The committee appointed to investigate the circumstances of the "Columbia" crash, in which seven astronauts perished, including Col. Ilan Ramon, has published its final conclusions. The report confirms the theory of the foam hitting the insulation tile of the shuttle wing. A significant part of the report deals with the conduct of the space agency, and links it to the disaster
Has the "closer" culture spread in the NASA agency? At least that is what the final report of the investigative committee, appointed to investigate the circumstances of the crash of the shuttle "Columbia" on February 1 of this year, shows. Seven astronauts lost their lives in the disaster, including Major General Ilan Ramon (click here for an extensive project on the shuttle disaster).
In the afternoon (Tuesday) the committee published the final report, which is more than 200 pages long. About half of the report concerns the way the American space agency is run. The committee states that the space shuttle "Columbia" crashed due to foam hitting one of the insulation tiles of the shuttle's wing already during the take-off phase, but the real cause of the disaster lies in "a culture of poor organization" that pervaded the American space agency.
The members of the committee believe that the ground crew that accompanied the shuttle in flight made light of the malfunctions that were identified at the moment of launch. They also claim that there has only been a minor change for the better in the level of ferry safety since the Challenger disaster in 86, in which seven crew members perished. The committee warns that if there is no real improvement - it is only a matter of time until the next disaster. It is still unclear whether, following the report, there will be someone in NASA who will draw personal conclusions and resign.
The investigative committee examined thousands of components of the shuttle, which were scattered throughout many states in the United States on the day of the crash. The committee also interviewed hundreds of scientists who were involved in the space project in the present and in the past. The committee members dedicate the final report to the seven astronauts who perished in the disaster, including the first Israeli astronaut.
The shuttle's fate was decided upon takeoff
The report confirms the initial explanation, according to which the shuttle's fate was already decided upon takeoff: a piece of insulating foam from the external fuel tank hit the edge of the wing, where insulating tiles are assembled to protect the shuttle's body from the great heat of re-entry into the atmosphere. of them.
When the phase of returning to Earth began at the end of the mission in space, that area of the wing was exposed to the tremendous heat, making it difficult for the shuttle to stabilize at the appropriate angle to enter the atmosphere. The damage to the wing got worse as the heat increased, and the different angle caused the shuttle to lose control and break up.
Poor organizational culture
However, the report arouses interest mainly in the context of the performance of senior NASA officials in the face of the malfunction. Reports that have been published so far indicate that they knew about the malfunction but avoided finding out the true scope and checking the options available to them. NASA engineers photographed the malfunction during takeoff and knew about the damage to the wing. However, apparently, they did not correctly assess its scope and severity.
Furthermore, it is also known that while the shuttle was in space, there was a correspondence at NASA in which engineers warned of the damage and asked to photograph the shuttle with the help of satellites. However, senior NASA officials ignored these requests or did not act too quickly to implement them. Therefore, the assessment of the damage to the wing remains under the definition of "no risk to flight safety".
The committee's conclusions do not directly point an accusing finger at NASA managers. Instead, they criticize NASA's decision-making culture, which turned out to be sometimes not based on a deep understanding of the subject. Various sources have directed criticism at the fact that managers are sometimes appointed at NASA without having the appropriate knowledge and skills to serve in their position. Another criticism concerns the atmosphere and the organizational culture at NASA, which turned out to not encourage criticism, complaints or the expression of an opinion that is contrary to the opinion of the superiors.
"If no change is made, another disaster will happen"
It was stated in the report of the committee that investigated the Columbia disaster * "The safety control system is ineffective and outdated"
News agencies
The Columbia disaster was caused by a chain of mistakes stemming from the work culture at NASA - according to the investigative committee's report published this afternoon in Washington
The report strongly criticizes NASA's way of working. The agency has been described as money-seeking, reckless, and as relying on an ineffective and outdated safety control system.
The report also states: "If NASA does not make extensive changes, more disasters are expected." The report said that since the space shuttle Challenger disaster in 1986, safety controls had improved, but not sufficiently. The head of NASA, Sean O'Keefe already told his employees in June that they should prepare for a report that will be "pretty ugly", as he said.
The head of the investigative committee, Admiral Harold Gaiman, already stated a few days ago that no new dramatic information should be expected in the report.
The New York Times reported that an engineer who worked for Boeing discovered that a misused computer program caused the space agency to make some wrong decisions. It is this software called "Makhtesh" that determined that the damage caused to the space shuttle during takeoff is not serious.
The engineer, Alan Richardson, who worked for 28 years in the American space programs and participated in the Apollo missions, said that the software, called Richardson discovered that the software was designed to address problems caused by bumps from tiny pieces of foam. On the Columba flight the software had to deal with problems caused by a piece of foam a hundred times larger than normal.
A printed summary of the conclusions will be submitted to the President of the USA along with a digital version, on CD. These documents will also be handed over to Congress and the families of the seven astronauts, among them Israeli Lt. Col. Ilan Ramon, who perished in the shuttle explosion.
It is known that he will criticize the way missions are managed in the American space agency - which was nicknamed the "NASA culture" and contributed to the terrible tragedy.