Andrew Thomas from Australia argues that Ali Khamenei's 36 years of rule have given him almost unlimited power, but have left behind a weakened regime, a divided Iranian society and a deep erosion of the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic.
There will be much more talk about the war between the US and Israel and Iran (which in Israel has earned the nickname "The Roar of the Harrier"). The first blow of the war was the assassination of many senior figures in the Iranian regime in two large-scale meetings in an area near the residence of Iranian leader Ali Khamenei, which also suffered dozens of heavy bombs.
In a commentary article published by Andrew Thomas On THE CONVERSATION, he writes that Khamenei “will not be remembered by most Iranians as a strong leader” and that “he will not be admired.” Thomas adds that the main legacy he will leave behind is “the profound weakness his regime brought to the Islamic Republic on all fronts.” This assessment is especially striking now that Reuters and the AP have reported that Khamenei’s death was confirmed by Iranian state media following the US-Israeli strikes, and that within Iran itself there has been a mixed reaction of grief, relief, fear, and uncertainty.
Thomas presents Khamenei as a leader who emerged from deep within the Islamic Revolution, rather than as a ruler who was imposed on it from the outside. According to him, from a young age he embraced ideas of revolutionary Islam, was influenced by Khomeini after meeting him in 1958, and had been active against the Shah's rule since the 60s. After the 1979 revolution, he quickly integrated himself into the new centers of power, helped organize the Revolutionary Guards, and was later elected president. According to Thomas, the combination of ideological loyalty to Khomeiniism and close ties to the Revolutionary Guards was one of the keys to his rise.
One of the main points of Thomas' analysis is that Khamenei was a relatively surprising choice to succeed Khomeini, but after taking office in 1989 he actually gained more institutional power than his predecessor. Thomas notes that his appointment itself drew criticism, because he was not then considered to have the high religious status required by the constitution, and so a referendum was held that changed the clause and allowed the election of a supreme leader based on "Islamic scholarship." He says that once the change was approved, Khamenei was given exceptionally broad powers: to set general policy, appoint and dismiss members of the Guardian Council, and suppress dissent with relative ease.
From here, according to Thomas, began the systematic construction of a long-term government that relies less on revolutionary charisma and more on control of institutions. He mentions that Khamenei worked with various presidents when it suited him, but repeatedly blocked attempts at reform, especially with Mohammad Khatami and Hassan Rouhani. He was also behind the suppression of the major protest after the 2009 elections, and later, he says, ordered the suppression of the wave of protests of late 2025 and early 2026 "by any means necessary." In his article, Thomas writes that Khamenei "gained unprecedented power in domestic politics," but used it mainly to ensure his own survival and the survival of the regime.
Thomas also attributes heavy responsibility for Iran's regional and international direction to Khamenei. According to him, he was one of the main architects of Tehran's proxies strategy, supported a strong anti-Western line, and used opposition to the United States and Israel as a fundamental element of the regime's legitimacy. But later, he argues, this line began to look increasingly hollow. Especially after Trump returned to the White House in 2025, and after the 12-day war with Israel, Thomas believes that the regime's legitimacy was further eroded. In his words, the Iran of the end of Khamenei's era was "weaker," and even within the country itself, slogans were heard in protest chants that explicitly called for his death.
The most interesting thing about Thomas's report is perhaps the direct comparison to Khomeini. When Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini died in 1989, millions accompanied him, and the public mourning was immense. Thomas claims that with Khamenei, the story would be completely different: he ruled longer, but never enjoyed the same aura. The latest reports from AP and Reuters also support this picture: alongside state-organized mourning rallies, there were also sporadic celebrations, sirens of joy, and cries from homes, but all of this was mixed with deep fear of continued bombings, a heavy presence of the Basij, and the fear of chaos. Thus, the moment of Khamenei's death also illustrates what Thomas is trying to say: not a consensus of admiration, but a divided society, exhausted and unsure about the future.
The bottom line is that Thomas does not claim that Khamenei was a weak ruler in the institutional sense. On the contrary, he describes him as one of the most powerful men modern Iran has known. But precisely because he was so powerful, he bears direct responsibility for the end result: a regime based more on coercion than trust, an economy in crisis, Russian foreign relations, and a public whose parts do not react to his death with mourning but with relief, caution, and fear. Therefore, according to Thomas, Khamenei will not be remembered primarily as a man who lasted 36 years, but as a man under whose rule the Islamic Republic lost much of its security and legitimacy.
More of the topic in Hayadan:
