Resilient Development 2022–2032, an assessment of climate risks and security in Africa, and a common African position on climate, peace and security is being formulated. A regional strategy for stabilization, recovery and resilience in areas affected by Boko Haram is also operating in the Lake Chad Basin.
However, the gap between policy documents and implementation capacity on the ground remains large. Countries in the region face a lack of climate finance, technology gaps, weak infrastructure, and governance institutions that are not always able to provide basic services or resolve conflicts over resources. The Peace and Security Council is therefore expected to emphasize the need for strengthening state presence, rebuilding trust between governments and communities, improving service delivery, coordination among countries, and more equitable access to climate finance.
The discussion in Addis Ababa is expected to end with a concluding statement. According to estimates, the Council will express concern about the deterioration of the security situation in the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin, and especially in Mali, and will emphasize that a classic military response is not enough. To deal with the crisis, a broader approach is required, connecting climate, governance, security, livelihoods, population mobility and development. The main message is clear: in areas where the state is weak and life depends on water, land and pasture, the climate crisis does not remain in the background. It penetrates the security systems, society and the economy – and requires an integrated approach long before the next crisis erupts.
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