Dr. Shaul Yanai of the University of Haifa explains how Iran's attempt to exert pressure on the US and Israel by attacking Gulf states, energy facilities, and shipping lanes could destabilize the region and the global economy.
מTo: Dr. Shaul Yanai, Doctor of History of the Middle East, University of Haifa
The Arab Gulf states are radically different from Iran. First, they are tribal dynastic monarchies, some of which have ruled continuously since the 18th century. Second, they are predominantly Sunni, while Iran is Shiite. Finally, they all have excellent relations with the United States, which Iran has defined as the Great Satan. Since the 1979 revolution, Iran has been trying to become the hegemonic power in the Gulf. To counter this ambition, the Gulf states established the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981, whose main goal is cooperation against external subversion.
During the period of tension that preceded the American-Israeli attack, Iran warned that it would not limit its response to Israeli and American targets but would punish all countries where American bases are located, even if they do not directly launch attacks. This definition includes all the Arab Gulf states. This warning has come true in recent days.
An examination of missile launch data from Iran since the beginning of the current round shows that while about 200 missiles and drones were launched against Israel up to March 4, 2026, about 1,600 were launched against the Gulf states. Some of them were launched against American military targets, but also against civilian targets and energy facilities throughout the Gulf. In other words, the Gulf states have absorbed most of the Iranian wrath.
The question of why Iran did not limit itself to American goals is of concern to many in the Middle East. Iranian doctrine states that the survival of the Islamic Revolution regime is the ultimate goal. Given the intensity of the attack and the significant damage to the political and military leadership and vital interests, the regime feels a clear and immediate danger to its existence. There is concern that the attack will be exploited by civil protest in order to relaunch the mass demonstrations, which were suppressed just over a month ago at the cost of the murder of thousands of Iranians.
The Iranian government fears disintegration
Another concern is that separatist groups within Iran: the Kurds, the Ahwazis, and the Baluchis, will seize the opportunity to establish independent autonomies. An understanding has emerged in Tehran that the Americans, and perhaps the Saudis, are arming the separatists with the aim of overthrowing the regime. The damage to Iranian oil exports, which constitute over 80% of the country's foreign exchange earnings, is seen as an attempt to paralyze the long-struggling economy and force Iran to accept the US's conditions.
The above reasons and others forced Iran to adopt a desperate policy and attack the Arab Gulf states, apparently in the belief that they would exert significant pressure on Trump to end the war before he could achieve his main goal of regime change.
The focus on attacking oil and gas production and refining sites, along with the threat of closing the Strait of Hormuz (through which about a fifth of the world's energy consumption passes), is intended to create a global economic crisis. The price of oil has already jumped by more than 20% and may soon reach $100 per barrel. This means that the global economy could enter a recession and inflationary spiral. Iran believes that many other countries will demand that the US shorten the campaign in order to minimize the damage to their economies.
This reality creates a dispute among the Arab Gulf states regarding the desired nature of the response to Iranian aggression. There are countries such as Kuwait and Oman that oppose joining the war alongside the US and Israel. Their main fear is of an Iranian and perhaps also Shiite counter-reaction that would jeopardize their stability.
The United Arab Emirates, which has so far borne the brunt of the Iranian attack, is faced with a fundamental dilemma: containment or attack. So far, containment has not yielded results and may have only encouraged Iran to continue the attack. If the Emirates decide to join the attack, Iran will also have to deal with the UAE's armed forces, which are considered among the most skilled forces in the Middle East and have been nicknamed "Little Sparta" by American officials due to their operational efficiency. If the decision is made to join the campaign against it, it will make a significant contribution to weakening or even to the fall of the Iranian regime.
The most significant Gulf state is Saudi Arabia. There is an age-old theological, political, and economic animosity between it and Iran. Over the past decade and a half, these two theocracies have struggled for hegemony in the Middle East. They have been directly or indirectly involved in almost all the theaters of war, such as Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Gaza. The main strategic goal was the desire to establish their status as the greatest regional powers. Saudi Arabia is interested in regime change in Iran and perhaps even breaking it up into its various ethnic components. Since the beginning of the campaign against Iran, the Saudi kingdom has been trying, so far without success, to unite all the Arab Gulf states for joint action against Iran. If it actively joins, it will be the first time that the two theocracies will find themselves in direct military conflict.
The Gulf states are in a significant dilemma whether to join the campaign and try to overthrow the regime that has threatened them for almost five decades, or to continue to absorb the Iranian missile barrages, hoping that the others will do the work for them. In any case, it seems that regardless of the outcome of the war, these countries have directly experienced the realization of Iranian threats and will have to prepare accordingly.
More of the topic in Hayadan:
