The collapse of the Aztec Empire shows why rule by force and force does not last

Accumulating hostility, lack of alliances, and Cortes' exploitation of rivals turned a powerful empire into a vulnerable one; the article offers a cautionary lesson for a foreign policy based on coercion and fear

The collapse of the Aztec Empire in the 16th century cannot be explained solely by differences in technology or military power. According to the article, the root of the failure was political: a rule built on Coercion and fear Over time, it accumulates too many adversaries who wait for a moment of weakness. The moment the empire needs aid and alliances, it finds that its political capital has eroded – and sometimes it is too late to repair. This is according to research published by Jay Silverstein of the Department of Chemistry and Forensic Science at Nottingham Trent University, in an article he published in The Conversation.

The author begins with an episode from 1520: Aztec envoys arrived at Tzintzuntzen, the capital of the Tarascan kingdom in what is now the state of Michoacan. They bore a warning from Emperor Cuauhtémoc: “strange” foreigners – the Spanish – were invading and endangering the region. The envoys sought to meet with the Tarascan ruler, the Cazonci, King Zuanga, but he had died shortly before, apparently from smallpox brought by the Spanish. Relations between the two powers had been tense for years: since 1476, there had been clashes on the western border, major battles, and the construction of fortifications. The Tarascans saw the Aztecs as a dangerous and deceitful adversary who threatened their very existence. Therefore, when the envoys arrived to request an “audience” with a king who was no longer alive, they were sacrificed – and, according to the story, “were privileged” to meet him in the afterlife. For the author, this is a turning point that illustrates how accumulated bitterness turns into active hostility.

To explain the mechanism, the article draws on a philosophical-political distinction between “power” and “power.” Inspired by Carl von Clausewitz and other thinkers, it is argued that “power” is ideological and political capital: a combination of economic strength, alliances, and moral and image influence in the international arena. “Power,” in contrast, is the direct exercise of military might to impose a political will on others. Power can be maintained over time through prosperity, alliances, and legitimacy; power, on the other hand, “burns” with use, drains resources, and can erode both internal cohesion and external influence, especially when it is perceived as arrogant or imperialistic.

The author mentions that the Aztec Empire was founded in 1428 as a triple alliance between three city-states: Tenochtitlan, Texcoco, and Tlacopan. In practice, Tenochtitlan became dominant. The system of rule combined seasonal military campaigns with a system of ceremonial displays of power, intimidation, tax collection/gestures, and the perception of ethnic superiority. In other words, it was a rule based on coercion, and coercive rule over time produces conquered populations and enemies who seek an opportunity to turn the tables.

This is where Hernán Cortés came into the picture. According to the article, he exploited the hostility toward the Aztecs to build a coalition: he made an alliance with Tlaxcala and other groups that had previously been subject to the Aztecs, and reinforced his limited Spanish force with thousands of native warriors. This combined force besieged Tenochtitlan. Faced with the siege, the Aztecs had only one political option: to convince the Tarascans—the other major power in central Mexico—to join them. But their first attempt ended in the sacrifice of the messengers, so they tried again.

In 1521, Aztec envoys arrived in Tzintzuntzen once more and met with the new ruler, Tangáxuan II. They brought with them “evidence” of the Spanish threat: captured steel weapons, a crossbow, and armor, to illustrate what they were up against. The Tarascan ruler listened and sent a reconnaissance mission to the border to find out if this was true or an Aztec deception. On their way, they encountered a group of Chichimecs, described as semi-nomadic warriors who sometimes served as a border patrol. When told that the mission was on its way to Tenochtitlan to check on the situation, they replied that the mission was late: it was already “the city of death,” and they themselves were on their way to offer their services to the Tarascans. According to the article, the following year the Tarascans surrendered to the Spanish as a tributary kingdom; And later, in 1530, the ruler was burned to death by the Spanish who were looking for where he had hidden gold.

The article offers a counter-thought: If “normal” diplomatic relations had been maintained between the Tarascans and the Aztecs, the Tarascans might have taken the warning of the first messengers more seriously. The author paints a scenario in which, during the siege of Tenochtitlan, tens of thousands of Tarascan warriors—skilled archers—would have descended from the mountains in the west and tipped the balance of power. Under such conditions, it is argued, it is not clear that Cortes’s force would have been able to prevail.

The historical conclusion is sharply formulated: The Aztec failure did not stem from a lack of courage or military ability. On the contrary, in the struggle against the Spaniards the Aztecs demonstrated adaptability, learning to deal with horses and cannon-carrying vessels. The failure was strategic-political: an empire that relies on coercion and fear is left without friends the moment it is vulnerable.

From here the article moves to a contemporary analogy and recommends that the United States learn from the lesson. According to the author, American foreign policy since 2025, with the entry of Donald Trump into his second term, has adopted patterns of exercising coercive power for the sake of achievements, prestige, and emphasizing American “exceptionalism.” This is expressed, according to the text, in threats or limited use of force such as tariffs or military strikes in Iran, Syria, Nigeria, and Venezuela. At the same time, it is argued that other countries are reexamining the effectiveness of this pressure, and some of them – including Colombia, Panama, Mexico, and Canada – are in no hurry to respond to the threats.

The article adds that the more extreme the American demands – for example, the demand for Greenland – the more the threats are perceived as toothless, while NATO countries, according to the text, strengthen their commitment to long-standing agreements and declare that they will not give in to pressure. Within such a trajectory, it is argued, the United States could be pushed from exercising “coercive power” to exercising actual “coercive power.” If the trend continues, the author warns of a downward spiral of military conflicts, regional hostility, vulnerability to other armies, economic disruptions, and environmental disasters – to the point where the world’s most powerful power will be left exposed and without allies.

for the scientific article

More of the topic in Hayadan:

• The Aztecs - from the spear of the sun to broken spears
• There is no longer any dispute: the Aztecs and the Maya sacrificed human beings - and brutally
• The disease that brought down at least three empires
• Israeli researchers have helped to date figurines from an ancient and unknown culture in Central America
• 2,600 years ago the Maya were already churning chocolate