Tonight: the final report on Colombia

The commission of inquiry into the Columbia disaster will publish its final report this evening, Tuesday

 The report of the commission of inquiry into the Columbia ferry crash will be published this afternoon in Washington. The report points to serious deficiencies in NASA and many deficiencies whose correction would have prevented a disaster. As expected, the report will state that a piece of insulating foam that broke off from the fuel tank and hit the left wing at high speed caused the crash. The report also claims that the management culture at NASA is flawed; The agency ignored engineers who said that there was concern that the damage caused to the wing was significant, claiming that the concern was unfounded.
Haaretz's Natan Gutman adds that he is not expected to renew the question of the cause of the malfunction in the shuttle, but will also address the question of the personal responsibility of the heads of NASA.

Washington. The External Investigation Committee's report that will be officially published today in Washington is not expected to bring much new information on the question of what caused the Columbia space shuttle to crash, but it does arouse interest in the question of the personal and general responsibility of the heads of NASA and the organization as a whole for the disaster.

There is no longer any dispute about the causes of the crash - during the launch of the shuttle, on January 16, a piece of insulating foam broke off from the fuel tank and hit the left wing at enormous speed. Calculations show that the speed and rotation of the piece of insulation caused it to hit the wing with a force equal to one ton, creating a hole in the wing in the area that should protect the shuttle from heat when re-entering the atmosphere. When the shuttle returned to Earth on February 1, hot gas seeped through the hole, causing the wing to break and the shuttle to disintegrate.

These are the known facts. But the questions that the investigative committee was asked to deal with also concerned examining the possibility of preventing the malfunction in advance, or discovering it in time and trying to save the ferry. A day after the launch, NASA personnel discovered, from analyzing the video footage of the launch, that the piece of insulation foam had come off. They began a series of calculations and experiments, with the aim of examining what the impact could mean. Their conclusion was unequivocal - there is no fear of damage to the integrity of the ferry's body, and there is no need to carry out additional actions in this regard.

But there were other voices in NASA that expressed concern: engineers warned that the calculations were wrong, and that there was concern that the damage caused to the wing was significant.
They suggested ordering external photographs from American spy satellites, which could show the shuttle's hull from the outside, and suggested treating the matter seriously. Shuttle program managers ignored the warnings and determined they were unfounded. They also refused to order the external satellite images.

Looking back, NASA believes that the root of the problem is an error in the model responsible for performing the impact calculations of the piece of foam. However, the investigative committee believes that the responsibility is not limited to one miscalculation: according to reports in the US media, the committee will determine that the managerial and organizational culture at the American space agency was problematic - warnings and comments from engineers and mid-level professionals were not handled properly, and the agency did not create an atmosphere in which an employee would be comfortable to complain or express an opinion that goes against the majority position.

One of the members of the committee stated that during his six months of work in the investigation of the disaster, he learned that at NASA a situation has arisen in which the managers are not professionals in their field, and they often make decisions on technical issues without consulting the professional level. The committee believes that instead of openly examining the question of the consequences of the damage to the insulation foam, the managers directed the professional level to prove that everything is fine.

On the question of personal responsibility, it is not clear what the committee's recommendations will be. Shuttle program manager Ron Ditmore has already stepped down. The head of the space agency, Sean O'Keefe, does not appear to be about to retire voluntarily, and it is doubtful that the committee will recommend it. It is possible that the allegations directed at the director of the Columbia mission, Linda Hamm, will cause her to draw personal conclusions.

A chain of mistakes caused the Columbia disaster

The investigative committee's report to be published today in the US: the shuttle's fate was decided 81 seconds after takeoff * Among those responsible: the computer software, and the engineers

Alex Doron, Ma'ariv, says that the report of the commission of inquiry into the space shuttle "Columbia" disaster, which will be published today in the United States, points to a series of serious flaws in NASA and a chain of mistakes that could have been corrected to prevent the disaster. A printed summary of the conclusions will be submitted to the President of the USA along with a digital version, on CD. These documents will also be handed over to Congress and the families of the seven astronauts, including the late Israeli Lt. Col. Ilan Ramon, who perished in the shuttle explosion.

The head of the investigative committee, retired admiral Harold Gaiman, already stated a few days ago that one should not expect new dramatic information in the report. However, it is known that he will criticize the way missions are managed in the American space agency - which was nicknamed "NASA culture", and contributed to the terrible tragedy.

