| For the first time in the country's history, the population growth rate has fallen below one percent (0.9%). Fertility rates are declining in all sectors. Despite the increase in life expectancy, a jump of approximately 77% in the annual number of deaths is expected by 2040. The migration balance is negative: 2025 is the second consecutive year with negative net migration. Alongside the increase in outbound migration of foreign-born Israelis, there was an increase in outbound migration of native-born Israelis. |
Since the establishment of the state, the population growth rate in Israel has fallen below 1.5% only twice: to 1.42% in 1981 and to 1.35% in 1983. Israel's growth rate in 2025 is about to break this record: according to our estimates, it will be about 0.9%. Prof. Alex Weinreb, Head of Demography and Director of Research at the Taub Center, examines the three components of demographic change in Israel: mortality, fertility, and migration, as part of the demography chapter of the State of the Nation Report 2025. This examination is carried out while focusing on developments in fertility and birth rates among various population groups, mortality trends and their future implications, as well as migration patterns to and from Israel. Life expectancy in Israel is high, but a surge in the number of deaths is expected Israelis' life expectancy in 2023 was 83.7 years. Of all OECD countries, only Switzerland, Japan and Spain achieved a higher result. Life expectancy in Israel was 5.3 years higher than in the United States and 2.7 years higher than in the United Kingdom. An examination by population group shows that all groups except Arab men, who are affected by a high rate of homicides, have returned to the upward trend that characterized them until the coronavirus. Although life expectancy has increased in recent years and is expected to continue to increase, even if not at the same rate that characterized the second half of the twentieth century, the absolute number of deaths is on the rise - from about 46,000 in 2018 to about 51,000 in 2024. This trend was mainly influenced by the age structure in Israel: large age groups of Jews and Arabs began to enter their 70s and 80s - ages when mortality rates rise sharply. The annual number of deaths is expected to increase by approximately 77% by 2040 (an increase of 71% in the Jewish population and 111% in the Arab population). The stability in the number of births creates the illusion of stagnation, but in fact fertility is declining. Over the past decade, the annual number of births in Israel has remained stable. The data show that the overall stability in the absolute number of births since 2016 has occurred despite significant declines in fertility rates in almost all population groups. Jewish women are the only group whose fertility rates are relatively stable and even higher today than in 2005, although they have declined significantly since 2018. The fertility rate of Jewish women is about twice as high as that of Druze or Christian women, and about 0.4 children higher than that of Muslim women. The declines in fertility rates are expected to reduce the natural increase (the difference between the number of births and deaths) of each group, especially the Arab population. It is expected that in the coming decade there will be a significant slowdown in the growth of the number of Arab women of reproductive age. If fertility rates continue to decline, there will be a decline in the absolute number of births in this population. Based on fertility patterns of Jewish women in their 20s, the final fertility rate for secular and traditional non-religious women is expected to approach 1.7 children per woman by the end of the 2030s – slightly higher than in Northern European and North American countries today. Among religious women, including traditional religious women, the fertility rate is expected to decline to about 2.3 children per woman, and among Haredi women the rate is expected to decline to 4.3 children per woman. Parallel trends will also be felt in Arab society, where the fertility rate is expected to decline to 2.7 among religious women and 2.0 among non-religious women. Historic slowdown in population growth: the end of the era of rapid natural reproduction Between 2016 and 2025, Israel's annual natural increase rate fell from 1.6% to 1.3%. A particularly sharp decline was observed in the Arab population, where the rate fell from 2.1% to 1.6%. The main reason for this is stability in the number of births alongside a 43% increase in the number of deaths, following a rapid increase in the number of elderly people in Arab society. In the group of Jews and others (those not defined in the population registry as Jews, Muslims, or Christian Arabs), the natural increase rate fell from 1.5% to 1.2%. These rates are expected to continue to decline, until in 2040, Israel's overall natural increase will stand at about 1%. This is a fundamental change in the source of Israel's demographic growth. In the two decades preceding the COVID-1.9 pandemic, at least 80% of Israel's annual demographic growth resulted from natural increase and the rest from net migration, but in recent years this ratio has changed. Due to the ongoing decline in fertility and the expected increase in the number of deaths, immigration will play a more significant role in any demographic change, both growth and decline. For the foreseeable future, the number of births will continue to exceed the number of deaths. However, Israel is no longer expected to experience annual growth rates of 1.9%–2.0% as a matter of course. Moreover, the country will need a positive immigration balance to maintain demographic growth exceeding 1.3% in 2025, growth of more than 1.2% by 2030, and growth of more than 1% by 2040. Nevertheless, these figures still reflect high demographic growth compared to other high-income countries. |
| Annual natural increase in Israel in 2016–2023 and projections for 2024–2040 by population group (in percent) |
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| Negative migration balance – In 2024, there was a sharp turn in migration patterns in Israel In 2024, for only the fourth time this century, net migration – the number of immigrants entering less the number of immigrants leaving – turned negative; the number of immigrants leaving Israel was 26,000 higher than the number of immigrants entering, including new immigrants. In 2025, this trend will continue and the gap is expected to be about 37,000 people. Given the CBS's immigration calculation formula, a negative immigration balance is expected in 2026 as well. This drop towards negative numbers is a significant change in immigration patterns in Israel. It has no precedent in the country's history.. The current wave of out-migration reflects primarily remigration of non-Israeli Israelis, with about a third of this group being immigrants who are not Jewish according to halakhah (“others”). This immigrant group grew disproportionately between 2015 and 2019. The rate of emigration from Israel among this group is 8.1 times that of Jewish Israelis (Israeli-born and foreign-born). Although the rate of emigration abroad of Israelis born in the country is lower, a steady upward trend can still be seen in the last three years. It is important to note that despite the surge in the number of emigrants leaving in recent years, emigration rates from Israel remain low by international comparison. The crude rate of emigration out of Israel in 2024 was 83 per 10,000 residents, an unusually high value for Israel, but only slightly above the median of the European Union. In 2025, the crude rate of emigration out of Israel is expected to be 78 per 10,000 residents, thus falling below the median. The 2025 data also indicates declines in the number of Israelis returning to Israel and in immigration rates to Israel. Based on data from the first nine months of the year, the number of immigrants to Israel in 2025 is expected to be the lowest since 2013 (apart from 2020, the year of the Corona pandemic). |
| Israel's real net migration |
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| A negative net migration rate over time is expected to reduce the growth rates of Israel's population. The overall picture, of a decline in the natural growth rate alongside negative net migration (a negative balance between the number of outgoing and incoming migrants) shows a net loss of approximately 37,000 people in 2025. As a result, the overall growth rate of Israel's population in 2025 will fall to 0.9%. This is less than half the average annual growth rate in the decade preceding the Corona period. This is a significant change in Israel's demographic map. The migration goals of native-born Israelis who emigrate from Israel are diverse. Fewer and fewer Israelis are migrating to traditional destinations such as the US, Australia and the UK, and more are choosing Germany, Cyprus and countries in East Asia as their immigration destinations. This suggests changes in the immigration motives of Israelis, primarily a search for a change in lifestyle, rather than purely economic considerations. The diversification of immigration destinations also indicates a change in Israel's role in global Jewish communities, which may signal its transformation into a kind of metropolis that nourishes and helps preserve small Jewish communities outside of Israel. Prof. Alex Weinrev, Research Director and Head of Demography at the Taub Center, says: "We are at the dawn of a new era in Israel's demographic development. The peak period of natural increase has passed, along with a less stable and even negative immigration balance - two factors that constitute a clear break with past patterns. In light of this, it is clear that immigration policy is becoming increasingly central to strengthening Israel's demographic growth for the coming decades. However, policy can only be determined when we know more about the relative characteristics of Israelis leaving Israel and those entering it. Without such information, policy will be based on only a partial picture." Prof. Avi Weiss, President of the Taub Center and editor of the report: "The State of the Country Report provides a comprehensive and up-to-date overview of the social and economic systems in Israel. The socio-economic challenges facing the State of Israel at the end of 2025, after two years of war, are great, and the report puts the spotlight on the most important issues that require a response." |
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