Yesterday, the New York Times reported that a retired Boeing engineer discovered that a computer program, which was used incorrectly, caused the space agency to make several wrong decisions, including the one that determined that the damage caused to the space shuttle during takeoff was not serious.
The engineer, Alan Richardson, who worked for 28 years in the space programs, including in the Apollo operations, said that the software, called "Makhtesh", was not intended at all for predicting damage in space missions.

Richardson discovered that the software was supposed to handle problems caused by impacts from tiny pieces of foam, and was not intended to provide a prediction of damage from a piece of foam XNUMX times larger than normal, as happened on the Columbia flight. But the engineers at Bui Ng who ran the software made a wrong estimate from the data they received and came to the conclusion that there was no danger to the shuttle and that it would survive the flight despite everything. The mission managers rushed to receive this report, a week before the planned landing date, and continued with their routine work. And this instead of demanding additional analysis, based on satellite photographs and video cameras that followed the takeoff and recorded the impact on the wing, without giving it enough weight.
The report on Columbia: the management culture at NASA is flawed

 The External Investigation Committee's report that will be officially published today in Washington is not expected to bring much new information on the question of what caused the Columbia space shuttle to crash, but it does arouse interest in the question of the personal and general responsibility of the heads of NASA and the organization as a whole for the disaster.
There is no longer any dispute about the causes of the crash - during the launch of the shuttle, on January 16, a piece of insulating foam broke off from the fuel tank and hit the left wing at enormous speed. Calculations show that the speed and rotation of the piece of insulation caused it to hit the wing with a force equal to one ton, creating a hole in the wing in the area that should protect the shuttle from heat when re-entering the atmosphere. When the shuttle returned to Earth on February 1, hot gas seeped through the hole, causing the wing to break and the shuttle to disintegrate.

These are the known facts. But the questions that the investigative committee was asked to deal with also concerned examining the possibility of preventing the malfunction in advance, or discovering it in time and trying to save the ferry. A day after the launch, NASA personnel discovered, from analyzing the video footage of the launch, that the piece of insulation foam had come off. They began a series of calculations and experiments, with the aim of examining what the impact could mean. Their conclusion was unequivocal - there is no fear of damage to the integrity of the ferry's body, and there is no need to carry out additional actions in this regard.

But there were other voices in NASA that expressed concern: engineers warned that the calculations were wrong, and that there was concern that the damage caused to the wing was significant. They suggested ordering external photographs from American spy satellites, which could show the shuttle's hull from the outside, and suggested treating the matter seriously. Shuttle program managers ignored the warnings and determined they were unfounded. They also refused to order the external satellite images.

Looking back, NASA believes that the root of the problem is an error in the model responsible for performing the impact calculations of the piece of foam. However, the investigative committee believes that the responsibility is not limited to one miscalculation: according to reports in the US media, the committee will determine that the managerial and organizational culture at the American space agency was problematic - warnings and comments from engineers and mid-level professionals were not handled properly, and the agency did not create an atmosphere in which an employee would be comfortable to complain or express an opinion that goes against the majority position.

One of the members of the committee stated that during his six months of work in the investigation of the disaster, he learned that at NASA a situation has arisen in which the managers are not professionals in their field, and they often make decisions on technical issues without consulting the professional level. The committee believes that instead of openly examining the question of the consequences of the damage to the insulation foam, the managers directed the professional level to prove that everything is fine.
On the question of personal responsibility, it is not clear what the committee's recommendations will be. Shuttle program manager Ron Ditmore has already stepped down. The head of the space agency, Sean O'Keefe, does not appear to be about to retire voluntarily, and it is doubtful that the committee will recommend it. It is possible that the allegations directed at the director of the Columbia mission, Linda Hamm, will cause her to draw personal conclusions.

Tomorrow the report of the commission of inquiry regarding the Columbia disaster

25.6.2003

The commission of inquiry appointed to look into the Columbia disaster will publish its conclusions tomorrow, Tuesday (26.8.03) at a press conference to be held in Washington. The report summarizes the work of the committee that was appointed immediately after the crash of the space shuttle Columbia that occurred on February 1, 2003. The committee is chaired by retired Admiral Harold (Hal) Gehman.

Exactly one hour before the press conference, at 10:00 am (Washington time), the report will be published on the committee's website. At 11:00, when the press conference begins, it will be broadcast live on the committee's website. With the publication of the committee's conclusions, we will, of course, present their main points on this website.